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Focusing on Tibet, this thesis argues that ethnic tensions in general, and ethnic 
conflicts taking place in China in particular, are caused by the ways in which 
national/ethnic identity are constructed and protected. Through the lens of identity 
politics, a theory of security dilemma is applied to explain the strained Sino-Tibetan 
relationship over the past decades and the historical context of Chinese 
nation-building is highlighted. This thesis distinguishes two categories of security 
dilemmas: ‘Low-uncertainty societal dilemma’, where an illusory incompatibility 
exists within mutual perceptions, referring to a scenario of conflict mitigation; and 
‘high-uncertainty societal dilemma’, where one’s own security requires the other’s 
insecurity, leading to a scenario of conflict outbreak. This thesis discusses two 
individual variables — state-led modernisation and international intervention — and 
conceptualises their impacts on security scenarios. Since Tibet was annexed by the 
People’s Republic of China, it is argued that a sense of uncertainty repeatedly 
emerged and caused tension and violence as Beijing and ethnic Tibetans adopted 
multiple approaches to implement identity-reinforcing means, whereby Beijing 
practiced its nation-building project and the Tibetans acted and reacted with resistance. 
The ensuing conflicts were the outcome of contextual Sino-Tibetan interactions 
caused by a pervasive sense of uncertainty, in which both the Chinese authorities and 
Tibetans perceived behaviours from the opposite side as threats, and thereby 
employed securitisation, resulting in a greater insecurity for all. Mitigation and ways 
to escape the security dilemma are arguably workable though this would rely on 
sincere dialogue and trust-building as well as the creation of positive domestic and 
international conditions.  
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With a focus on Tibet, this thesis argues that ethnic tensions and conflicts taking place 
in China are caused by the ways in which national/ethnic identity are constructed and 
protected. Through this lens of identity politics, a theory of security dilemma is 
applied to explain the strained Sino-Tibetan relationship over the past decades and a 
historical context of Chinese nation-building is highlighted. This thesis categorises 
two types of security dilemma. ‘Low-uncertainty societal dilemma’, where an illusory 
incompatibility exists within mutual perceptions, refers to a scenario of conflict 
mitigation; and ‘high-uncertainty societal dilemma’, where one’s own security 
requires the other’s insecurity, refers to a scenario of conflict outbreak. This thesis also 
discusses two variables: state-led modernisation and international intervention, and 
conceptualises their impacts on these scenarios. This thesis argues that while Beijing 
and Tibetans repeatedly adopted multiple approaches to implement identity and 
broader security-protection, in which Beijing practiced its nation-building project and 
Tibetans acted and reacted to protect their society, insecurities remained. It contends 
that the ensuing conflicts were the outcome of contextual Sino-Tibetan interactions 
overshadowed by a pervasive sense of uncertainty, in which both the Chinese 
authorities and Tibetans perceived behaviours from the other side as threats, and 
thereby employed securitisation, with the consequence of a greater insecurity for all. 
 
Research Puzzle and Main Argument 
 
Since 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclaims itself as a united 
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multi-ethnic state, featuring the pluralistic integration of the Chinese nation.1 On 
international occasions, the ruling authority is also keen to highlight its internal 
constitution, which includes diverse cultures.2 While the 55 non-Han state-recognised 
ethnic minorities only account for 8.35 percent of China’s total population,3 China is 
attempting to dilute its Han-centric national image. 
 
For Beijing, this behaviour is justified by a deliberate managing of minority groups in 
geo-political terms. As has been pointed out, these 8.35 percent minorities reside in 
64.3 percent of the country’s total land area, mostly in the territorial periphery of 
China, which are bordered by 14 countries. This implies that governance of 
ethnopolitics would not only directly relate to the state’s national and international 
stability, considering some minorities’ transnational characteristics, but would also 
impact the PRC’s relations with its neighbours.  
 
Compared to ethnic conflicts cases in other former socialist states e.g., the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and certain African states, inter-ethnic relations in China are 
comparatively moderate. This does not mean, however, that China is free from ethnic 
tensions and conflicts. On the contrary, ethnicity is posited as a source of a potential 
and powerful threat to the state’s sovereignty, political unity, and territorial integrity, 
especially in the post-Cold War era. Managing and preventing social grievances in the 
minority areas, as well as constructing a cohesive Chinese national identity for these 
                                                     
1 Fei Xaiotong, “Zhonghua Minzu De Duoyuan Yiti Geju,” Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and 
Social Sciences) 4 (1989): 1-19. 
2 Annie-Marie Brady, ““We Are All Part of the Same Family:” China's Ethnic Propaganda,” Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 41, no. 4 (2012):159-181; Elena Barabantseva, “Who are “Overseas Chinese 
Ethnic Minorities”? China’s Search for Transnational Ethnic Unity,” Modern China 38, no.1 (2012): 
78-109.   
3 Zhongguo Minzu Tongji Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 2013, Zhongguo Minzu Tongji Nianjian 2013 
(China Statistics Press, 2014), 692. 
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ethnic minorities, has therefore been prioritised as one of the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)’s main tasks on its nation-building agenda. 
 
In order to stabilise these minority areas, the CCP has adopted comprehensive 
strategies and tactics. Initially, the CCP upholds its recognition of multiculturalism 
and empowers ethnic minorities with autonomous rights. The state practices a system 
of Regional Ethnic Autonomy, outlining a legal framework for preferential treatment.4 
Over the past decades, the authorities have established five autonomous regions5 and 
more than 1000 autonomous prefectures and counties in areas that were poorly 
governed, from China’s perspective, in the dynastic and republican periods. Since the 
Reform and Opening Up, a growing China has put vast fiscal supplements and 
investments to promote modernisation and urbanisation in the minority regions. In 
addition, power-sharing, aligned to the United Front (tong zhan 统战),6 a concept and 
a flexible strategy that the CCP uses to deal with non-communists and dissidents 
including minority groups, is employed. Acknowledging their significant role and 
influences, the CCP utilises the United Front strategy to co-opt and regulate these 
traditional social and religious figures. Moreover, the CCP actively recruits minorities 
as members and cadres. Figures show that the number of minority cadres has grown 
from 10,000 to 2,900,000 from 1950 to 2005.7 Through them, Beijing wishes to 
transmit and impose the Party’s policies more effectively on individuals.  
                                                     
4 Zhongyang Minzu Ganbu Xueyuan. Zhingguo Gongchandang De Minzu Lilun Yu Minzu Zhengce 
(Minzu Press, 2013), 130-142. 
5 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was established in 1947, two years prior to the establishment 
of PRC. Then, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955. Both Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region were established in 1958. Finally, Tibet 
Autonomous Region was established in 1965.  
6 Gesang Peijie, ed., Minzu, Zongjiao, Tongyi Zhanxian Lilun Yu Zhengce (Xizang Renmin Press, 2008), 
308-309. 
7 Tuanzhongyang Minzu Diqu Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu, Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Zhongguo Minzu 
Lilun Yu Minzu Zhengce Yanjiuyuan and Zhongyang Tuanxiao Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Lilun Yanjiusuo. 




Despite these attempts, which have been innovated over time, the policies have not 
produced the desired result everywhere they were implemented. Rather, certain ethnic 
groups have been active in resisting Chinese ambitions, of which Tibetans are a 
prominent example.  
 
Tibetan resistance is not the only case in China of a community standing against the 
central government’s ambitions, but it does represent a significant one in the sense 
that it demonstrates the most politically active and lasting movement, and one that 
provokes the most widespread international debates and concerns. Since the PRC 
officially annexed Tibet in 1951, Tibetans have resorted to a variety of approaches to 
oppose Beijing. Their movement is described as a never-ending circle,8 this decade 
witnessed the violent 14 March Incident in 2008 and the continued self-immolation by 
monks, nuns and the young since 2009. Tibetan riots have been analysed repeatedly, 
and the fast social vicissitude in China over the past decades has complicated the 
discussion. The dispute over Tibet and Tibetans is broadly termed as ‘the Tibetan 
issue’, though Chinese officials deny its existence.  
 
In public, both sides claim their willingness to resolve the problem in a peaceful way, 
but their positions are recognisably divided. Speaking in a firm tone, Beijing insists on 
the recognition of its sovereignty over Tibet as a precondition to talks and it has 
launched multiple policies and campaigns aimed at easing local discontent. From the 
other side, the Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, states his acceptance of China’s 
sovereignty while argues for ‘genuine autonomy’ as a potential resolution to the 
                                                     
8 Ronald D. Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (London: Hurst & 




Tibetan issue. He states the necessity of preserving Tibetan culture and society, and 
calls for an adaptation putting all Tibetans under a common administration in the 
relevant realms. In line with the Dalai Lama, the Central Tibetan Administration 
(CTA), the previous Tibetan Government in Exile, also supports the ‘middle-way’ 
approach. In the 1980s and the 2000s, both sides formulated rounds of talks to 
negotiate their divisions. However, the status quo stalemate remains unresolved. 
 
This thesis investigates the Sino-Tibetan conflict in depth, seeking to explore its cause 
and development in terms of intractability. It seeks to answer a central question:  
 
How have Sino-Tibetan relations become increasingly tense and confrontational?  
 
Furthermore, a set of sub-questions is proposed to guide the analyses:  
1. What has caused this conflict to develop in the way that it has? In terms of 
Sino-Tibetan negotiations, what caused the Sino-Tibetan dialogues to achieve 
so little progress? Why is compromise hard to reach from both sides? 
2. Has there been a behavioural pattern in their interactions since 1949? 
3. Under what conditions can the conflict be mitigated and even resolved?  
4. What are the implications in the case of Tibet for ethnic conflict studies?  
 
To answer these questions, this thesis will employ security dilemma theory. In 
addition, this thesis also draws upon a combination of archival analysis, field survey 
and anonymous interviews with key actors, some of whom were engaged in the 
negotiations and conflicts. This is an original work in that security dilemma theory is 
being applied to examine the Sino-Tibetan relationship. This thesis will be presented 




Applying Security Dilemma Theory to the Sino-Tibetan Conflict 
Security dilemma theory is situated within the discipline of international relations (IR). 
It refers to the concept that while neither of the two actors wishes to harm the other, 
they adopt defensive behaviour due to a sense of insecurity that ultimately results in 
conflict. By applying this theory in a conflict study, this thesis frames the nature of the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict as an effect of a sense of uncertainty, that has structurally 
emerged and was intensified by both sides through their actions towards each other. A 
dilemmatic, dynamic, and action-reaction spiral, has shaped and reshaped their 
interactions over the past decades. To be clear, this thesis contends that the enduring 
Sino-Tibetan conflict is the outcome of contextual Sino-Tibetan interactions within 
which both the Chinese authorities and Tibetans perceive intentions and behaviour 
from each other as threats, and thereby employ securitisation means, resulting in 
escalated tension and conflict.  
 
This thesis argues that local grievances and ethno-nationalist sentiments in Tibet have 
their core as identity contestations that have resulted from or are related to the state’s 
aims, strategies, impacts on local conditions, Tibetan reactions, and the resulting spiral. 
To clarify, this research considers the Chinese government and ethnic Tibetans in 
terms of the ways in which they defend their self-defined ‘societal identities’, a 
concept developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver as well as the Copenhagen School 
of IR.9  
 
                                                     
9 Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); 




It is without doubt that there are multiple players, who may have diverse perspectives 
within the Chinese government and the Tibetan community, between the elites and the 
masses, across local and central levels. However, for analytical purposes, this thesis 
reduces the involved actors on each side into one unitary actor for simplicity and 
coherency. This is not to say that each side acted as one whole, but for the purpose of 
this research, their actions are viewed to have been done for either the CCP or the 
Tibetans as a whole. In fact, in the following chapters, this thesis analyses internal 
interactions within each side. In addition, the roles of the Dalai Lama and the CTA are 
politically discernible. Given their influential and unifying role over the Tibetans and 
given their active agency on international occasions claiming to speak on behalf of 
Tibetans, this thesis pays attention to them, treating them as Beijing’s counterpart in 
the empirical analyses.10  
 
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemmas and High-uncertainty Societal Dilemmas 
This thesis categorises two types of security dilemmas: low-uncertainty societal 
dilemma and high-uncertainty societal dilemma. A low-uncertainty societal dilemma 
refers to a situation where an illusory incompatibility exists within mutual perceptions, 
and its outcome is mitigation and co-existence. A high-uncertainty societal dilemma 
refers to a situation where one’s own security requires the other’s insecurity, and its 
outcome is conflict with violent features. My typology is built upon an array of 
literature of the ethnic security dilemma and in particular the work of Paul Roe.11 
                                                     
10 Åshild Kolås, “Tibetan Nationalism: The Politics of Religion,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no.1 
(1996): 51-66.; Thomas Kauffman, The Agendas of Tibetan Refugees: Survival Strategies of a 
Government-in-Exile in a World of Transnational Organizations (Berghahn Book, 2015); Tsering Topgyal, 
“The Insecurity Dilemma and the Sino-Tibetan Conflict” (PhD Diss., The London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 2011); Reuben Wong, Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic, 
Diplomatic and Human Rights Trends since 1985,” Current Politics and Economics of Asia 17, no. 1 
(2008): 155-181. 
11 Paul Roe, “Actors’ Responsibility in ‘Tight’, ‘Regular’ or ‘Loose’ Security Dilemmas,” Security 
Dialogue 32, no. 1 (2001): 103-116; “Which Security Dilemma? Mitigating Ethnic Conflict: The Case of 
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This thesis argues that the Sino-Tibetan relationship in different periods has faced one 
or other of these scenarios. Further, these scenarios are affected by two variables: 
state-led modernisation and international intervention. They are described briefly 
below. 
 
State-led Modernisation and International Intervention 
This thesis makes an innovative contribution to security dilemma theory by 
considering two independent variables, state-led modernisation and international 
intervention, to account for the origin of uncertainty and conflictual dynamics.  
 
State-led modernisation refers to the transformation of society through urbanisation, 
political centralism and profound economic and cultural changes by the state, in line 
with modernisation theory. 12  Drawing upon current studies that address 
modernisation’s negative dynamics with regard to ethnic conflict, 13  this thesis 
examines the effect of radicalisation. It contends that as the state radically carries out 
modernisation within a short time, societal uncertainty and insecurity are fuelled 
among minority groups, so that conflict is likely to occur. From this perspective, this 
thesis argues that the Chinese state is confronting an internal security dilemma in 
Tibet that is largely of its own making. The Chinese central government claims that it 
is striving for a united multi-ethnic state, but in practice it is attempting to homogenise 
its citizens, over-emphasising the unity of the Chinese nation. Also, the government is 
wary of any booms in regional and ethnic identity. The established Regional Ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                        
Croatia,” Security Studies 13, no. 4 (2004): 280-313; Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
12 Karl Deutsch, “The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration,” 
World Politics 5, no.2 (1953): 168-195. 
13 Saul Newman, “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?” World Politics 43, no. 3 (1991): 
451-478; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 2000). 
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Autonomy system is restricted under the CCP’s rule and within the framework of state 
integrity,14 meaning that rights of territorial autonomy are limited. It is assumed 
throughout this thesis that the CCP equates a single national identity to a strong and 
cohesive state. 
 
The Chinese ruling authority aims to shape a new national identity that is superior to 
all ethnic groups’ traditional identities. An unnegotiable position officially addressed 
in the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of 
1949,15 no longer offered secession as a right for ethnic minorities to disengage from 
modern China. Instead, the CCP has strengthened the integration and communication 
between the Han- and non-Han- dominated regions through extensive infrastructure 
programmes. Since Reform and Opening Up, vast fiscal supplements and investments 
have been allocated to facilitate this process. However, these infrastructure projects 
and fiscal investments have been seen to diminish local ethnic traits, threatening the 
cultural survival of minority groups.  
 
International intervention is another variable which arguably affects the Sino-Tibetan 
security dilemmas. Drawing upon the existing literature on ethnic conflict,16 this 
thesis analyses the influence of an external patron of the state or of the domestic 
minority group on the state-ethnic group relationship. Significantly, it can play a role 
                                                     
14 Binggao Jin, Minzu Lilun Tonglun (Beijing: Central University for Nationalities Publishing House, 
2015), 483. 
15 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui, Xizang 
Gongzuo Wenxian Xuan Bian 1949-2005 (CCCPC Party Literature Press, 2005). 3. 
16 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Erin Jenne, “A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: 
Explaining the Dog that did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 4 
(2004): 729-754; Enze Han, Contestation and Adaptation: the Politics of National Identity in China 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Harris Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-building: Making 
Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities (Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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in enhancing the sense of uncertainty and triggering the security dilemma when one 
actor perceives the rival as obtaining external support. As such, when the West 
expresses concerns about the Tibetan issue, the Chinese government tends to doubt its 
intentions, doubling down on its stance and remaining rigid on its policies in Tibet. 
The outcome, however, often leads to a larger degree of local backlash.  
 
Despite the conflictual impasse, this thesis argues that a window for breaking the 
vicious cycle of security confrontation does exist. It can be built through redefinition 
and thereby re-conceptualisation of common identities and sense of security. 
Nevertheless, the obstacle — the sense of insecurity — is essential. In short, a detailed 
conceptual framework will be discussed in Chapter Two and more empirical studies 
will be presented in the following chapters. 
 
While this section has outlined the research questions and main arguments, the next 
section defines the key terms and is followed by a literature review of the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict. Subsequently, it is explained how this thesis will contribute to 
the existing literature, both theoretically and empirically. This is followed by an 




Ethnic Group/Ethnicity and Nation 
Definitions of ethnic group/ethnicity and nation are diverse among scholars within the 
studies of nations and nationalism, given that both terms are considered compositions 
of elements involving shared history, common language and even religion. Some 
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scholars argue the two terms are equivalent to each other,17 while others believe the 
categories are intrinsically distinct.18 The divisions are related to scholars’ positions 
on ethnic group/ethnicity and/or nation as the representation of primordial existence 
(Primordialism), the product of modern society (Modernism), and the construction and 
transformation from the pre-modern ethnie (Ethnosymbolism).19 In relation to these 
concepts, discussion about identity and nationalism has become yet more complex.  
 
Even though these concepts are abstract, ethnic group/ethnicity is generally used to 
emphasise certain cultural connotations, 20  whereas the term nation is often 
synonymously used to link the state and the population in a country, with emphasis on 
the political aspect.21 The use is dependent on contextual factors, but in general, 
ethnic group often has a narrower definition compared to nation.22 
 
In Mandarin, both terms are interchangeably translated as Minzu, which in its practice 
in the PRC is used not only for the majority Han and ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu
少数民族) but also for the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu 中华民族) as a whole. 
This terminological ambiguity has created a great confusion in English over how to 
accurately apply these concepts to the Chinese case. The aim of this thesis is not to 
provide a new definition of nationalism but to follow the general usage previously 
mentioned. By doing so, this thesis uses the term nation when describing the Chinese 
                                                     
17 Clifford Geertz, “Primordial and Civic Ties,” in Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. 
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Process, eds. Alain Dieckhoff and Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2-3. 
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nation or the whole population of China, following the context of the CCP’s 
aspirations to construct a single national identity. This thesis applies the term ethnic 
group/ethnicity when referring to the individual state-recognised fifty-six ethnic 
members that constitute the whole Chinese nation.  
 
Nation-building and PRC’s Practice in Tibet 
In the current nation-state system, nation-building has been a theoretically and 
practically significant theme. Prior literature on ethnic conflicts ascertains that most 
conflicts have been related to the practice of nation-building. Generally, scholars use 
this term to refer to a procedural development involving various public institutions 
and political systems in a state as well as related to the working of governance.23 Its 
core idea is to aim at uniting and integrating the citizenry with shared values and a 
loyalty to the central government.24 Rejai and Enloe suggest it as an umbrella concept 
by noting two main dimensions covered in the nation-building process. One is the 
‘state of mind’, which refers to ideas toward the nation; the other is termed as the 
‘nationalist movement’, which suggests social and political processes fulfilling this set 
of ideas.25 For Deutsch, nation-building is a development of social mobilisation and 
social communication in the state-wide space, which completes national 
construction. 26  Moreover, Brubaker highlights the state’s reification of political 
practice. He asserts that the state, through a top-down process, codifies its citizenry 
                                                     
23 Karl Deutsch, “Introduction,” in Nation Building in Comparative Contexts, eds. Karl Deutsch, and 
William Foltz (London: Routledge, 2010), 3; Cynthia Watson, Nation-building: A Reference Handbook 
(California: Santa Barbara, 2004), 9; Kate Jenkins and William Plowden, Governance and 
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into categories, determined by birth and descent, serving not only statistical 
accounting but also granting them obligatory ascribed status within the state-wide 
range.27 For this purpose, a nation can be built via ‘an institutionalised form, a 
practical category, and a contingent event’.28  
 
By highlighting certain dimensions, some scholars divide the concept of 
nation-building into ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’. The former often refers to 
the ‘hard aspects’ by focusing on the degree of development of public institutions and 
its relevant apparatus as well as infrastructure. The latter often refers to the ‘soft 
aspect’ by focusing on the production and re-production of a collective identity within 
a state population. The existing literature suggests that both ‘state-building’ and 
‘nation-building’ projects are able to be completed by domestic and international 
actors. Under various conditions, these actors would need to overcome obstacles such 
as ethnic or religious differences that may collide due to differing sources of loyalty.29  
 
On the other side, a large group of scholars insists on the adoption of a hybrid concept, 
justifying that by doing this, it can capture a comprehensive picture of nation-building 
across institutions and ideas. To that end, Nicolas Lemay-Hebert makes a clear 
statement, “It is impossible to conceive of state-building as a process separate from 
nation-building.”30 There is concrete evidence to support such a standpoint. It is noted 
                                                     
27 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 18. 
28 Ibid, 16. 
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that many scholars, policy makers and media reports utilise these terms 
interchangeably in their daily practice, particularly in the US.31 In this regard, a 
hybrid way of understanding seems to be more useful. 
 
For these aforementioned theoretical and practical reasons, this thesis adopts a wider 
notion of nation-building. That is to say, in its analyses, this thesis uses this term to 
refer to the Chinese comprehensive statecraft of integrating Tibet into the PRC and to 
the Chinese pursuit of building Tibetan loyalty to the Chinese nation.  
 
The CCP’s goal of building a unitary and consolidated Chinese nation composed of 
several ethnic groups raises the question as to which approach may be the most 
appropriate to achieve this. A key issue is how to reconcile a civic national identity 
based on inclusive PRC citizenship with exclusive ethnic identities based on a variety 
of common characteristics such as culture, religion, language etc. Differing from the 
Soviet Union, the PRC did not adopt federalism but instead chose a system of 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy under the unitary state. Since 1949, a rhetorical notion of 
National Unity and Ethnic Consolidation has been asserted and has guided China’s 
policies. In this context, Beijing’s approach to nation-building is perceived by some 
minority groups as a threat to their ethnic identity. In some respects, the growth of a 
coercive capacity of the state, while proving the process of nation-building, triggered a 
deeper sense of insecurity amongst minority groups such as that experienced in Tibet. 
Moreover, the situation became more complicated given the existence of the Dalai 
Lama and his utmost spiritual and political influence on Tibetans. The CTA is looked 
                                                     
31 Call, “Ending Wars, Building State, Building States”; James Dobbins, “America’s Role in 
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upon by some Tibetans as a legitimate alternative government to Beijing with regard 
to political well-being and Tibetan historical memory.32 As a special case, the CTA, to 
some extent, functions by constructing Tibetan ‘ethno-national identity’ on its own. 
This will add more complex aspects to consider when analysing China’s 
nation-building in Tibet. 
 
Tibet 
The debate over the geographical concept of Tibet has a long history, between the 
Chinese government and the Dalai Lama’s government, as well as scholars including 
Tibetologists. This is a vital consideration, as the differences in the range and scope of 
Tibet not only engage sensitive political debates, but also impact our academic 
examination of China’s policy toward ‘Tibet’.  
 
Beijing firmly insists that the term Tibet only refers to the area it calls the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR). Its geographic range almost equals the area that was 
under the rule of the Dalai Lama’s government before 1949. Beijing argues that 
during the Qing dynasty and the Republican period, the Tibetan-inhabited area outside 
of the rule of Lhasa had been incorporated into different administrative units, as parts 
of today’s Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, where the government has 
currently established autonomous prefectures and counties. As such, there is no reason 
for Tibet to lay claim to all Tibetan areas.  
 
On the other side, Dharamsala and many Tibetans disagree with this view. Claiming a 
geographically continuous feature of ethnicity, they suggest that the concept of Tibet 
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should include these aforementioned areas as a whole. They assert that traditionally 
the Tibetan areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces are altogether 
termed as Eastern Tibet (which can be divided into Kham and Amdo), versus Central 
Tibet or Utsang, justifying a position that Tibet should be unified so as to include the 
Tibetan-inhabited parts of the aforementioned Chinese provinces.  
 
Whereas both sides do not share a coherent definition, scholars must adopt a certain 
standpoint for analytical purposes. For a difference between the TAR and all 
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This thesis draws upon Goldstein’s classification between ‘geographic Tibet’ and 
‘political Tibet’.33 By doing so, Tibet in this thesis is confined to the TAR unless 
specifically stated otherwise. Thus, China’s Tibet policy refers to the policy mainly 
towards the TAR. In terms of the word “Tibetans”, this thesis adopts a broader usage 
that includes those inside and outside the TAR and those who are in diaspora.  
 
Using the terms in this way provides two analytical advantages. Firstly, it corresponds 
with China’s commitments in real politics and policy objectives. Secondly, it helps 
readers accurately understand the historical context within which the perceptions of 
threat have been formed regarding the Sino-Tibetan relationship at different times. 
 
Literature Review  
 
Existing studies on the Sino-Tibetan conflict draw largely upon disciplines such as 
history, anthropology, and Tibetology. These authors have focused on topics related to 
a general or particular period of history,34 personal autobiography of political and 
religious figures,35 China’s policy revolution and Chinese human rights issues,36 as 
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well as specific incidents of unrest.37 In general, this great body of literature has 
advanced our understanding through their multiple approaches and concerns, and they 
are provided as valuable secondary literature for this thesis. In particular, Goldstein’s 
three volumes of A History of Modern Tibet and The Snow Lion and the Dragon: 
China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama and Shakya’s The Dragon in the Land of Snows have 
become classic reference books, owing to their richness of transnational and 
multi-lingual materials. However, some gaps in the existing studies have been 
identified.  
 
Firstly, the Chinese language sources are relatively under-utilised, especially in 
non-Chinese literature. This outcome can be explained due to the ongoing political 
sensitivity of the Tibetan issue in China and the authoritarian characteristics of the 
Communist regime, making access to relevant materials difficult. The archives 
covering post-1949 Tibet are hard to access for both the public and academics. In 
addition, foreign scholars are prevented from receiving the necessary visas to conduct 
fieldwork in the TAR. Local Chinese scholars may face less restrictions; however, 
censorship poses a severe challenge. Perhaps more ironically, these difficulties have 
biased the academic literature to primarily focus on the Tibetan perspective of the 
conflict and thus neglect the Chinese perspective. In this sense, this thesis aims to 
provide more Chinese aspects to the conflict by including collected Chinese sources.  
 
Secondly, with few notable exceptions, the existing literature often produced 
news-comment-like analysis or chronological records. Conflict theory is seldom 
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applied to the Tibetan issue and they do not reflect on conflict theory in the case of 
Tibet. The existing literature has accumulated informative discussions through 
collected data, but it often lacks an explanatory mechanism or framework. While these 
works bring together a great deal of material, an explanation about the causes behind 
actions, and the factors affecting the Sino-Tibetan conflict are rarely provided. In other 
words, the existing literature is inadequate in providing a clear framework for the 
researchers following behind them. As such, studies of the Tibetan issue are limited in 
the social sciences and the case of Tibet is under-examined in comparative studies 
with ethnic conflicts cases in other regions. This thesis aims to fill this gap. 
 
Despite these gaps, previous approaches and theories in Political Science and IR have 
brought insightful explanations, models and frameworks that this thesis will draw 
from. Suisheng Zhao, 38  Enze Han, 39  and Tsering Topgyal 40  are regarded as 
significant authors who have contributed their own theories to explain the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict. In the work of Zhao and Han, Tibet is taken as one component 
within their broader examination of all Chinese cases and they provide different 
explanations at domestic and international levels respectively. Conversely, Topgyal’s 
research focuses on Tibet. Their research is outlined below.  
 
Zhao traces the interplay among state nationalism, liberalism and ethnonationalism 
from the late Qing to the early 2000s, and makes a genealogical-like argument about 
the formulation of the modern Chinese nation-state. In his view, the core of the 
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Tibetan issue is the CCP’s cultural suppression of ethnic Tibetans as a result of its 
statist position. The ruling authorities are arguably aiming to prevent any emergence 
or development of a strong ethnic identity among minorities, which is believed to 
impede the Chinese nation-building project. Zhao draws a clear line in his account of 
how Chinese nationalist ideology has directly influenced the way the central 
government has treated the Chinese periphery; he analyses the Sino-Tibetan conflict 
through a lens of central-local relationship. 41  However, his interpretation 
over-simplifies the Tibetan issue as he does not provide any reason behind the CCP’s 
perception of Tibetan identity as a threat, nor does he provide further analysis about 
the eruptions of Tibetan disturbances and rebellions at different times. Regional and 
international factors are dismissed in his discussion.  
 
From another side, Han’s work can supplement Zhao’s failure to address the 
international dimension. His main argument is about the international influence on 
domestic ethnic identity contestation. In his view, the existence of external aid 
provision or a link to an outside authority or government that is perceived to be 
stronger than the home state by the domestic ethnic minority can formulate an 
alternative identity for the ethnic minority in question. Han argues that, given the 
existence of Dharamsala and the provision of external assistance by the American 
government, a political identity contestation has occurred for Tibetans. Tibetans in 
China believe that there is an alternative option for them other than being ‘Chinese’.42 
Han’s explanation captures the significance of international dynamics and stands out 
in its functioning impact on domestic politics. Within his framework, the agency of 
Tibet, has been emphasised to some extent by being able to balance its relationship 
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between an external actor and the home state. Nevertheless, in his analysis, the role of 
the Chinese state is limited to that of a passive actor with the international factor 
considered to be the most decisive aspect. As such, his explanation omits the role of 
intra-state-ethnic politics. Also, it deserves to be noted that to a certain extent, the 
existing literature mainly takes Tibet as an object that is influenced by China’s foreign 
relations, geopolitics and politics among great powers.43 As a consequence, Tibet’s 
agency is insufficiently examined. Han also notes this point in his study.44 
 
Differing from Zhao and Han who represent arguments focusing on the domestic and 
international aspects, Topgyal analyses the Tibetan conflict through the framework of 
insecurity dilemma theory.45  As an explanatory model, the theory was initially 
developed to consider ‘Third World’ countries and it shares many ideas with the 
theory of security dilemma which is employed in this thesis. Topgyal has produced a 
group of articles and a book in recent years and systematically developed his 
explanatory framework to apply it to individual Tibetan conflicts and events. His 
studies not only set up valuable foundations both at the theoretical and methodological 
levels for this thesis, but also serve as part of the literature to which this thesis aims to 
respond.  
 
Topgyal’s works create significant value in many respects. Firstly, he brings the 
concept of insecurity dilemma and thereby security dilemma to the Sino-Tibetan 
                                                     
43 Simon Chang, “A ‘Realist’ Hypocrisy? Scripting Sovereignty in Sino–Tibetan Relations and the 
Changing Posture of Britain and the United States,” Asian Ethnicity 12, no.3 (2011): 323-335; Dawa 
Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (1997): 
1078-1095; Barry Sautman, “The Tibet Issue in Post-summit Sino-American Relations,” Pacific Affairs 
72, no. 1 (1999): 7-21.; Guangqiu Xu, “The United States and the Tibet Issue,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 
(1997): 1062-1077.  
44 Han, Contestation and Adaptation, 145. 
45 Topgyal, “Identity Insecurity and the Tibetan Resistance against China”; China and Tibet. 
31 
 
conflict. Topgyal argues that security, rather than nationalism, serves as a fundamental 
factor when explaining the PRC’s repeated repressions of Tibetans and the Tibetan 
resistance. Though he admits that security and nationalism are intertwined, he 
presumes China to be an insecure and weak state and argues that China has 
implemented this nation-building project (which he refers to as state-building) in order 
to reverse such insecurity. This, he states, was provoked by Tibetan resentments 
caused by perceived threats from the Chinese state to their ethnic identity. Given that 
China has not been successful in this part of its nation-building project, Topgyal 
believes that an action-counter cycle of conflicts will take place within Sino-Tibetan 
interactions.46 
 
In addition, Topgyal argues that Tibetan diaspora adds a further dimension of 
insecurity within both domestic and international politics. He states that transnational 
ethnic groups can still be an adversary to the state within a situation of insecurity. His 
argument is inspired by the literature of anti-terrorism, where traditionally, insecurity 
theory is applied to discuss the state-ethnic relationship without discussing in detail 
the features of the minority group. In this regard, Topgyal makes a theoretical 
contribution by expanding the space of international influence on the insecurity 
dilemma. Nevertheless, many shortcomings can be identified in his work.47  
 
Firstly, Topgyal’s work is challenged in terms of the analysis of conflict development. 
While he demonstrates the logic of insecurity dilemma, he does not elaborate on 
which factor in particular results in the dilemma, or explain in which way it does that. 
By outlining the CCP’s Tibet- and Tibetan policies and the subsequent Tibetan 





reactions in a chronological sequence, he describes the situation within the framework 
of ‘insecurity dilemma’ but fails to discuss the causes further.48   
 
Secondly, while discussing the international dynamics of the situation within his thesis, 
Topgyal insufficiently exemplifies the triadic relationship between the state, the 
domestic ethnic groups and external international actors. The possible impact of 
external intervention, in his analysis, seems to only enhance the state’s determination 
to suppress the Tibetan minority without providing analysis. This has left potential 
gaps both at the theoretical level and empirical level that require further discussion.49   
 
Thirdly, Topgyal adopts an ethno-symbolist standpoint over societal, and/or 
ethnic/national identity, and uses this standpoint to explain why the Sino-Tibetan 
conflicts include violent encounters.50 The ethno-symbolist position was developed 
by scholars including Smith and Armstrong,51 and is regarded as the adoption of a 
middle-way between the dichotomous primordialism and modernism/constructivism 
division in the study of nations and nationalism. In other words, ethno-symbolists 
recognise the modernity-related characteristics of nations and their constructivist 
aspects, but also place great emphasis on the nations’ continuity from their pre-modern 
ethnies. However, by taking this standpoint, Topgyal deviates from the original 
assumption of insecurity dilemma theory, which adopts a constructivist position.  
 
As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever state, within insecurity dilemma theory, identities are 
viewed as socially constructed, but once constructed, they can be regarded as 
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temporarily fixed (for a certain period until they are reconstructed again).52 Based on 
this, the Copenhagen School takes identity as an operational object of analysis. 
Following the ethno-symbolist position and logic, Topgyal focuses more on the fixed 
dimensions of identity and less on the fluid aspects. This results in a failure to identify 
signs of an alleviation of conflict within Sino-Tibetan interactions, which 
consequently denies the possibility of a positive resolution. Overall, he 
over-emphasises conflictual aspects and neglects the characteristics that concern peace. 
By further examining certain historical events, this thesis argues that a way to escape 
conflict did exist and still exists.  
 
The final question is about Topgyal’s application of insecurity dilemma theory without 
its mother theory ‘security dilemma’, which shows a wider range of applications for 
ethnic conflict cases. This thesis argues that Topgyal’s employment of insecurity 
dilemma theory, that asserts China is a weak state, deserves reconsideration.  
 
Initially, China does not belong to the group of ‘Third World’ states that insecurity 
dilemma theory aims to examine. In addition, following Mohammed Ayoob, Topgyal 
measures ‘weakness of state’ in terms of socio-political cohesion. However, this thesis 
agrees with the viewpoint of Job and Sørensen, who argue that, in addition to social 
cohesion, a ‘weak’ state should also be measured by its economy, the efficiency of 
state institutions, and popular legitimacy.53 Following this definition, China may not 
be considered a ‘weak state’ given obvious features. While still being categorised as a 
developing state, China’s growth regarding its politico-economic power and state 
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capacity has been widely recognised.54  
 
This thesis does not intend to engage in the debate whether or not China is a weak 
state. Rather, it only suggests that Topgyal’s application of insecurity dilemma theory 
is inadequate. To mitigate some of the deficiencies of the insecurity dilemma theory, 
this thesis argues that employing the security dilemma theory is more useful, as it 
allows a wider range of application without being limited to the ‘weak states’.55  
 
Overall, previous literature has provided valuable foundations from multiple aspects 
and some scholars are forging powerful explanatory concepts. Multiple theories and 
factors have been introduced, but one that can balance both theory and empirical 
utility is still relatively lacking. To improve the current state of studies, this thesis 
analyses the Sino-Tibetan conflict using security dilemma theory, but it will also make 
further innovations. In chapter two, this thesis will categorise two mechanisms of 
security dilemma as (1) low-uncertainty societal dilemma and (2) high-uncertainty 
dilemma based on Paul Roe’s security dilemma typologies.56 In addition, I will 
further discuss state-led modernisation and international intervention as independent 
variables to security dilemma scenarios.  
 
Expected Research Contributions 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the Tibetan issue in three ways. Firstly, it 
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uses a new conceptual framework to examine the theme, providing an innovative  
standpoint. Secondly, it brings more first- and secondary Chinese language literature 
into discussion thereby aiming to provide a more balanced Chinese perspective. 
Thirdly, by referring to under-utilised Chinese archives, it contributes an analysis of 
this history in-depth from 1949 onwards. These three features allow this thesis to 
provide new insights. 
 
This thesis contributes a new perspective which scrutinises the politics of the Tibetan 
issue through the lens of security dilemma theory. This thesis believes that the concept 
of security dilemma, as a meso-theory explanation that grasps the structural and 
agential dynamics within the Sino-Tibetan conflict, will be of great help for current 
and future studies. Tang pointed out that an important advantage of this theory is its 
inclusiveness and integrity.57 As such, it enables a comprehensive understanding of 
the Chinese nation-building process in the minority region of Tibet and the protracted 
and evolving Sino-Tibetan conflict in the contemporary era within which the state's 
policy-implementations and Tibetan responses as well as external interventions can be 
analysed. Further, this thesis adds innovation to security dilemma theory by 
distinguishing types of low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty societal dilemma and by 
examining two variables to examine the Tibetan case. These concepts help identify the 
interactional scenarios. By examining the relationship between the Chinese state’s 
practice of modernisation on Tibetans and the existence of international intervention, 
this thesis contributes to a better understanding of uncertainty formation and the 
dynamics within Sino-Tibetan interactions with regard to peace and conflict.  
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Going further, this thesis supplements current studies, from which Chinese language 
first-hand and secondary materials are largely absent. The literature published in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan is also brought into the discussions. The political sensitivity of the 
Tibet issue within China creates restrictions for both international and Chinese 
investigators. Hillman is explicit in his edited volume that censorship and political 
treatment of most forms of Tibetan protests as separatist and hostile behaviour towards 
China have to a large degree silenced many Chinese scholars, and made it difficult to 
find interviewees willing to share their experiences. In addition, international 
researchers are often impeded, by administrative means, from acquiring access to the 
TAR.58,Additionally, many official documents and reports (as well as small amount of 
secondary literature by Chinese scholars) are not accessible to researchers. Despite 
these restrictions, accessing these materials is necessary and arguably beneficial when 
discussing the Tibetan issue. This thesis has made some progress in that direction, 
with more details within the methodology and research materials section.   
 
Finally, this thesis contributes to empirical studies by providing another way of 
historical interpretation. Past reviews of the post-1949 history often demonstrate that 
conflict was always inevitable between the Beijing regime and ethnic Tibetans. 
However, this thesis’s finding opposes such a claim. Contrary to the argument that the 
nature of Sino-Tibetan conflict is primordial antagonism and is a zero-sum game, 
several cases examined within the empirical chapters demonstrate that the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship has also been featured as conflict mitigation and 
co-existence. In this way, this thesis highlights the resulting dynamics and conditions.  
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While this thesis is a piece of political research, history plays a pivotal role and it uses  
a variety of primary historical materials collected in various archives. Examining 
declassified historical archives, including government documents, has enabled the 
capture of the evolution of the Tibetan issue and the relevant policy-making process. 
This thesis focuses on the post-1949 era, concentrating on the following primary 
sources: the official records of the PRC’s Tibet policy; the Beijing-Tibet/Dharamsala 
interactions (e.g. records of planned meetings and negotiations); and informal/formal 
records of Beijing and Tibet/Dharamsala’s individual interactions with key foreign 
governments, including Great Britain, the United States, India, and Taiwan. Sources 
for these documents, in both English and Chinese, are outlined fully below.  
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) documents, National Archives, United 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom was the main international power to have extensive 
relations with Tibet before 1949. While India, after independence, has increased its 
influence and the US provided significant assistance in Tibet during the Cold War and 
post-Cold War periods, the UK is still arguably influential and is often consulted by 
Western countries on the Tibetan issue. The accessible FCO documents, having been 
declassified up to 1990 regarding the Tibetan issue, contain valuable discussions and 
debates inside the British government. Events relating to the PRC’s military and 
administrative commitments towards Tibet, local situations at different times and the 
Dalai Lama’s overseas visits are recorded. The documents also provide information 
about the UK’s interactions with other countries such as India, the US, and China with 




Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan documents, Archives of Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The documents from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Taiwan have been declassified up to 1975 and contain numerous and 
valuable records made by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, a unit that was responsible for Tibetan 
affairs. Given its historical background and constitutional framework, the Republic of 
China’s (ROC) government based in Taiwan is another country that claims to have 
sovereignty over Tibet. As a result, Taiwan has been active in conducting intelligence 
about the PRC’s Tibet policy and local situation in Tibet as well as the activities of 
Tibetan diaspora and significant figures, such as the Dalai Lama and Gyalo Thondup 
abroad.  
 
Internal Reference, Universities Service Centre for Chinese Studies, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. The editorial journal Internal Reference is 
written by members of the Xinhua News Agency for policy-making purposes of the 
CCP. The journal is not openly available in China but the Universities Service Centre 
for Chinese Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong has some accessible 
collections between the years 1950 to 1964. As a primary source, this body of material, 
can provide significant insights as they reflect the Chinese state perspective. The 
content of each journal is primarily news and discussions from local and international 
societies. The documents provide a headline for each item including communist 
opinions and setting the tone for discussions of the topic. Examining these journals 
provides insight into the minds of the CCP leadership during this time.  
 
With the help of these archives, this thesis has gained a greater understanding of 
important events surrounding the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Each of the accessed 
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documents has also been used to triangulate information provided by other sources, 
providing a more comprehensive picture. This thesis would translate document titles. 
Given that information for the more recent decades remains classified, data has been 
collected through other approaches and sources.  
 
As mentioned, due to the current regulations, most archives regarding modern Tibet 
after 1949 are not available in the PRC. Alternatively, I utilise volumes and collections 
of official documents published by the China Tibetology Press59 and the Chinese 
Communist Party History Press to gain more information about the Chinese 
perspective. These are the authoritative units that are responsible for editing relevant 
official documents in China. Also, publications by the Department of Information and 
International Relations (DIIR) of the Central Tibetan Administration in India are also 
used in this thesis.  
 
Anonymous interviews were conducted with Chinese scholars and officials who 
were/or are engaged in the Tibetan affairs, mainly between September 2015 and 
January 2016 in Beijing and Lhasa. Specifically, Chinese Communist officials were 
approached via email and social media tool, such as WeChat. I also visited institutes 
including the China Tibetology Research Center, Renmin University of China, Minzu 
University of China and the University of Tibet. In addition, I contacted some former 
Tibetan officials of the Central Tibetan Administration during the research period. 
Given their personal experiences, the Chinese and Tibetan interviewees provided 
nuanced and supplementary aspects about the policy-making process and the 
Beijing-Dharamsala relationship.  
                                                     
59 The China Tibetology Press was established in 1986 under the administration of the China 





Finally, this thesis presents a collection of major CCP leadership statements and 
records and autobiographies of the Tibetan figures that are referred to this dissertation. 
All the materials listed below, provide this thesis with important information relating 
to political events, inter- and intra-governmental discussions and policies reflecting 
the contextual situations back to then. These include: 
 
Collections of governmental statements and governmental records. Certain important 
collections are used. They are Xizang Zongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian 西藏工作文献选
编(Collection of CCP Works in Tibet);60 Zhongguo Gongchandang Xizang Lishi 
Dashiji 1949-2005 中国共产党西藏历史大事记 1949-2005(Chronology of the CCP 
in Tibet); 61  Xizang Wenti Dashiji 1959-1999 西藏问题大事记 1959-1999 
(Chronology of the Tibetan Issue)62 Minzu Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian 民族工作文
献选编 2003-2009 (Collection of Ethnic Works). 63  
 
Collections of speeches or talks by CCP political leaders. The significant collections 
include Mao Zedong Xizang Gongzuo Wenxuan 毛泽东西藏工作文选(Selected 
Writing of Mao Zedong on Tibet);64 Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan 邓小平文选(Selected 
Writing of Deng Xiaoping);65 Jiang Zemin Wenxuan 江泽民文选(Selected Writing of 
                                                     
60 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui, Xizang 
Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian.  
61 Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui Dangshi Yanjiushi, Zhongguo Gongchandang Xizang Lishi 
Dashiji (Beijing: CCP Party, 2005). 
62 Sichuan Sheng Shehui Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin Zangxue Yanjiusuo, Xizang Wenti Dashiji 1959-1999 
(Sichuan Sheng Shehui Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin Zangxue Yanjiusuo, 2000). 
63 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Guojia Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui, Minzu Gongzuo 
Wenxian Xuanbian 2003-2009 (CCCPC Party Literature Press, 2010). 
64 Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe and Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui, Mao Zedong Xizang 
Gongzuo Wenxuan (China Tibetology Press, 2001). 
65 Xiaoping Deng, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Di Er Juan (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1993); 
Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Di San Juan (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1993). 
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Jiang Zemin).66  
 
Autobiographies. These works include the Dalai Lama’s Freedom in Exile: the 
Autobiography of the Dalai Lama;67  the autobiography of Gyalo Thondup, the 
brother of the Dalai Lama: The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong: The Untold Story of My 
Struggle for Tibet;68 the autobiography of Phuntsok Wangyal, a founder of the Tibetan 
Communist Party: A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa 
Phüntso Wangye.69  
 
Chapters Arrangement  
 
Chapter Title 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework: Security Dilemma Theory 
Chapter 3 Societal Dilemmas: Coexistence and Conflict in Sino-Tibetan 
Relations, 1950s 
Chapter 4 Socialist Transformation and Ethnic Conflict in Tibet, 1960s-1970s 
Chapter 5 Revivification of Societal Dilemmas: Sino-Tibetan Dialogues, 
Tensions, and Perils, 1980s-1990s  
Chapter 6 Integration of Tibet and Sino-Tibetan Societal Conflict, 2000-2012 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
 
                                                     
66 Zemin Jiang, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006). 
67 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama (New York: Harper Collins, 
1991). 
68 Thurston and Thondup, The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong. 
69 Goldstein and Sherap, A Tibetan Revolutionary. 
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This thesis is composed of seven chapters, including this introduction. Chapter one 
outlines the content of this study, introducing the core questions, research background, 
review of gaps in current literature, and clarification of the primary sources.  
   
Chapter two is devoted to clarifying security dilemma theory as the conceptual 
framework of this thesis. It commences with a discussion about core notions and then 
it discusses how this theory has been utilised to analyse ethnic conflicts. The concept 
of societal security and its integration in security dilemma theory is then discussed. 
Following this, Paul Roe’s classification of ‘tight societal dilemma’, ‘regular societal 
dilemma’ and ‘loose societal dilemma’ are reviewed., Drawing upon them, this thesis 
introduces concepts of low-uncertainty societal dilemma and high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma, as well as the concept of a real security threat in order to explain conflict not 
caused by the security dilemma. It further discusses two independent variables — 
state-led modernisation and international intervention — to the developed societal 
dilemmas.  
 
From chapter three to six, the evolution of the Tibetan issue since 1949 is discussed 
and subjected to empirical analysis. These chapters analyse the creation, 
implementation, and adaptation of China’s Tibet policies in different periods; the 
Tibetan responses will be analysed as well. These individual chapters will also review 
the interactions and negotiations between Beijing and the regime of Tibet and then 
Dharamsala, focusing chronologically on the Dalai Lama and his government. Distinct 
security dilemma scenarios are applied to narrate the Sino-Tibetan interactions at 
various times.   
 
Chapter three examines the first decade of territorial and administrative incorporation 
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of Tibet into the PRC, focusing on the period of ‘peaceful liberation’. It argues that the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship in this period manifests both scenarios of a low-uncertainty 
societal dilemma and a high-certainty societal dilemma. This chapter analyses the 
various means used by the CCP to justify and consolidate China’s sovereignty over 
Tibet, which had resisted Chinese central authority and pursued independence from 
China since 1912. It contends that by establishing a primary state apparatus in Tibet, 
the CCP was attempting to construct a Chinese national identity. However, the Party’s 
efforts were not successful, as seen by the fact that the mutual coexistence of both 
regimes did not move forward to an expected integration, but instead collapsed, 
leading to the Lhasa revolt in 1959. This chapter will discuss the dynamics to this 
transition in detail.  
 
In chapter four, security dilemma theory will be applied to examine the PRC’s 
socialist crusades in Tibet between 1959 and 1979. This chapter scrutinises the CCP 
Party-state’s fierce penetration down to Tibetan society and continued mobilisation of 
Tibetans and argues that through these campaigns, Tibet, was transformed into a 
socialist system similar to other regions of China. The scenario of a high-uncertainty 
societal dilemma is first identified, then the real security threat during the Cultural 
Revolution, and finally the low-uncertainty societal dilemma during the 
Beijing-Dharamsala rapprochement from the mid-1970s. This chapter also finds that a 
positive international environment for Beijing would benefit its Tibet policies. 
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution and the launch of Reform and Opening 
Up, the Chinese government publicly contacted the exiled Tibetan government.  
 
Chapter five contends that the Sino-Tibetan relationship experienced a U-turn at the 
end of the Cold War, ending up in a scenario of high-uncertainty societal dilemma. 
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This chapter examines China’s series of institution-building and inducement policies 
for Tibetans, and modernisation projects to promote economic development instructed 
by the Tibet Work Forums launched in the early 1980s. It also examines the Tibetan 
delegations’ visits to China and the negotiations between Beijing and Dharamsala, 
arguing that there was a positive atmosphere regarding resolution of the conflict. 
However, factors including the Tibetan backlash toward China’s policies, a standoff 
within negotiations, and the internationalisation of the Tibetan issue impeded the 
Chinese state-Tibetan relationship. The outbreaks of Tibetan demonstrations in the late 
1980s provoked tighter controls from Beijing. Turing to the 1990s, the dual strategy 
known as “Grasping with Both Hands,” was adopted by Beijing, referring to the 
promotion of economic development and modernisation at the same time as tight 
control over Tibetan society.  
 
In chapter six, this thesis argues that a high-uncertainty societal dilemma still 
dominates the post-2000 era of Sino-Tibetan relations. This chapter analyses the 
continuation and ongoing employment of Grasping with Both Hands, by which the 
Chinese government continued its way of forcing the economic integration of Tibet 
into the whole state while reinforcing political suppression at the same time, against 
the background of China’s growth in its growing comprehensive capacity. As a result, 
the authorities achieved wider and deeper integration of Tibet into the 
politico-economic-social networks of the state. However, the process provoked a high 
sense of uncertainty amidst the local Tibetans. In addition, the constant external 
concerns over Tibet also raised Beijing’s wariness and led it to insist on its policies. 
Eventually, the high degree of sense of uncertainty gave birth to Tibetan disturbances, 




In the conclusion, this thesis reviews the previous chapters and findings. This chapter 
will return to and answer the core question: How have Sino-Tibetan relations become 
increasingly tense and confrontational? and other sub-questions. It presents the 
implications of the dynamic evolution of the Tibetan issue within the practice of the 
PRC’s national construction since 1949. It also discusses proposed solutions to the 
Tibetan issue and the Sino-Tibetan security dilemma. It concludes by presenting 









This chapter introduces the conceptual framework. In Chapter One, the central 
research question was outlined: How have Sino-Tibetan relations become increasingly 
tense and confrontational? In addition, it outlined a set of sub-questions pertaining to 
the intractability of the conflict and addressing the interactions between the Beijing 
regime and the Tibetan minority. Means to alleviate and look for appropriate solution 
to the present tension are also raised as a major concern. To answer them, this research 
proposes to employ security dilemma theory.  
 
Scholars with a long-term interest in ethnic conflict have associated their studies to 
three major approaches. The first body of literature employs the rational-choice theory. 
This approach follows a methodological economic individualism argument, stating 
that conflicts are the outcomes based on rational calculations of maximum gain. This 
approach has been consistent in producing valuable literature.70 However, it meets 
criticism that it is inadequate in explaining the emotional aspect of human actions.71 
As such, this approach is limited to assess the power of identity on ethnic conflict such 
as the Tibet issue.  
                                                     
70 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 
379-414; Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist 
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The second approach revolves around debates between primordialism and modernism, 
both of which tend to associate the causation of ethnic conflicts to human essence but 
differ in their suggested causal pathway.72  Briefly, primordialists emphasise the 
‘given’ aspect of nation and ethnicity but they often fail to differentiate between them. 
They claim that a nation/ethnic group is a natural and organic community, bonded 
together with certain elements including shared bloodline, language, religion, history 
and customs. Primordialists claim that ethnic conflict is difficult to reconcile given the 
primitive and persistent features and emotional dynamics.73 Conversely, modernists 
recognise the ‘modern’ essence of nation and point out the significance of social 
conditions and artificial (especially elite) manipulation.74 In this sense, research from 
this perspective tend to underline socio-economic causes to the outbreak of conflict.  
 
Flaws within these works are identified. It is clear that the primordialist argument is 
systematically inconsistent.75 If pre-determined ethnic feature is the main cause to 
conflicts, it is difficult to account for peace and non-violence in some multi-ethnic 
states. For example, within China, Beijing has good relations with ethnic Mongols and 
                                                     
72 The intellectual group in primordialism includes Geertz, “Primordial and Civic Ties”; Connor, 
“Nation-building or Nation-destroying?”. The intellectual group in modernism includes Gellner, Nations 
and Nationalism; Anderson, Imagined Communities; Eric Hobsbawm. Nations and nationalism since 
1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Some scholars 
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on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Theories of 
Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Smith, Nationalism and 
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Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: 
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74 Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction," in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–14; John Breuilly, “Dating the Nation,” in When is the 
Nation?: Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism, ed. Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 15-39. 
75 John Coakley, “‘Primordialism’ in Nationalism Studies: Theory or Ideology?,” Nations and 
Nationalism 24, no. 2 (2018): 327-347. 
48 
 
ethnic Koreans, and yet its experiences with ethnic Tibetans is difficult. The modernist 
argument also has distinct limitations. If material differences are the only source for 
conflicts, the role of psychological elements is beyond the scope of the explanation. 
As can be seen in the independence movement in Quebec, Canada, the preservation of 
a French culture occupies a central role as an important element for 
self-identification.76 Likewise within Tibet, modernists can argue that exacerbating 
socio-economic disparity is an explanation of Sino-Tibetan tension in the late 1980s, 
but it is unable to explain the roles of religion and culture in the conflicts throughout 
the post-1949 era.77 Hence, the existing literature has not yet amounted to a balanced 
framework for us to capture the dynamics of intra-state ethnic conflict.  
 
The third approach focuses on small or large-N comparative politics studies across 
time and scope, in which scholars investigate a range of potential causes such as 
culture, language, religion, social status and even geography and natural resources.78 
While generating rich insights with regard to particular variables across individual 
conflicts, there are limitations to this approach. Despite quantitative studies correlating 
one or more factors to the conflicts, causal mechanisms remain unclear. Moreover, the 
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Global Data Set,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316-337; Wimmer, “Nation-building.” 
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literature often overlooks the dynamics of agential interactions in specific historical 
contexts. The large body of qualitative studies that focus on this topic produces 
impressive conclusions over factors and theories, though these often suffer from 
fragmentation and context specificity, resulting in findings where the generalisability 
is questionable.79 
  
To fill these identified gaps, the theory of security dilemma is employed to explore the 
causal mechanism of intra-state ethnic conflict. This theory is particularly suited to 
this case for many reasons. First of all, it has been oriented to understand intra-state 
ethnic violence and even civil wars, in particular, cases brought about by the 
nation-building process. It focuses on a notion of uncertainty between parties, of 
whether one intends to harm the other, and on the dynamics and interaction between 
them. This theory allows a discussion about different sources of conflict without 
exclusion, rather than being engaged in an incompatible debate over human essence or 
rational-choice. In addition, this theory arguably fills the insufficiency of the small- 
and large-N approach, given that it can provide specific details against situated 
background. In this sense, this theory is appropriate to analyse the Tibetan issue in 
order to best capture the material and psychological dynamics that result in conflict.  
 
This thesis discusses the security dilemma further by drawing upon an array of current 
literature. Firstly, this research distinguishes three categories: (1) Low-uncertainty 
Societal Dilemma, (2) High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma, and (3) Real Security 
Threat. Significantly, the real security threat is excluded from the concept of security 
dilemma. The low-uncertainty societal dilemma and the high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma connect to outcomes of conflict mitigation and conflict outbreak respectively. 
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Secondly, this research explores two variables as state-led modernisation and 
international intervention, assessing how they affect the security dilemmas. The 
dynamics of the security predicament and the intensification of conflict, as well as the 
means to break the deadlock are hereby presented.  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the main notions of the security dilemma and 
introduces its application from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. Following this is a 
discussion of societal security that has occupied a significant position regarding the 
dynamics of the ethnic security dilemma. This section formulates the whole concept 
and is devoted to the ideas of Barry Buzan and scholars of the Copenhagen School of 
IR as well as Paul Roe. In the third section, the chapter discusses Roe’s three models: 
tight, regular and loose formulations. Building upon these scholarly works, this 
chapter then reconceptualises new typologies and discusses two independent variables, 
laid slightly out in the previous paragraphs. The final section briefly demonstrates a 
conceptual operation of Sino-Tibetan relations since 1949.  
 
Security Dilemma Theory and its Application to Ethnic Conflict 
 
Classic Notions 
The theory of the security dilemma was originally formulated to explore causes to 
inter-state conflicts.80 Departing from the realist and neo-realist assumptions of IR 
theory that perceives international systems as that under the condition of an anarchical 
                                                     
80 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (Collins, 1951); John Herz, “Idealist 
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180; Political Realism 
and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); 
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nature, theorists narrate a predicament in which actions taken by one state actor, 
originally aiming to strengthen its own security, conversely results in less secure 
circumstances, even culminating in the outbreak of military confrontation with 
others.81 In a classic volume, Robert Art and Robert Jervis refer to it as “An 
action-reaction spiral [that] can occur between two states or among several of them 
so that each is forced to spend even larger sums on arms and be more insecure than 
before.”82 The key that renders this tragic consequence is the state actor’s uncertainty 
about its counterpart’s intentions.83  
 
Paul Roe makes this point explicit, as he states: "Uncertainty produces fear… that the 
other wishes to harm them."84  Very often that means that states must employ 
countermeasures such as accumulation of arms since there is no higher authority they 
can turn to.  
 
Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler note that the security dilemma involves two major 
strategic predicaments. 85  Firstly, it concerns one’s interpretation of the others’ 
intentions and capabilities; and secondly, by association is the issue of response.86 
Indeed, uncertainty and indistinguishability between offence and defence can further 
exacerbate mutual distrust, triggering and worsening the tension. Robert Jervis 
suggests that unless the requirements for offence and defence can differ in kind or 
                                                     
81 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 167-170; Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A 
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amount, a state without expansionist intention whilst seeking a military posture for 
securitisation, resembles an aggressor.87 Even though the first state does not intend to 
threaten the second, the latter may still perceive a threat. Consequently, a state’s 
increase in security can have unintentional impacts on the level of security of others. 
Likewise, where states aim to increase their own securities, it inadvertently results in 
growing insecurity among other states. A spiral process continues until at least one 
side crosses the edge of tolerance, which ultimately leads to conflict. Following this 
logic of worst-case scenarios, a state may choose to launch a pre-emptive attack on 
another to protect itself from attack.88  
 
A substantial body of literature is invested in describing the features of the security 
dilemma. From Mearsheimer’s viewpoint, the security dilemma is an inevitable 
situation for state actors owing to the anarchic nature of the international political 
system where anarchy forces states to compete with each other to gain supremacy.89 
Alan Collins also addresses his ‘system-induced security dilemma’ by ascribing the 
security dilemma to the anarchic nature of international politics that results in 
uncertainty and the subsequent spiral effect.90 Barry Posen associates the relationship 
between uncertainty and indistinguishability, and between offence and defence, to 
three features of international politics: anarchy, self-help and fear. In this way, he 
draws on the strategic interactions among states with regard to the notion of the 
security dilemma. As he states: 
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This is the security dilemma: what one does to enhance one’s own security 
causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure. Cooperation 
among states to mute these competitions can be difficult because someone 




Give the existence of uncertainty, the theory of security dilemma emphasises that 
states adopt defensive stances. In this way, a significant aspect of the theory is the lack 
of malign intentions. To clarify, when a state presents malign intentions towards 
another and the latter perceives this as a justifiable threat, the scenario then escalates 
to a real security threat, rather than a security dilemma. Randall Schweller sums this 
up clearly by arguing that the concept of threat in the security dilemma must be 
‘apparent, but not real’.92 If a state arms itself based on a purpose other than security, 
that is to say, it is justifiably perceived as an aggressor, then this is deemed as 
aggression and is an example of a security threat. As states act under the dilemmatic 
conditions that mean they cannot be certain about whether they are equipped with 
enough information, and given that, a state actor cannot be certain of the intent from 
the other, misperception of others’ behaviour can easily occur.93  
 
To summaries the notions of the security dilemma, this thesis refers to Shiping Tang’s 
eight point of BHJ that he presents based on a comprehensive examination of the 
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classic literature, i.e. works of Herbert Butterfield, John Herz and Robert Jervis.94 
Firstly, the ultimate source of the security dilemma stems from the anarchic nature of 
international politics. Secondly, under such anarchy, state actors suffer from 
uncertainty concerning the intentions of others. Thirdly, the security dilemma can only 
exist when both state actors interact with each other without holding malign intentions. 
Fourthly, while aiming to overcome uncertainty and fear, states may resort to 
accumulating power or military capabilities as a means of defence, but which 
inevitability involve certain offensive capabilities. Fifthly, once activated, the 
dynamics of the security dilemma tend to self-reinforce and often triggers spiral 
situations. Sixthly, the nature of the security dilemma is inclined to result in 
self-defeating circumstances, resulting in more military power but less security. 
Seventhly, the vicious circle of interactions stemming from the security dilemma can 
result in tragic consequences. Finally, the severity of the security dilemma can be 
affected by both material and socio-psychological factors. In his view, the former can 
include geography and distribution of power, whilst the latter includes nationalism and 
worst-case assumptions.95  
 
According to Tang, the process from anarchy to the security dilemma and then to war, 
is not straightforward. Rather, it is an action-reaction spiral that contains dynamic 
inter-state interactions. He contends:  
 
 
Anarchy generates uncertainty; uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to 
power competition; power competition activates the (dormant) security 
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dilemma and the activated security dilemma leads to war through a spiral.96  
 
 
To emphasise, he insists that a conceptual differentiation between the security 
dilemma and the spiral model is both useful and necessary. The latter arguably shows 
a wider range than the former. The security dilemma can transform into a spiral, but 
the latter is still applicable as it focuses on interactions between and among involved 
actors. As such, Tang reminds us that the security dilemma is conditional while the 
spiral is universal.97 Moreover, from his listed process, this thesis underlines that 
uncertainty takes a central role, which drives the rest points.  
 
Bringing Security Dilemma Theory to Intra-state Level 
The theory of security dilemma has been continually developed in the discipline of IR 
and been further applied to explore domestic conflict. With the cessation of the Cold 
War and subsequent dissolution of the US-USSR bipolar global structure, intra-state 
ethnic antagonism became the most common type of conflict worldwide. This is a 
pivotal background for scholars. Many accounts of these conflicts have centred on the 
dynamics of inter-ethnic group relationship and interactions between the state and 
domestic ethnic minorities.98  Those inspired by security dilemma theory began 
considering interactions between intra-state groups in the same manner as that 
between sovereign states. This thesis is also inspired by this academic development. 
 
A question regarding the application of security dilemma theory to domestic issues 
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might be raised here. A fundamental element of uncertainty of intentions among states 
that leads to the security dilemma stems from the lack of a supreme authority capable 
of enforcing order; in this way, some wonder how this application from the 
international level to the domestic level is justified. In their response, the pioneering 
theoretical advocates have defended their stance by concentrating on the implications 
of uncertainty but not the absence of authority.99  
 
By observing the domestic tensions and civil wars with ethnic features that erupted 
within the former Socialist states in the 1990s, scholars reflect on scenarios in which 
the central regime collapsed, and/or one particular ethnic group dominated a 
multi-ethnic state. Within either of these circumstances, the domestic groups would 
generate fear towards others. In this respect, the inter-group interactions within a state 
are comparable to inter-state interactions in the international environment in that the 
involved parties are compelled to pursue self-securitisation. This argument definitely 
corroborates Jack Snyder’s ‘perceptual security dilemma’ which suggests that the 
security dilemma could occur when one actor mistakenly perceives the other’s manner 
of defence as offence.100 Through these conceptual clarifications and refinements, the 
application of security dilemma theory to domestic level issues is justified. The theory 
can be adapted to become one of the most integrative theoretical tools in ethnic 
conflict studies.101 
 
Barry Posen was the pioneering scholar who applied security dilemma theory to 
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explain intra-state ethnic conflicts.102 Having examined the ethnic wars occurring 
within the disintegrated former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Federation, Posen 
contended that the power vacuum, created by the loss of central authority, abruptly 
triggered the onset of inter-group tensions and the emergence of de facto anarchy. In 
this context, the state lost control of its domestic groups, who now had to pursue their 
own interests and competed with others. Consequently, they took action to assure their 
own security but under such an anarchic structure, their actions could be perceived as 
an increase in offence by other groups, who may react by adopting similar actions to 
reinforce their own security. By using security dilemma theory, Posen also integrated 
dichotomist ethnic identities as well as other factors including historical hostilities, 
uneven military abilities and potential external intervention that complicate the sense 
of insecurity for the ethnic groups.103 Posen contributed an important foundation in 
the area of ethnic conflict studies.  
 
Given such literature, we see the main concepts of security dilemma theory, including 
anarchy, which refers to uncertainty, feature of self-help, defensive stance, and 
accumulation of power applied to intra-state ethnic conflict. Similar to the situation in 
international politics, when a group initially adopts a defensive and therefore benign 
intention for self-protection, the resulting anarchic nature of a collapsed state hinders 
the transmission of this intention to others. Lake and Rothchild expressed this 
explicitly. In their viewpoints, the fear for actors’ own safety in isolation is the 
primary cause of inter-ethnic group conflict. When information fails to transmit to 
another and credible commitment falls into question, ethnic security dilemma can 
become even more severe. Elite manipulation of political memories and emotions as 
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well mass mobilisation can make the dilemma further irreducible.104 Indeed, the 
tragedy of inter-state politics can also occur at domestic level. 
 
Soon, scholars began paying attention to the state and non-state actors in their 
exploration of past and existing conflicts. The state-minority group relationship 
become a significant theme. Saideman observes that in many cases of intra-state 
ethnic conflict, conflicts between the state and ethnic groups, minorities in particular, 
manifest as the main form.105 To understand the factors causing this, Saideman argues, 
the state is often characterised by the control of richer and stronger resources than its 
sub-national groups. In this regard, when the domestic ethnic groups compete with 
each other aiming to take control of the state which dominate the resources, “the state 
may [thus, seem to] be biased toward or against particular ethnicities.”106 He says:  
 
 
     This is the heart of the ethnic security dilemma within existing states. If the state    
cannot protect the interests of all ethnic groups, then each group will seek to 
control the state, decreasing the security of other groups and decreasing the 
ability of the state to provide security for any group.107 
 
 
This perspective highlights the role of the state in the conflict. Indeed, many empirical 
studies have revealed that the state is often the key actor engaged in domestic ethnic 
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conflict.108 Thus, scholars brought the state back into the main focus in their analysis. 
This provides a significant implication for studying the case of Tibet, in which the 
Chinese central government is one of the most important actors involved in the 
evolution of the Tibetan issue.   
 
Among those dynamics engaging the state in the ethnic conflicts, nation-building and 
relevant commitments integrating domestic groups conforming to the national 
narrative are noticed.109 Given the fact that the state can actively create a domestic 
environment for all ethnic groups and it can play a significant role in shaping the 
inter-ethnic relationship, an underlying point is that policy-making and institutional 
arrangements matters. The state’s commitments can result in the national integration 
and security on the one hand, but might cause the national disintegration and erosion 
of security on the other.  
   
Aligned to this line of thinking and inspired by the core concepts of security dilemma 
theory, scholars such as Brian Job, Mohammed Ayoob, John Glenn and Georg 
Sørensen conceived a novel idea termed as the ‘insecurity dilemma’. 110  Their 
argument derived from observations of ‘Third World’ states, in particular, those that 
they termed as ‘weak states’ often suffering from frequent and constant ethnic 
conflicts. In their view, when a state, usually administrated by the state’s ethnic 
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majority or core group, attempts to integrate domestic diverse societal groups through 
nation-building to fulfil the needs of security, these minority or non-core groups will, 
in many cases, reject the states authority. This is because they are often required to 
discard at least part of their societal distinctiveness. As a result, the original goal of 
securitisation has failed and instead, societal antagonism is formed and may even be 
radicalised.111  
 
Brian Job illuminates the logic of why nation-building in these states encounter 
obstacles. He argues that not having a singular nor shared ‘national idea’ within these 
states play a vital role. That is to say, the state and the target groups share distinct 
‘core values,’ which are central to identities and interests, as well as relevant visions 
for all state population. However, when the state embarks upon nation-building, its 
behaviour and standpoint are easily perceived as threats by the target groups. While all 
involved actors aim to defend their well-being, the rivalry, interactions and 
competition between them are conversely self-reinforced and an intra-state security 
dilemma is realised.112  
 
This body of literature seems to reveal a new direction of security dilemma theory. 
Nevertheless, as discussed briefly in chapter one, the definition of ‘weakness’ has 
been subject to debate. Whilst it is generally agreed that a ‘weak state’ refers to 
elements such as lack of popular legitimacy and state institutions are ineffective in 
providing public services and security, many elements and conditions defining 
weakness are less clearly agreed upon.  
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According to Job, weak states are states suffering from domestic ethnic conflicts and 
faced with threats that are very often internally driven.113 Glenn underlines the lack of 
coercive means to carry out ruling power and the lack of public infrastructures. 
Moreover, Sørensen categorises weak states as based on a generally defective 
economy and an incoherent society in consolidation.114 What is more, Ayoob’s way of 
measurement involves a number of characteristics. In his view, apart from the lacks of 
internal cohesion in terms of economic, social, ethnic and regional aspects, and 
legitimacy of state boundary, institution and governing elites, the state’s inabilities 
towards the transnational and international contestations and corporations also need to 
be taken into consideration.115 To put them together, some of these defined-points 
cover the overlapping aspects, while others are defined by siding completely different 
features.  
 
As mentioned in chapter one, by drawing upon Ayoob’s categorisation, Tsering 
Topgyal characterises China as a weak state given an emphasis on the socio-political 
incohesion.116 Topgyal has then produced a series of valuable studies about China in 
which Tibet and Tibetans are taken as the major focus. 
 
This thesis, however, is cautious about their judgement; in particular, by considering 
the overall strengths of China’s economic performance, its state capacity, and its 
achievement of institution-building. In some ethnic minority regions, China arguably 
maintains a harmonious relationship. Thus, applying this framework to China might 
deserve reconsideration. On the other hand, this thesis suggests that the logic and main 
                                                     
113 Ibid, 17-18. 
114 Sørensen, “After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the 
Dilemma of Liberal Values,” 363-364. 
115 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 15. 
116 Ibid 16; Topgyal, China and Tibet, 15-17. 
62 
 
concepts of security dilemma theory are more conducive to examining the Chinese 
case. Some scholars have used this theory analysing the case of Xinjiang.117 As such, 
this research contributes an application to Tibet. 
 
The classical concepts of security dilemma theory and its applications in ethnic 
conflict have been widely discussed in this section. The theory, with its valuable 
insights, helps to illuminate the causes, developments and predicaments of intra-state 
conflicts in relation to the nation-building politics. These are the benefits for this 
thesis in adopting it to consider the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Following this section, 
this research discusses the concept of security. In particular, the aspects of societal 
security in which ethnic identity takes central stage will be discussed below, assessing 
how this concept has affected ethnic conflict studies. This is also in line with a 
significant academic move, as scholars began paying more attentions to the nuances of 
security since the end of Cold-War.118 
 
Societal Security and the Security Dilemma 
 
The notion of societal security was initialised by Barry Buzan in the early 1990s.119 
Buzan regarded it as the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, 
culture, religious national identities, and customs of states.120 Having been juxtaposed 
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with military, political, economic and environmental aspects, society, in his idea, was 
treated as one that altogether constituted a state’s national security. In other words, 
society is relative to and is not prioritised than other four aspects.121  
 
Ole Wæver and subsequent scholars in the Copenhagen School reconceptualised 
Buzan’s idea and broadened its usage. From Wæver’s perspective, society is not only 
viewed as an aspect accounting for state security, but also ‘a referent object of security 
in its own right’.122 Wæver argues that the core of society concerns identity.123 It is 
about self-identification or we-group awareness. In this sense, societal security can be 
understood as identity security. As such, the heart of this concept is surrounded by the 
maintenance of we-group identity. Wæver defines it as:  
 
 
The defence of an identity against a perceived threat, or more precisely, the 
defence of a community against a perceived threat to its identity.124  
 
 
Societal insecurity takes place within a community when its group members perceive 
their group to be meeting an identity crisis due to posed threats. Wæver further 
highlights the significance of identity to society with the analogy of the relationship 
between sovereignty and the state. He contends that as a state loses its sovereignty it 
will no longer exist as a state. Similarly, if a society loses its identity, it will not 
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survive as a society. 125  Therefore, just as a state protects its sovereignty by 
strengthening its relevant capabilities, a society can resort to various approaches to 
protect its societal identity.  
 
Wæver further considers the concept of society by distinguishing the concepts of 
civic- nation and ethnic- nation.126 To be specific, civic nation is defined through 
citizenship. Wæver notes that in some cases a society’s boundary equates to a 
nation-state if the people living in the state self-identify themselves as being unified; 
indeed, if these people are composed of groups from various ethnic backgrounds, they 
are a ‘state-nation’. Secondly, Wæver suggests that many politically significant 
ethno-national entities can also be societies, who have self-identified their existence, 
but do not form their own sovereign states, and/or necessarily do not coincide with 
current state borders. In many cases, they have posed challenges to the home states’ 
governance, or vice versa; these states are often the chief threat to society. Through 
the concepts of civic-nation and ethnic-nation, Wæver reminds us that in the distinct 
context, society and state can share distinct logic of security.127 
 
In developing a concept of society, Wæver and his peers broaden the horizon and 
analytical power of security studies. Significantly, they are inspired by their empirical 
observation on post-Cold War international politics and they seek to correct the flaws 
brought about by the traditional IR that limits its focuses to the state. The Copenhagen 
School aims to capture the conflictual dynamics where state and societies do not align, 
or cases where national minorities are in opposition to home states.  
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The Copenhagen School’s refinement of the concept of society influences its use in 
discussions regarding a state’s nation-building politics. Wæver defines societal 
security as:  
 
 
The ability of a society to persist under changing conditions and possible or 
actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable 
conditions, for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, 
association, and religious and national [ethnic] identity and custom…128 
 
 
In this respect, for a state’s nation-builders, reconciling civic national identities based 
on inclusive citizenship, and exclusive ethnic identities based on a variety of 
essentially common characteristics, can be an issue. Societal cohesion can influence 
state security, making society an important aspect of the latter. As Wæver says, the 
more secure these groups are in terms of identity, the less secure their home states may 
feel.129 Scholars have noted that during the process of conceptual construction of a 
common national identity, distinguishing ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is important. This process 
involves many dynamics of conflict since Other is always ‘securitised’ as a threat to 
Self. Other can be perceived in any ‘outside’ group, which can be constructed through 
identity and ethnicity, as well as other factors. In many cases, national construction 
emerges in the form of denigrating the Other. Further, as rhetoric combines with 
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political-legal measures, the Other is likely to receive a real threat.130 In this way, 
while nation-builders aim to create a stable Self, an enemy is inevitably created.  
 
In international politics, states usually attempt to increase their security by enhancing 
their own arms; at intra-state level, states can impose a set of institutions and policies 
for integration for the same purpose. However, such behaviour may create doubts 
within their domestic groups, wondering whether the states are in fact attempting to 
repress or damage local cultures and identities. Nation-building, therefore, can be seen 
as essentially ambiguous. On the one hand, it can be considered as a means to protect 
itself but on the other hand, it can also be perceived as an instrument to harm others. 
To clarify, in the context of a multi-ethnic state, the relationship between the state 
itself and its diverse ethnic groups, as individual societies, is controversial and may 
potentially involve tense interactions. 
 
While developing their concepts, the Copenhagen School met a variety of challenges. 
Criticisms from several scholars question their approach and stance over societal 
identity, claiming that Wæver et al imply an objectivist attitude. More specifically, 
they claim that the Copenhagen School ignores the socially constructed features of 
ethnicity/nationality, and instead, views them as a given fact.131 To some extent, the 
debate revolves around culturalism versus constructivism in relation to 
ethnicity/nationality. In their response, the Copenhagen School re-affirms that they do 
take a constructivist position. Buzan and Wæver insist they treat identity as a concept, 
but it is a concept that is socially constructed. 132  They justify themselves by 
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contending that “If one studies only the processes by which identities are formed, then 
identity never becomes a ‘thing’ at all: there is never a product as such”.133 To be 
more explicit, they consider societal identity as a temporarily fixed ‘thing’ within 
which its group members adhere to and behave according to certain common 
characteristics, in order to self-identify as group members. In this way, if societal 
identity is with a ‘fluid essence’ and identity is asserted to be persistent and be able to 
self-evolve along with change of social condition, questions over what can be a threat 
to identity is significant.  
 
For the Copenhagen School, threats are perceived to come from those who interfere 
with the reproduction of self-identification and from changes in natural process, 
relating to the survival of societies.134 Utilising Buzan’s concept, Paul addresses that 
as society is inter-related with the five sectors which account for state security, 
military, politics, economy, and environment, threats can be directed from each of 
these respective sectors.135 
 
First, military threats can stem from two sources: external and internal.136  The 
external aspects refer to a foreign state that attacks a society or indirectly, its home 
state and then the society, resulting in difficulties of societal re-generation for the 
community. Internal military threats refer to that from a society’s home state, often the 
central regime. Such incidents can take place where an ethnic group is in armed 
conflict with the state.137 Having often been linked to negative aspects, it should be 
acknowledged that military activity towards a society does not necessarily cause a 
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threat. In Roe’s presented examples, the French society remained relatively stable 
under Nazi Germany’s occupation during the Second World War.138 Furthermore, in 
the case of international intervention, military activity can be used to help protect and 
reinforce a society when the society is suppressed within a state.139 This will be 
discussed further below in the section on independent variables. 
 
Political threats refer to suppression of certain ethno-national groups by political 
means e.g. systematic/institutional discrimination; usually this happens to ethnic 
minorities. Roe suggests that military and political threats are frequently strongly 
connected when they occur. As such, threats can range from exclusion of societal 
members to suppression of the communities’ expression and re-production of 
culture.140  
 
Threats from the societal sector can cause a community to believe that its identity is in 
danger. Roe articulates this point by narrating a concept of ‘cultural cleansing’, or 
‘culturecide’. In his view, destruction of one group culture represents the demise of 
the group. He notes: 
 
 
Cultural cleansing poses an enormous threat to group cohesion. Cultural 
cleansing is perpetrated, not against populations as such, but manifestations of 
group culture: religious and educational establishments to note a prominent 
few.141 
                                                     
138 Ibid.. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, 50; “Societal Security,” 208. 





Societal threats do not only exist between inter-group relationships. Rather, as Wæver 
points out, as a state can also be regarded as a society, societal threats can stem from 
within the state. As we will analyse, the Sino-Tibetan conflict fits within this category.  
 
Moreover, in pondering societal composition and societal borders, Roe considers 
societal threats from three dimensions by referring to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. 
These include: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition.142 He 
contends that if the balance of community population in an area changes too quickly 
and its societal members cannot adapt, the community may grow insecure. Without 
doubt, the power of migration is evident. In terms of the Tibetan issue, many 
opponents of Beijing also claim that the government attempts to dilute the local 
population of Tibet by the influx of migrants from other regions. The notions of 
horizontal competition and vertical competition are also important. The former refers 
to communities ‘forced to change due to the cultural impacts from another group’, and 
the latter refers to communities ‘having to widen or narrow their identities by facing 
integration or disintegration’. Indeed, when assessing nation-building, in association 
with national integration (e.g. modernisation), this may potentially result in insecurity 
for the target group. 
 
Regarding economic threats, Roe associates this with the modern capitalist system, 
suggesting that threats can originate from transnational capital, including globalism.143 
In addition, the formation of economic threats can stem from domestic 
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socio-economic conditions. In either case, cultural distinctiveness is undermined, and 
‘consumer’ types can damage traditional identity.144 Sharing a similar line of thinking, 
economic modernisation and development, which includes marketisation in many 
Chinese ethnic minority regions (e.g. Tibet and pan-Tibetan areas) has been discussed 
in the existing literature.145 
 
Finally, Roe suggests that threats can stem from changes in the environment.146 
Reasons for the changes can be diverse and complex. They can be related to climate 
change or economic development, from natural to artificial causes. The discipline of 
environment psychology has produced plenty of research about environmental change 
and human emotion and perception.147 The core point here is that as land constitutes a 
significant aspect of identity, landscape changes can have huge impacts on the status 
of societal identity. As can be seen, environmental protection has also become an 
important element in defending Tibetan identity by the Dalai Lama and the Central 
Tibet Administration.  
 
By integrating the Copenhagen School’s notion of societal security into the security 
dilemma, Roe conceives his understandings in ethnic conflict. He defines this as:  
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The actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthen 
its own society), causing a reaction in a second society, which, in the end, 
decreases the first society’s own societal security (weakens its identity).148  
 
 
Clearly, the logic of inter-state interaction is now re-conceptualised into that of 
inter-societal interaction. To further apply this concept to ethnic conflict, Roe 
highlights a scenario as follows: ‘One society (ethnic group) seeking only to defend its 
identity within the state, may be perceived by another (ethnic group/state) as 
harbouring secessionist goals’.149 Within a nation-building process, when the home 
state implements its nationalising project towards its domestic target ethnic minorities, 
and if the latter perceive the state’s actions as threats to their societal identities, the 
sense of insecurity will also be enhanced and ‘security dilemma’ will be activated 
between them.150  
 
From the previous discussions of nation-building studies, we have understood that 
nation-building commitments would head to a certain degree of, and inevitably 
homogenisation within, the state border. However, a debate might then form within 
multi-ethnic states and in particular, where domestic ethnic groups are concerned 
about the survival of their ethnic distinctiveness and question the direction and 
components of the national society that is being defined by the state. Viewing this 
analogy from the perspective of security dilemma theory, when the state actor aims to 
strengthen the defined societal culture, the domestic ethnic group is likely to react by 
pursuing activities that strengthen its own. When the state recognises this reaction, the 
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state may then re-strengthen the nation-building programme aimed at national 
cohesion, which in turn can provoke another round of reactions from the domestic 
ethnic group. As such, their interactions turn into a cycle or spiral of escalating tension. 
If both sides cannot negotiate an amicable consensus, an ethnic conflict may result. 
 
It deserves noting that military means are not always adopted as the main approach to 
improve societal security. Wæver discusses how cultural means, or cultural 
nationalism (as interpreted by Roe) are also used.151 Cultural nationalism emphasises 
various commonalities of a group, such as language, culture, and religion and 
devalues factors that may downplay its integrity and solidarity. Cultural nationalists 
may even claim autonomous rights from the home state in association with cultural 
reproduction. Such mechanism is echoed in the literature of psychology. Research 
demonstrates that when a group’s integrity is threatened, the calls for positive and 
distinct group identity becomes salient. A bias favouring ingroup and derogating 
outgroup relatively increases.152  
 
Moreover, Roe argues that ‘ethnic or political nationalism’ can also emerge as a 
defensive response to the state by the target groups.153 The means through which this 
happens can be self-rule in the region where the societal groups dominates. Once this 
becomes the case, the situation can be more complicated and intensified.  
 
Finally, all steps within these interactions are significant. If either side, the state or the 
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societal groups, rejects to view the opposite as equal, rivalry can be escalated.154 Even 
worse, if violence has been employed by one side to fight against the other, peace will 
be very difficult to achieve and violent memories could hinder mutual trust thereby 
separating the entire nation for many years.155 Nevertheless, not all nation-building 
projects imposed by the state must necessarily harass the identity of ethnic groups. 
Instead, as Roe reminds us, it depends upon the individual social context and requires 
further examination.156 
 
Paul Roe’s Transformable Categories of Societal Security Dilemmas  
 
Having pondered the possibilities of unlocking the security dilemma, Paul Roe 
conceived of three societal security dilemma models. This section introduces his main 
arguments of the models and paves the way for building the conceptual framework for 
this thesis. This section will also discuss Roe’s theoretical achievements and identified 
flaws. While his conceptual contribution is addressed, as this thesis will point out, Roe 
seems to blur the scope of security dilemma and security threat, which makes his 
analytical models imprecise. To fill this gap, this research refreshes his ideas and in 
particular, discards the notion of loose societal dilemma. In the next section, this 
chapter will propose a new framework.  
 
Inspired by the Copenhagen School’s social constructivist stance, Roe formulates a 
view that societal security dilemma emerges, not only due to the political structure 
featured as an anarchy-like domain, but also due to the involved actors’ choice to 
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interact in a way that their actions construct an anarchic political structure. In this 
respect, the root of the dilemma is related to the actors’ perceptions and actions within 
interactions with others. As a result, Roe distinguishes what is termed by this thesis as 
‘transformable’ categories of societal security dilemmas, within which actors can 
change and even leave the dilemmas they engage in. These categories are 
reconceptualised from his works, termed as: tight, regular and loose (detailed further 
below).157  
 
In a tight societal dilemma, misinterpretation of others’ intention plays a key role. In 
Roe’s definition, the tight societal dilemma occurs when there is an illusory 
incompatibility between the two groups regarding their individual societal security 
requirements. Both sides are security-seekers in nature, but mutual misperceptions 
over bilateral relationships compel them to act as if they harbour revisionist desires 
towards each other. Activated and exacerbated by the action-reaction spirals, tension is 
unleashed, and in some instances, violence and war break out.  
 
In the regular societal dilemma, the argument centres on the incompatible security 
requirement; unlike the tight societal dilemma, misperception does not constitute the 
main element. Within this scenario, both involved actors are still security-seekers in 
nature, but the logic directing the actors’ behaviour is in accordance with ‘real 
incompatibility’. In this respect, actions for self-maintenance and security–
enhancement, including strengthening aspects of societal identity by the first group, 
result in the necessary insecurity of the second. The presence of the first group 
overrides the autonomy and coherence of the second group. The relationship between 
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them is manifest as a zero-sum game. 
 
The third type of societal dilemma is the loose formulation. Paul Roe argues that its 
nature contrasts with the other two approaches. Whereas the involved actors are the 
security-seekers in the first two scenarios, the actors are mainly the power-seekers. In 
this way, the central argument is that the actors involved behave according to the 
offence-defence balance, rather than a calculation of self-security. Offensive action is 
adopted when a greater advantage is expected. Similarly, defensive action is taken 
when the actor expects to acquire benefits. Within these scenarios, aggression is 
ignited or deterred based on anticipated returns. Moreover, the lack of malign 
intention, a significant element in other types of dilemmas, no longer exists in this 
formulation. Given the offence-defence logic, Roe contends that the loose societal 
dilemma allows for the existence of hostile intention. 
 
From the outset, Roe operationalise these three types as a way to analyse the dynamics 
of ethnic conflict dynamics in the former Yugoslav and other East European examples. 
The implications brought about by differentiation are thought-provoking. These 
typologies draw analytical attention to the dimensions of involved actors’ perceptions 
about themselves, others, and political structures that feature the conditions of 
uncertainty and fear. To clarify, Paul Roe suggests that:  
 
 
This categoriz[s]ation essentially derives from a refocusing of the security 
dilemma away from the fundamental compatibility of ‘goals’ to the 
fundamental compatibility of ‘security requirements’ instead. That is, I shift 
the emphasis of enquiry from the general, whether security is being sought, to 
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the more specific, the means through which security is being sought.158 
 
 
Clearly, his purpose is not only to conceive frameworks to describe different aspects 
of ethnic violence, but prescriptively he also attempts to explore potential solutions to 
confrontations. Roe focuses on the fundamental role of intention in determining 
interactions in different situations. Following this logic, the difference between benign 
and malign intention can be used to group the ‘tight and regular societal dilemmas’ 
together, and the ‘loose societal dilemma’. Then, whether or not security needs are 
reconciled for the actors involved, can be used to categorise between tight and regular 
societal dilemma.159 This way of narrowing down the interpretation adds extra credit 
to the original argument of the security dilemma. 
 
Arguably, two main contributions have been achieved by Paul Roe’s work. Firstly, the 
distinction between tight, regular and loose styles offer more deliberate and 
comprehensive tools for analysts to discuss a great body of both inter- and intra-state 
ethnic violence and wars. Researchers are able to further explore causation and 
correlation in individual cases. Secondly, these models can help to specify attributes of 
responsibility of the involved actors. While Paul Roe claims that the security dilemma 
features as a tragedy, his narrow interpretation highlights the agential dynamics. In 
this sense, researchers are able to conceptualise the involved actors in terms of distinct 
security requirements when configuring a variety of cases, differentiating whether the 
cases belong to either the resolvable or the irreconcilable categories. It is the latter 
types of conflict that need devotion in order to transform them into resolvable 
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conflicts by reformulating the actors’ security requirements. His models thereby 
provide thoughts in considering conflicts as well as possible resolutions. 
 
To provide a broader picture, Roe is working out dynamics to escape the predicament 
of the security dilemmas. His argument highlights the agency of actors; their 
perception is strongly connected to what they practice. This way of thinking echoes 
Booth and Wheeler’s three redefined types of ideational schemes in terms of ‘logics of 
insecurity’.160 They are transcender logic, mitigator logic, and fatalist logic. In their 
perspectives, these three logics consist of different understandings of security, namely 
Kantian, Lockean, and Hobbesian logics, which constitute the means of interaction 
between the actors. These logics, and therefore their respective corresponding 
conceptions of security, also posit alternative methods to deal with insecurity. 
Essentially, they contend that the IR environment is what the involved actors 
created.161 They are in line with the Wendtian standpoint.162 
 
The merits of Roe’s models have been presented here, and they are helpful in 
understanding further prospects of the security dilemma. However, certain challenges 
to his frameworks are identified and are addressed below.  
 
Firstly, the terminology of Roe’s three models easily confuses researchers. For many, 
the explanations given to the tight, regular, and loose security formulations seem hard 
to grasp and the major content of each one is difficult to determine. Roe did give 
definitions about each item, but the principle orienting the categories to the 
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corresponding content is vague. That is, Roe fails to explain his logic naming the 
models. It is fair to say that conceptualisation of terminology is subjective and is a 
privilege belonging to the author, but a point of clarity should also be taken into 
account.  
 
The second identified drawback of Roe’s models is essential. He recognises the 
importance of intention, though he does not provide a concrete approach to 
uncovering said intentions in different situations. Consequently, it is unclear how to 
differentiate between an offensive stance and a defensive stance. Similarly, a potential 
flaw also occurs in the differentiation between the tight and the regular societal 
dilemma, as Roe does not deliver an accurate indicator. To both, Roe claims that the 
issue is with the illusory incompatibility of security versus reality.163 According to 
Shiping Tang’s review, Roe is never clear about whether he adopts a subjective or an 
objective attitude. 164  In operational terms, Roe’s models would face technical 
questions when attempting to categorise specific cases. This undoubtedly reduces the 
theoretical credibility.  
 
Furthermore, from the perspective of a theoretical foundation, Roe’s models are also 
questionable. Not all his security formulations have been aligned to the core notions of 
the classic security dilemma. To be more explicit, he may have blurred the concept 
between the security dilemma and others such as security problem. Consequently, his 
deviation of conceptual uniformity seriously dilutes the value of the security dilemma.  
 
In the first section, we reviewed several key elements of the security dilemma. Among 
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them, several aspects are outlined, including the anarchic nature of the IR environment, 
the lack of malign intention, and the accumulation of power. In this respect, the notion 
of the tight societal dilemma is arguably successful in terms of these features. Roe has 
also importantly advanced an understanding that the dilemma can be dissolved when 
illusory incompatibility of the security requirement has been acknowledged by the 
actors.  
 
By allowing the occasional outbreak of violence within the tight societal dilemma, 
Roe leaves a puzzle. That is, there is a confusion over distinguishing the tight and 
regular societal dilemmas in theory. Although he suggests that these two types can be 
measured by whether there are compatible security requirements or not, the same 
outcome of the types, in fact, discredits the meaning and usefulness of this division. 
This thesis will therefore preserve Roe’s main argument that the tight societal 
dilemma can move towards coexistence, but exclude his allowance for the occasional 
outbreak of violence, in order to keep theoretical coherence and avoid the issues 
outlined above.  
 
With regard to the regular societal dilemma, Roe’s argument also brings about 
criticism. He claims that the relationship between intention and action may not be 
coherent: an actor may hold a benign intention, but can adopt a seemly malign action 
at the same time. He uses this to argue that the regular societal dilemma still conforms 
to the concept of security dilemma.165 By identifying a notion of required insecurity, 
Roe claims that within the regular societal dilemma, an actor can behave aggressively, 
but theoretically speaking, without intending to harm others.166 A question could be 
                                                     




raised here, that is, how to measure the exact original intention of actors? Roe does 
not provide an explanation. Given this omission, Roe is challenged by the question of 
whether his argument deviates from the core notions of security dilemma theory. 
Shiping Tang criticises Roe, asserting that he must either misrecognise an outcome of 
an activated security dilemma or he has essentially miscategorised a false security 
dilemma. In other words, Roe only either catches part of the aspects of the security 
dilemma or he incorrectly categorises cases of threat.167 
 
To support his argument, Roe cites the concepts of Charles Glaser and Robert Jervis. 
In the former, Glaser contends that a state, while not being expansionist, is still 
capable of adopting an aggressive stance if such action is the solution to counter its 
own insecurity.168 In this way, Roe claims that the actors are still security-seekers in 
nature. They are very cautious about conflicts, and the consequential conflicts are still 
regarded as ‘unintentional’. According to Jervis, relationships between 
Germany-France and Germany-Russia prior to the First World War, exemplifies these 
cases.169 In either situation, any one of the actors must take an aggressive stance 
towards others, although these states claimed themselves as the status quo states. In 
this sense, a scenario of regular societal dilemmas and the principle of the security 
dilemma are congruent.  
 
This thesis suggests that Roe’s argument is valid. In this thesis’s operation, the author 
will use the collected first-hand materials to help distinguish which interaction 
belongs to compatible, and incompatible security requirements.  
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Finally, the loose societal dilemma manifests as the most problematic. This category 
does not satisfy the main foundations of the security dilemma at all. Actors within this 
formulation have malign intentions interacting with others and are defined as 
power-seekers who only calculate interests in action, rather than the 
self-security-protectors in any aspects. In this way, the element of offensive 
unintentionality has been omitted since the actors can be aggressive in thinking and 
their actions can justifiably make them aggressors.170 To this point, a line between the 
security dilemma and the security threat is completely blurred. The significant point of 
uncertainty – towards others’ intention and thereby the actor’s own, does not matter. 
Following the logic of loose societal dilemma, it would be impossible to regard any 
outbreak of conflict as an ‘unintended consequence’. Nor can it be termed as a 
‘tragedy’ of mis-communication. Instead, conflicts are predictable in this type of 
scenario, given the principle that actors have tended to attack to gain advantage. This 
implication demonstrates a clear contradiction to the security dilemma. 
 
While Roe tries to refine his argument to claim that the loose societal dilemma is 
applicable as a formulation of societal security dilemma, he admits that this indicts 
full criticism.171 Most points used to enhance this typology, face the same challenges, 
as they all confront the basic ideas of security dilemma.172 Viewing these severe 
theoretical flaws, this research suggests that a separation of the loose societal dilemma 
from the camp of security dilemma is justifiable. 
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Thus far, this section has reviewed Paul Roe’s three models of societal dilemmas and 
their advantages and flaws. Roe’s academic purpose involves a balance between 
explanation and resolution of the ethnic conflict. He is ambitious to create models 
being applicable to all manners of cases and categorises them by their characteristics. 
Nevertheless, this goal surpassed the major objective of security dilemma theory. In 
fact, the theory confined itself to a certain domain in the first place. As John Herz, the 
founding father of the security dilemma notes, this theory is aimed at revealing how a 
security dilemma situation could result in war, but the security dilemma shall not be 
the only cause of all human conflicts; conflicts could also erupt from malign 
expansionists.173  
 
Explaining State-Ethnic Minority Relations: A New Framework 
 
In the previous discussions, this thesis addressed strengths and usefulness of security 
dilemma theory as an analytical framework. It also identified certain gaps in the 
current literature. While scholars have paid great attention to the concept and 
conceptualisation of the theory itself, discussions about specific factors affecting the 
dilemma are comparatively less. As a meso-level theory, many studies often present it 
as an explanatory concept, but relevant and in-depth analysis in terms of what or how 
variables function and affect the mechanism is relatively new. Kaufman integrates 
leadership factor and mass emotion to the security dilemma.174 Tang contributes 
another innovative effort by raising factors including emotion, interest, capability, and 
opportunity. However, he mainly outlines the logic about how these elements can 
result in the security dilemma without giving further analysis. All these elements 
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contain more sub-elements, such as fear, honour, and anger, which can be 
distinguished under the category of emotion. 175  Improvement of these gaps is 
arguably valuable and necessary. To this point, this section presents an original work 
about security dilemma theory by integrating two independent variables and drawing 
upon the existing literature.  
 
First of all, this research revisits the concept of uncertainty, highlighting its central 
role in the framework-foundation. Then, it re-distinguishes three categories as 
low-uncertainty societal dilemma, high-uncertainty societal dilemma, and real security 
threat. Aligned with the classic security dilemma concept, the real security threat is 
separated from the camp of security dilemma. Then, variables of state-led 
modernisation and international intervention to the exemplified societal dilemmas are 
respectively discussed. Degrees of peace and conflict in the state-ethnic minority 
relationship are ranked.  
 
Uncertainty 
Arguably, uncertainty constitutes an essential starting point for the analytical concepts 
in this research. Given the comprehensive review of the security dilemma, it is 
identified that uncertainty occupies the most significant notion that triggers the whole 
mechanism of the dilemma, leading to other features, including self-help and defense 
and broader spiral interaction between or among actors. In the security dilemma, 
uncertainty is strongly related to insecurity and fear. This thesis views uncertainty to 
be an internal view towards the future in relation to the survival of self and being 
engaged in violent confrontation with others. It is regarded as a feeling and an 
anticipatory stance that shapes one’s action and response to others.  
                                                     




Having pointed out that the existence of uncertainty can stem from an ‘unresolvable’ 




...you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing 
from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you 
to realise or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your 




While initially his discussion about uncertainty in the security dilemma was related to 
interstate conflict in the international anarchic environment, this concept has also been 
used to examine the relationship between state and non-state actors at an intra-state 
level and in ethnic conflict.177 
 
With regard to survival, uncertainty can link sources that can potentially become 
threats (i.e. physical extinction, decomposition of material elements, etc.) to those that 
can help self-define ourselves as a community, with a specific group identity, be it 
national or ethnic.178 In nation-building politics, if a group has formed a distinct 
identity as a social figuration, and if the process integrating the group into the 
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naitonalising state would result in the loss of this identity, either real or imagined, the 
state’s nation-building endeavour poses a potential risk for the group. On the other 
hand, if the group owns an agency strong enough to demand and resist or even appeal 
to an external actor to intervene in the state’s endeavour, the group can be a challenger 
to the integrity of the nationalising state. Based on this conception, this thesis will 
further discuss the catergorised societal dilemmas and the resulting variables in the 
next sections.    
 
In their comprehensive analysis, Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler identifies two 
features of the security dilemma, and uncertainty plays a central role in both 
aspects.179 Accordingly, the interpretation of others’ intentions and the response to 
others are the main issues within the security dilemma. They contend that due to the 
feature of uncertainty, those responsible in making decisions regarding significant 
matters face a difficult choice, which is telling others whether to be defensive or 
offensive. Subsequently, the decision-maker, even after figuring out the purposes, 
would have to determine his own response. Then, the actor faces a new round of 
choices between delivering offensive or defensive signals. Afterwards, the opposing 
actor faces a similar pattern of decision-making in deciding their reaction. From the 
view of Booth and Wheeler, uncertainty can not only cause these predicaments, but 
also possibly cause mutual hostility through a spiral interaction of going through 
misplaced suspicion or misplaced trust.180  
 
Owing to the logic of self-protection under sense of uncertainty, people are 
encouraged to prepare for the worst in order to tackle a potential threat. An emphasis 
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on expecting the worst case-scenario, as a consequence, often detracts attention from 
logical conflict resolution and a true solution. Approaching an issue from this mindset 
easily distracts the actors involved from viewing a probable positive outcome and 
results in taking a harder position in their policies and practices. Moreover, it easily 
transforms a routine activity into an object implicating fear, anxiety and negative 
impression. All these would damage trust-building and may generate misperception.  
 
To some extent, studies of asymmetric conflict echoes this perspective. The literature 
argues that actors situated in a asymmetric power relations, not inevitably but often, 
have differences regarding attention to the risk perception and interactive behaviour. 
Influenced by the size of resources and conditions, the importance of the stronger 
actor for the weaker and the importance of the weaker for the stronger can also be 
asymmetric. For one thing, the weaker actor tends to be more sensitive and exaggerate 
typical unilateral action adopted by the stronger actor as a threat. For another, the 
stronger tends to perceive the weaker actor’s active action in looking for respect as a 
challenge. Differences in perspectives result in differences in perception and 
behaviour. Considering such a way of interpretation and interaction, misperception is 
common and can lead to conflict.181  
 
This perspective provides implications for this research. The development of the 
Sino-Tibetan negotiation may partially be line with such a scenario. Womack argues 
that power asymmetry between Beijing and Dharamsala has caused both sides to share 
distinct understandings and perceptions towards each other. For the Tibetans, the 
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Chinese commitments in Tibet are regarded as a significant societal threat; while for 
the CCP, the active demands for cultural autonomy and internationalisation tactics 
from the Dalai Lama and the TGIE only imply separatism. It is because of this 
disparity of interpretations that drives the break down in bilateral negotiations.182   
 
To deal with this issue, putting uncertainty under control through prediction and ways 
to behave accordingly is essential to human functioning.183 The actors engaged in the 
interaction strive to distinguish the motivation, intention, and capacity of their rival. 
Theoretically speaking, all actors in the structure of the security dilemma adopt a 
defensive stance.184 However, for those who are in the interaction, they may gain a 
contrarian perspective.185 Even though one actor does not intend to threaten the other, 
the rivalry may still perceive a sense of threat. In this case, one actor’s increasing 
reassurance for its own security can have an unintentional impact on how the other 
views their security.  
 
Moreover, even if one actor can know another's intention, the actor can not always be 
assured that the others would not change their minds due to various reasons at 
different times. In other words, the problem of uncertainty still exists. Jennifer Mitzen 
presents a concept of ontological security to analyse state actors’ behaviour.186 
Narrating this logic, Mitzen explains why some states seem irrational in their 
decisions to continue engaging with conflicts, because this way of routinisation can 
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serve them with a function acquiring a higher certainty, compelling them to take other 
actions. However, such argument again demonstrates that uncertainty constitutes a 
significant element in decision-making. Having said so, as a separate question, this 
thesis does not argue that researchers should not value the real intention of the 
involved actors, which is also a topic that has become a long-term debate between the 
positivists and the post-positivists.187 This research suggests that to a large extent, 
archives, interviews and field surveys are helpful to begin to understand intentions. 
What this research aims to underline here, is uncertainty can be a significant challenge 
for the involved actors interacting with others, which explains why scholars often 
connect the security dilemma to tragedy.  
 
Due to an uncertainty about others, the involved actors can only choose to securitise 
themselves; however, a larger degree of this sense of uncertainty would emerge 
thereafter. IR Theory academics have thus debated how to overcome this 
uncertainty.188 In the real world, many formal or informal institutions have been 
established or normalised to facilitate communication and reduce uncertainty.  
 
There is a larger body of literature reminding us that ideologies and emotions can 
influence an actor’s perception of another’s behavioral action, in which uncertainty 
plays a significant and complex role in the reaction being shaped or in shaping.189 In 
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terms of case studies, Posen contributes a classic research. He uses the concept of 
uncertainty and security dilemma to examine the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
and the former Soviet Union with a focus on Russian-Ukrainian relations.190 Dunn 
argues that a pervasive sense of uncertainty caused an autochthony discourse in his 
examined African cases. 191  Elsewhere, Bertrand narrates the ethnic conflicts 
occurring in Indonesia by analysing anxiety as a widespread emotion in the changing 
society.192 By focusing on the concept of ‘fear to the future’, which derives from the 
sense of uncertainty, Mcdoom and Pearlman in their respective studies analyse the 
outbreak of civil war in Rwanda in 1994 and Syria in 2011. Significantly, they both 
note that causation between fear and violence may not be one way; rather, they can 
affect each other in tandem.193    
 
This research recognises such arguments and notices this point. An actor’s tolerance 
and view on the other can vary194 and the way that uncertainty functions should 
remain relatively constant. It is for this reason that this research highlights the 
historical context and dynamic interaction among actors.    
 
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
The low-uncertainty societal dilemma draws upon notions of Roe’s tight societal 
dilemma and focuses on a key feature of reconcilable implications. In this scenario, 
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the involved actors are security-seekers in nature and they interact with others with 
defensive gestures. Tension may still exist due to misinterpretation of illusory 
incompatibility of security needs of the interacting actors. In this scenario, two 
societies are able to coexist. As long as there is justifiable information transparency 
and confidence between both societal groups, the dilemma is escapable. 
 
Taking Roe’s tight societal dilemma, this thesis contends that low-uncertainty societal 
dilemma appears when there is an illusory incompatibility between two or more 
groups with regard to their own societal security requirement. As Roe argues, the 
dilemmatic situation takes place when the involved actors’ are uncertain of the 
intentions behind each other’s action. In this sense, where one actor’s security 
requirements in the tight societal dilemma do not, in reality, conflict with that of the 
other, and both actors employ only defensive means, the mutual distrust and fear can 
still result in misperception and tension.195 However, given in its essence the security 
incompatibility is illusory, coexistence is feasible. The implication is that while the 
involved actors consider themselves in tension, harmony existed as a result of their 
interactions. 
 
Biligic argues that actors interpret the politics of the security dilemma in relation to 
how they would interact with others.196 As a result, actors in the low-uncertainty 
societal dilemmas should refuse a dichotomist and realist/neorealist attitude andadopt 
constructivism to pursue harmony.  
 
The obstacle to the mitigation of conflict rests on the stream of interactions shadowed 
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by misperception. Robert Jervis’s argument of the ‘spiral model’ that is distinct from 
the ‘deterrence model’, can also be addressed to illuminate the low-uncertainty 
societal dilemma.197 Both models similarly demonstrate an action-reaction cycle, but 
a key conceptual difference is whether there is malign intention. In the spiral model, 
actors enhance themselves for the purpose of self-protection, where the ‘apparent 
threat’ cannot be real. Conversely, in the deterrence model, actors’ self-enhancement, 
through deterrence of others, can serve to be the ‘real threat’. A real threat does not, 
however, exist when returning to the classic features of the security dilemma, meaning 
that only Jervis’s spiral reaction model is in line with the classic notion of security 
dilemma. 
 
To summarise, tight societal dilemma and the spiral model provide the following 
inputs towards the low-uncertainty societal dilemma. Firstly, tension is easily 
triggered within inter-group interactions, though the actors in practice have situated a 
place of mitigaiton. Secondly, a means for trust building are significant in preventing a 
swing to the high-uncertainty societal dilemma. This is of particular use for this thesis 
in the context of Tibet, as the Sino-Tibetan relationship is locked into the security 
dilemma andat certain times coexistence is recognisable.    
 
High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
The high-uncertainty societal dilemma is based upon the notions of Roe’s regular 
societal dilemma and centralised on the concept of mutually exclusive security needs 
within actors’ interactions. In this scenario, all sides involved are still security-seekers 
in nature and they all adopt a defensive stance. However, their security requirements 
are incompatible, and actions aimed at self-maintenance and security–enhancement 
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result in the insecurity of others. As a result, the presence of one actor necessitates the 
insecurity of the other’s autonomy and coherence. The bilateral relationship is 
manifest as a zero-sum style.  
 
Within the high-uncertainty societal dilemma circumstance, involved actors are 
sensitive to the opposites’ intentions and behaviours. Referring to the five dimensions 
of societal security that threats can emerge from sectors of military, politics, society, 
economy and environment, when the first actor touches one of these areas, the other 
actor can react at a fast pace. In turn and in return, the action-reaction spiral intensifies 
tension.  
 
Similar to the regular societal dilemma in which Roe argues that the formulation falls 
into a ‘difficult to resolve short of war’ scenario, the result of high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma scenario is often outbreak of violence and war. This type of societal dilemma 
matches the classic security dilemma. However, if appropriate strategies from internal 
or external sources could be utilised to help resettle and reformulate security 
requirements for all sides, conflict could be mitigated and turned into the 
low-uncertainty. This thesis thereby argues that dynamics through which conflict can 
be resolved exist.   
 
Real Security Threat 
The notion of the real security threat is irrelevant to any form of the security dilemmas. 
It is distinguished here as a contingent category. The definition of real security threat 
is quite straightforward. The real security threat is measured in the same terms as the 
previous discussion based on the offensive stance. In our theoretical operation, this 




The concept of the real security threat builds upon the previous critique of Roe’s loose 
societal dilemma. As identified, the argument of the loose security formulation is 
contradictory to the core assumptions of the security dilemma. Both its acceptances of 
power-seeking and existence of hostile intention, go against a theoretically defensive 
stance of security dilemma. Roe fully acknowledges questions over his model but 
argues that concerns over whether intentions are benign or malign are less important 
than whether or not security requirements are compatible or incompatible.198 In 
addition, he aims to categorise types of ethnic conflict into those that can be resolved 
without violence and those that are difficult to resolve without violence. As such, Roe 
suggests few solutions to a loose societal dilemma. To justify his argument, Roe refers 
to different scholars. Firstly, in his reference to Charles Glaser’s examination over 
greedy state actors and their actions, Roe argues that greedy states and the security 
dilemma can still co-exist. He claims that ‘there is no pure greedy state in reality’.199 
Further, Angstrom and Duyvesteyn’s declining-prize dilemma, where the 
power-seekers pursue action to gain benefits is raised, even though violence would 
erode the upcoming prize. Finally, Roe incorporates Kaufmann’s discussions with 
regard to certain conflicts that are irresolvable if they lack military means.200 Despite 
all these arguments, it is argued that by bringing malign intention to security dilemma 
theory, Roe blurs the security dilemma and security threat. The category of real 
security threat is necessary to avoid this mistake.  
 
Overall, the denial of the real security threat from the camp of security dilemma 
thereby making it an independent type, can be conceptually useful. Listing it with the 
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low- and high-uncertainty societal dilemmas, this thesis can examine the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship in an inclusive manner.  
 
Coexistence and Conflict in the Societal Dilemmas 
The previous section introduced new typologies of societal dilemmas. In both the 
low-uncertainty and the high-uncertainty security formulations, involved actors are 
defined as security-seekers, with the main difference being the compatibility, or 




Figure 2-1 Societal Dilemmas and Outcomes 
 
 
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemma refers to where an illusory incompatibility exists 
within mutual perceptions. The logic is that while the security dilemma is activated, 
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by seeking interactions through common ground, both parties are able to coexist and 
transcend the confrontation. Neither groups’ security requires the other’s insecurity. 
 
High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma refers to where one actor’s security does require 
the other’s insecurity. When the security dilemma is activated in this scenario, 
violence and war can easily break out between both actors because they are not able to 
make concessions towards each other.  
 
These distinguished types not only advance the notions of the security dilemma to 
intra-state conflicts, but also present windows of opportunity for alleviating and 
transcending the security predicament. Being linkable and transformable, these 
models provide an integrative analytical framework to explore the dynamics of ethnic 
conflicts. As illustrated, a low-uncertainty societal dilemma suggests a result of 
coexistence and transcendence; whereas the high-uncertainty and real security threat 
formulations mainly result in violence. 
 
Independent Variables 
This section focuses on the relationship between the developed societal dilemmas 
addressed above and independent variables. By integrating these variables, it analyses 
the formation of sense of uncertainty in the state-ethnic minority relations. This 
section presents scholarly works that help to build the independent variables below.  
 
State-led Modernisation: Radical or Modest 
State-led modernisation is the first variable of the security dilemmas. The state-led 
element is included in order to stress the context of nation-building. The concept is 
built by drawing upon the literature of modernisation theory, which has elucidated the 
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positive and negative effects of modernisation to national integration and I argue that 
the degree of radicalisation within modernisation imposition plays a key role. From 
below, this section begins with a discussion of the relationship between modernisation 
and identity. Then, a sophisticated point that national identity and multiple 
sub-national identities can form within the same modernisation process is clarified. 
This section then suggests, as modernisation continues that results in a sense of 
insecurity by target groups, the phenomena of security dilemma can be activated; the 
degree of radicalisation would matter.   
 
Firstly, modernisation refers to the increase of urbanisation, industrialisation, and 
transportation as well as other state administration and apparatus. This is believed to 
lead to psychological effects from these material bases above that lead to 
homogenisation of people within the scope. This notion has been hugely influenced by 
the works of Karl Deutsch. In his view, modernisation contains a strong power to 
construct and reconstruct identity. Its process operates in parallel to continuous social 
mobilisation. In association with this, modernisation reconfigures the social, economic 
and psychological ties of a society and reconnects the involved population into 
relatively new groupings of identity and self-identification.201  
 
Modernisation theory suggests that homogenisation features as a conspicuous 
outcome of modernisation. Weiner stresses a key mechanism of integration. From his 
perspective, state-led modernisation accompanies the process of bringing culturally 
and socially diverse groups into a single unit under governmental authority. It would 
be helpful to unite the whole group by a common thread and to reorganise them within 
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a certain territorial and political scope.202 To this point, the mind of nation-building 
guides the integration and its specific implement down to various areas.203 Anthony 
Birch heralds the significance of national integration and admires its function in 
building a state's legitimacy. He believes that through the effort of building public 
institutions and political socialisation by the government, a shared sense of national 
loyalty can be forged.204  
 
Taking a similar standpoint, Breuilly also contends that political modernisation plays a 
key role in generating communal consciousness. According to him, 
institution-building occupies the central space of political modernisation which 
reflects the intention of the ruler and frames the reactions of the ruled. Once the state 
has successfully legitimatised its existence in the minds of the people within the 
territory, Breuilly argues, the notion of a nation as a state is deemed to be 
congruent.205  
 
In the following empirical cases, the force of state-led modernisation is argued to 
foster a sense of nationhood. For example, in her examination of public construction 
in early twentieth century Turkey, Kezer contends that the extension of public 
infrastructure helped to create a web of imagined community in people's minds 
through their daily life experience within state controlled spaces.206 Similarly, in the 
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case of modern China, Kipnis identified an increased standardisation in the whole of 
society, driven by three dynamics of consolidation: a national education system, the 
expansion of urbanisation, and advancement in communication. He argued that 
increased commonality produced a general sense of Chinese nationhood.207 From 
these examples, modernisation can therefore be argued to be a helpful and positive 
tool for national construction.  
 
However, it has also been noted that identity may not be linearly forged in the 
direction that the nation-builders desire. Empirical evidence has shown that 
modernisation can lead to the formation of identity consciousness within the state 
boundary, but crucially, the state may not be able to dominate the content of 
‘we-group’. In other words, modernisation can possibly generate multiple and 
multilevel identities based on various conditions. In Gellner’s concept, this is a result 
of an uneven spread of modernisation, which explains the existence of diverse 
nations/ethnicities in the modern world.208  
 
As modernisation keeps being imposed, the target group other than the dominant 
nation-builder may complicate the politics of nation-building. In this way, the 
dynamics of modernisation can contribute to the onset of ethnic conflict. 
 
Deutsch suggests that social mobilisation accompanied by modernisation can have 
unexpected effects. Through greater political and economic contacts amongst different 
societal groups, people identify either their similarities or differences. The conditions 
are various and situational. If societal mobilisation does not lead to the erosion of 
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internal differences and build a common identity, the alternative path could be that 
societal members' awareness concerning ethnic differences becomes salient. Further, 
this leads to “a new growth of nationalism among the newly mobilised 
populations”.209  Potentially, such a wave of nationalism can then in turn pose 
challenges to the whole society, in particular the national cohesion.  
 
The target groups’ perception towards the status quo and any change brought about 
with modernisation is important. According to the Copenhagen School and Roe, when 
changes are perceived as a natural process, societal identity can alter along with the 
process. In other words, societal groups can generate a perception of threat if changes 
are not perceived to occur at a natural pace.210 Further referring to the previous 5 
threats to societal security; military, politics, society, economy, and environment, the 
dynamics to the sense of insecurity is illuminating. Significantly, modernisation can 
be strongly related to these sources to threat. In this way, as state-led modernisation is 
radically imposed and causing radical changes, perceptions of a threat can grow 
correspondingly.   
 
When facing state-led modernisation, the relationship between a target ethnic group’s 
perception of its identity survival and the perception to the state’s action is a dynamic 
interaction. The existing literature covers a vast number of empirical case studies and 
articulates that often the target groups fear the erosion of the status quo, not only in 
terms of material aspects, but also psychological features.211 These fears can lead to 
perceived threats to security, the kinds of which were discussed previously in this 
thesis when outlining Security Dilemma Theory. The groups can thus generate 
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discontent towards the state over revision of established statuses and resource 
redistribution.212  
 
Connor and Horowitz both address the issue of between-group competition triggered 
as a result of modernisation. Connor addresses the relationship between economic 
competition and increase of inter-group interaction within modernisation. He states 
that as modernisation leads to previously isolated groups being bound together, 
societies would be reorganised at the same time. Relevantly, intergroup competition 
becomes possible for the economic benefits of the groups.213 Horowitz expands on 
this issue, highlighting the effects and intertwinement of economy and politics in this 
context of modernising transition. If one group perceives its economic condition to be 
worsening as a result of modernisation, they will demand improvement from the state. 
Horowitz suggests that the process of modernisation must also involve resource 
redistribution. In addition, Horowitz emphasises the concept of cultural persistence. 
According to him , if a group considers the state-imposed modernisation to be a threat 
to its culture, while the state is incapable of handling such suspicion, the group may 
refuse the state’s policy and this may lead to bilateral tension.214 Expressing a similar 
idea, Sambanis argues that when facing powerful modernisation that can dissolve 
traditional society, the target group always constructs a distinct political identity as a 
defensive mechanism and thereby opposes the state. In his observation, this is often 
the case in Third World states that are under pressure of nation-building towards its 
multiple ethnic minorities.215 
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To summarise, state-led modernisation’s imposition on ethnic minority area poses 
dual implications of positivity and negativity to the societal security dilemmas. State’s 
strategy – being radical or modest – is significant, and related to the perception of the 
targeted group. This research will assess the means used by the Chinese Party in 
intensive and extensive nation-state-building projects involving Tibet. At distinct 
times, Tibetans perceived them as threats and bilateral confrontation occurred and 
moved towards the security dilemmas.  
 
International Intervention: Existence or Not 
The fact that international factors have a profound impact on ethnic conflict has been 
emphasised in relevant studies.216 Arguably, the presence or not of external assistance 
matters to the balance between the state and the target group, and thereafter their 
relationship. Drawing upon the current literature, this research formulates 
international intervention as the second variable to the sense of uncertainty and the 
security dilemmas.  
 
Previous research has already explored the triadic interplay between the nationalising 
state, its constituent societal groups (usually the target ethnic groups) and external 
actors. This section will review past studies of external intervention in a state’s 
nation-building project regarding the incentives and impacts. Literature relevant to the 
responses from the nationalising state and its domestic target groups will also be 
reviewed. In terms of the question of Tibet, which has been a highly internationalised 
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political issue,217 discussion within this section will be beneficial in revealing the role 
of international actors.   
 
In this thesis, ‘international dynamics’ refer to the state and the ethnic groups’ 
international relations (ties). To clarify, this research analyses how international 
intervention, meaning external assistance in the forms ranging from diplomatic 
support to military intervention, affect the state’s actions and policies, and the target 
group’s action towards the state.  
 
Brubaker provides a classic conceptual framework to understand the triadic nexus in 
the nation-building process.218 He classifies nationalising states, national minorities, 
and external homelands as the three actors in the analytical model. These three 
elements do not signify fixed entities but have variably configured political stances. A 
nationalising state is regarded as a stance that aims to construct a state itself, to be a 
nation-state by promoting certain characteristics or political hegemony. A national 
minority is viewed as a group that claims, demands, or asserts certain collective 
cultural or political rights from the host state based on specific ethno-cultural 
conditions. An external homeland, which can also be another nationalising state, 
claims to have rights to protect and monitor the interests of the minority in another 
state through constructing certain tie connections. The interactions between these three 
stances are interdependent. When a nationalising state is perceived, either by its 
national minority or external homeland, to embark upon nationalization, or the state 
explicitly proclaims its intention, its domestic minority can adopt various reactions 
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from full participation, to demanding autonomous rights, or full independence. In this 
process, external homelands can provide material or moral intervention by linking 
constructed relations.219 An important implication of this research is that the external 
actor is not necessarily a neighbouring country. In addition, the external actor can 
always intervene in a state’s nation-building by ‘constructing’ connections. 
 
Walt’s discussion of the formation and dissolution of international alliances when 
considering external involvement in state-ethnic interactions is relevant. In his view, 
an alliance is “a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two 
or more states”.220 The main reason for the formation of an alliance is to combine the 
actors’ capacity to advance their interests. An alliance can vary in terms of the ways it 
performs and the level of institutionalisation. It can change or persist due to rational or 
irrational factors, and can involve itself in domestic and international contexts, 
including the politics of the balance of power, ideology, domestic regime changes and 
elite choices.221 Drawing on his discussion, this research argues that the formation of 
alliances amongst the triad of the nationalising state, the state’s ethnic group and 
external relevant states, influence both the power of the state and the ethnic group. 
The motivations for an external actor to intervene in a state’s nation-building is then 
further discussed below.   
 
The incentive of the external actor towards a state’s nation-building is an important 
theme in international security literature. Based on realist perspectives, if an external 
power lends its support to domestic ethnic minorities within a state, this is expected to 
lead to conflicts between the state and the ethnic groups. An expected motive of the 
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external power is suggested to be the destabilising of the state. This is evident when an 
external power has disputes with its neighbours and it has ethnic ties within the 
state.222 Wang’s study of the two East Turkestan independent movements, by Uyghur 
ethnic nationalists, in China’s Xinjiang province in the 1930s-40s, argues that they 
were assisted by Japan and the Soviet Union. In his investigation, while the ethnic 
Uyghur identity arguably formed in the late Qing dynasty of the early 20th century, the 
Uyghurs did not seek independence. Rather, from historical review, their 
ethno-nationalist movements occurred in the much latter ROC period due to the 
encouragement of these external powers.223 As such, the external effect is explicit. 
Similarly, the realistic perspective is also adopted in pondering the reason for the US’s 
assistance to Tibetan guerrillas in the Cold World era to fight the CCP.   
 
Mylonas argues that inter-state relationships affect a state’s nation-building policies. 
He provides a theory regarding the policies pursued by a host state towards domestic 
ethnic groups, as the triadic nation-building politics within a country. According to his 
interpretation, the external power as the third actor, always supports the ethnic 
minority which potentially has geopolitical advantages in a state. Through this support, 
the external power can weaken the state’s power. In response, the host state would 
adopt one of three strategies of assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion towards 
the ethnic group, depending upon how it evaluates its domestic and international 
status. 224  His research suggests that, depending on how the nationalising state 
perceives threat, it would adopt a harder position towards the target group that is 
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receiving support from state’s enemy.225  
 
However, authors of a substantial body of literature have expressed that they are 
discontent with the concept that international actors are always keen to support ethnic 
groups against a state. They do not accept the simplified assumption that ethnic 
minorities always intend to oppose the state’s nation-building project. Indeed, several 
cases show that international intervention can be conducive to nation-building. 
According to Talentino, external assistance can play a positive role in preventing 
further ethnic conflict. The key element is stabilisation of society through mediation. 
As a result, a multi-ethnic state can create a harmonious environment for 
consolidating the national identity of its citizens.226 Echoing this line, Heraclides also 
justifies the advantage of external intervention. He notes that when the state 
government and the ethnic group have equivalent military power, ethnic conflict can 
become a lengthy civil war and possibly spread to neighbouring countries thereby 
forming regional issues. In this circumstance, he argues that external intervention can 
help mediate intra-state conflicts. 227  Dobbins examines the US’ role in foreign 
countries’ nation-building, arguing that the external actor played a positive role in 
nation-building within other countries. In his research, the US’ alliances with Japan 
and Germany essentially helped nation-building in both states after the Second World 
War.228 He articulates that the intention of the external actor and the will and capacity 
of the state should, in unison, be taken into consideration.229 By widely reviewing the 
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international assistance to nation-building projects in 20 post-conflict countries, 
Dobbins and Miller’s research further confirms such positive effects.230  
 
Although the positive dimension of external intervention is recognised, it is also 
empirically shown that external actors must consider the localised context when 
providing nation-building assistance. By analysing the US’ failed efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Darden and Mylonas consider that nation-building should be 
operated through two phases: nation-building and state-building. They argue that 
building the loyalty of the local population towards their central government should 
precede transferring coercive and organisational capacities.231 One implication is that 
building a functioning state institution is imperative in order to develop a cohesive 
civil identity which can build and thrive on a shared sense of community.232 In Call’s 
research, he argues that the occasion and timing for external intervention may have 
differing effects on state-ethnic interactions.233 As can be seen, the local context 
cannot be neglected in examining external intervention in nation-building politics, as 
it is possible that such intervention can intensify local conflicts. 
 
Moving now to examine interactions between a state’s ethnic group and external 
actors on the state’s nation-building agenda, the existing literature provides different 
perspectives. Examining the alliance between the domestic ethnic group and the 
external actor, Jenne argues that an ethnic group’s degree of radicalisation is strongly 
related to attitudes of its potential external patron. When perceiving that it is receiving 
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significant external support, the ethnic minority group is likely to make more radical 
political demands, whether or not the host state demonstrates high respect towards 
minority rights.234 The investigation by Thyne illustrates a similar result. He argues 
that as the external actor promises to assist the domestic group, the domestic group 
tends to enhance its demands upon the state as bargaining power between the 
nationalising state and the domestic group changes. On the other hand, if the external 
actor adopts a neutral standpoint or supports the state’s policy towards the targeted 
group, the target group is less likely to challenge the state. 
 
In addition to discussing the aspect from the external actor’s perspective, Han focuses 
specifically on the preferential choices of ethnic groups. In his research, he argues that 
political identity contestation does not only involve the original identity of the ethnic 
group, but also engages in other aspects, such as whether an alternative identity option 
for the ethnic group exists. Through examining five ethnic minorities, which have 
transnational ethnic ties in the People’s Republic of China, Han notes that national 
identity contestation does not occur in all ethnic minorities. Rather, it arguably occurs 
in Tibet and Xinjiang where the ethnic groups perceive to have alternative options 
other than the state’s agenda. While the Tibetan and the Uyghur examples show a 
higher tendency of violence against the PRC’s nation-building, such dichotomous 
conflicts on political identity do not occur in the cases of the Korean, the Mongols and 
the Dai.235 Therefore, an implication from his study is that conditions about the 
existing ethnic identity of the group, whether there exists an external patron or not, 
and the degree of external support, can influence the state-ethnic interactions.  
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By comprehensively analysing inter-state relations and the ethnic group’s perceptions 
towards the external patron’s strength, Mylonas and Han further expanded upon 
various potential policies that a multi-ethnic state pursues towards its ethnic groups in 
a nation-building process. They argue that, if an ethnic group does not receive external 
help, the state tends to assimilate it. If a stronger enemy of the state aids an ethnic 
group, the host state tends to exclude this group. However, if the help is from a weaker 
enemy, the host state tends to impose integration upon this ethnicity. In addition, if an 
ethnic group enjoys help from either the stronger or the weaker ally of the host state, a 
standpoint of accommodation is usually adopted.236 Although this research neglects 
the agency of minorities in a nation-building process, it provides a model and 
predicted actions from the perspective of the state. As can be seen, the state will 
harden its attitude towards ethnic minorities in relation to the perceived degree of 
challenge.  
 
This section discussed the potential positive and negative influences from external 
actors on a state’s nation-building politics, explaining the most likely triggering 
factors of ethnic conflict. As discussed, external intervention often plays an influential 
role. The state may adopt a tough standpoint on the minority group when it perceives 
threats; the group can also stand to challenge the state authority when receiving 
external support. By conjoining these concepts to our discussions on the theory of the 
security dilemma, it facilitates a deeper understanding of the positive or negative 
dynamics in a state’s effort to integrate the target group. This is further elaborated 
upon in the following section.  
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This thesis now presents four configurations that result in outcomes of conflict and 
coexistence pertaining to societal dilemmas in Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 (see next 
page). Firstly, the scenarios of low-uncertainty societal dilemma and high-uncertainty 
societal dilemma appear reliant on the interaction between the variable of the degree 
of radicalisation of state modernisation implementation and the variable of whether 
there exists any external support to the minority group.  
 
 
 State-led Modernisation  
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Configuration 1: The outcome of conflict is likely if the ethnic minority group 
receives external support and simultaneously faces a radical modernisation campaign 
launched by the state. 
 
Configuration 2: This outcome of conflict is likely if the ethnic minority group 
receives no external support but the minority group faces a radical modernisation 
campaign launched by the state. This outcome manifests higher degree of violence 
than the configuration 3.  
 
Configuration 3: This outcome of conflict is likely if the ethnic minority group 
receives external support and the minority group faces a modest modernisation 
campaign launched by the state. This outcome manifests lower degree of violence than 
the configuration 2  
 
Configuration 4: This outcome of coexistence is likely if the ethnic minority group 
receives no external support and the minority group faces a modest modernisation 
campaign launched by the state. 
 
 




Uncertainty and Societal Dilemmas in Tibet: A Brief Illustration (1949-2012) 
 
This section demonstrates the application of the developed framework to the case of 
Tibet. It charts when the Sino-Tibetan relationship featured in scenarios of 
low-uncertainty societal dilemma, high-uncertainty societal dilemma and real security 
threat. For one thing, the Chinese commitment to the nation-building project through 
state-led modernisation towards Tibet relies on the ways of practice that have caused 
Tibetan resistance. On the other side, various degrees of international intervention in 
Tibetan affairs also affects the ups and downs in Sino-Tibetan relations.  
 
The 1950s:  
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemma and High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
With the completion of the Seventeen-point Agreement in 1951, the PRC legitimatised 
its sovereign position over Tibet, which previously maintained its de facto autonomy 
and sought for a larger degree of international recognition, since 1912. Given the 
framework of the Seventeen-point Agreement, the Lhasa regime headed by the Dalai 
Lama could maintain, and was able to be exempt from, socialist transformation 
crusades. Beijing’s main goal at the time was to incorporate Tibet through building 
local cooperation with the Tibetan traditional elites. As such, inter-societal harmony 
was prioritised above other tasks. As Mao said:  
 
 
We have to maintain a good relationship with the minorities and consolidate 






For the government of the Dalai Lama, they were willing to make compromises as 
their ambition to preserve tradition could be fulfilled. On many occasions the Dalai 
Lama recalled that at this time, the Sino-Tibetan relationship was positive.238  
 
Since the mid-1950s, when Beijing launched its socialist movements nationwide, its 
promise was questioned by Tibetans in Tibet. The policy was termed as a ‘democratic 
reform’ and was imposed in Tibetan-speaking regions in Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
and Gansu provinces. Althought it was not implemented in Tibet, Tibetans felt great 
uncertainty and fear which resulted in severe resistance and the outbreak of violence. 
The coexistence between Beijing and Lhasa within that context disintegrated. It is 
argued that the Chinese Communist Party did not violate its promise of the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement, but the communist revolutionary leverage was perceived 
as a threat to Tibetan society and threw the bilateral relationship off balance.239 
Meanwhile, external intervention mainly from the US, complicated local conflicts.240 
Consequently, widespread unrest erupted in March 1959 and the Dalai Lama fled to 
India and denounced the Agreement of 1951. Subsequently, the Tibetan Government 
in Exile (TGIE) was set up in Dharamsala and the CCP began its direct rule in Tibet.  
 
In the following decades, the Sino-Tibetan relationship became more contentious. To 
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some extent, Tibetan discontents resulted from a combination of outcomes between 
fear and antagonism towards the state-led socialist transformation of Tibetan society 
and socio-political repressions. International support also backed the Tibetan 
determination.  
 
The 1960s:  
High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma and Real Security Threat 
In the 1960s, the Sino-Tibetan relationship manifested continued tension and violence, 
and with its power, Beijing could repress the Tibetan society. The Chinese authority 
initiated waves of socialist movements nationwide. Though the TGIE appealed the 
issue of Tibet to the United Nations three times in 1959, 1962 and 1965, and the 
Tibetan factor affected China’s relationships with neighbouring India and the Soviet 
Union, China’s sovereignty over Tibet remained unchallenged. In addition, despite the 
PRC government’s cooperation with significant traditional figures, for example the 
10th Panchen Lama, criticism of the harsh socialist policies was banned. The CCP 
established the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965, further drawing Tibet into the PRC 
state. During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Chinese government 
reshaped Tibetan society and further integrated it into the PRC entity.241  
 
The 1970s:  
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
From the mid-1970s, with improvements to China’s international and domestic 
environment, interactions between Beijing and Dharamsala showed progress. When 
the Dalai Lama planned his first visit to the West in 1973, two years after the PRC 
joined the UN, Beijing seemed to be open to such advancements. This was followed 
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by increasingly positive public reactions. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama publicly 
withdrew his goal of Tibet’s independence and instead pursued its autonomy. At the 
same time, Deng Xiaoping took office and expressed a willingness to improve 
relations with exiled Tibetans, by inviting and meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the 
brother of the Dalai Lama. Throughout the 1980s, four ‘fact-finding’ representative 
teams from the TGIE were sent to visit the Tibetan areas of the PRC and several 
bilateral dialogues were held. In addition, new policies created by the Chinese 
government claimed to improve the local situation. This period witnessed positive 
interactions between Beijing and Dharamsala 242  and significantly, a period of 
optimism was conceivable.  
 
The 1980s:  
Low-uncertainty Societal Dilemma and High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
Tensions reappeared and turned into intensive demonstrations in Tibet in the late 
1980s. This resulted from Beijing’s adaptation of previous political attitudes 
concerning a fast pace of Tibetan ‘cultural revival’. In addition, the Dalai Lama’s call 
for autonomy (in the form of the Five Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg Proposal) 
which had acquired strong support from the West, raised a sense of uncertainty and 
insecurity within the Chinese government towards Tibet. The security dilemma 
mechanism was subsequently triggered and tensions escalated during the 
action-reaction spiral. Self-protection methods employed by both sides brought about 
higher levels of chaos. Beijing’s tightening control in Tibet created local resistance 
and intensive protests between 1987 and 1989. After the repercussions of the 
Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 and the Dalai Lama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace 
Prize in the same year, bilateral interactions dwindled.  
                                                     




The 1990s-2012:  
High-uncertainty Societal Dilemma 
From the beginning of the 1990s, the scenario of the security threat dominated 
Sino-Tibetan interactions. This is illustrated by several factors. Beijing imposed 
comprehensive means to penetrate Tibetan society and focused upon religion. The 
Chinese government systematically defamed the Dalai Lama and forbade his image in 
China. Additionally, the Patriotic Education Campaign specifically targeted 
monasteries in order to decrease the influence of the Dalai Lama. A debate on the 
recognition of the 11th Panchen Lama was held and the flight of the 17th Gyalwang 
Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje to India revealed that local attitudes were 
strengthening.243  
 
Jiang Zemin explicitly suggested in the Third Tibet Work Forum: “The stability of 
Tibet is engaged in the stability of the country, Tibet’s development is engaged in the 
state’s development, and Tibet’s security is engaged in the nation’s security”.244 As 
such, ensuring the central government’s absolute advantage over Tibet, through any 
means, was a priority. In the late 1990s, Beijing proposed the ‘Western Development’ 
plan. Given its implementation, environmental changes were radical at a fast pace 
while large migrant populations entered Tibet. All these scenes drove new dynamics of 
ethnic tension in Tibet. 
  
The era of the 2000s saw a dichotomous bilateral relationship against a background of 
the rise of China. While Beijing and Dharamsala had irregular rounds of meetings and 
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negotiations between 2002 and 2010, they did not make any breakthroughs. Rather, 
disturbances and unrest persisted in the whole Tibetan region. The most violent 
demonstration occurred in 2008, known as the ‘14 March Incident,’ which deeply 
affected Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations. 245  The international condemnation of 
Beijing’s crackdown on demonstrations provoked its insistence on a tough stance. The 
TGIE in the name of the Dalai Lama proposed the ‘Memorandum on Genuine 
Autonomy for the Tibetan People to Beijing’, reclaiming again that the TGIE only 
pursued substantial autonomy under the PRC’s national framework. However, the 
CCP government continued to reject this proposal.  
 
It is argued that the intensive and extensive Tibetan demonstrations partly stemmed 
from their backlash towards the government’s modernisation projects with heavy 
emphasis on materialism on a large scale. Accordingly, these practices enforced great 
transformation of life-styles and customs that fueled a high degree of societal identity 
insecurity for local residents.246  
 
More significant causes of the tension in the Sino-Tibetan relationship relate to 
Beijing’s strengthening of political and social repressions. It can be widely seen that 
political propaganda appeared in forms of posters and billboards on most public 
occasions. The contents were not only about the central government’s ambitions 
towards economic progress, but also the promotion of patriotism, social stability, 
ethnic unity, and national territorial integrity, and a determination to eradicate 
opposition to the Party. These repeated signs, are believed to have alienated local 
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people, making them feel targeted as outsiders.247 The extreme official regulation  
on religion also generated substantial local threats, and is associated with the 
self-immolation of monks from 2009 to the present. 248  The central authority 
proclaimed that it was promoting a policy of ‘mutual adaptation of religion and 
socialism’, but most people perceived that behind these policies were the state’s 
intrusion and inhibition of Tibetan Buddhism, given that the latter constituted 
significant elements of ethnic minority’s self-identification and cultural representation. 
National flags of PRC were erected in most monasteries and temples of importance, 
and the meaning behind the symbol and the implication regarding the state was 
obvious. Due to these formal and informal regulations, as well as widespread rhetoric, 
the official policies did not cultivate loyalty from the local people. Conversely, they 
were considered a distortion of traditional values.  
 
In summary, over the past decades, the Chinese authority’s nation-building has been 
perceived by Tibetans as a potential threat. In some contexts, they were identified as 
security dilemmas whereas in others they were real security threats. This research 




This chapter has noted notions of security dilemma theory as a main concept for 
considering the Tibetan issue in association with the Chinese nation-building 
commitments in detail. The essence of this theory signifies that two or more actors, 
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while desperately seeking prevention from conflict, end up with precisely this 
outcome. This chapter also reviewed the concept of societal security and the societal 
security dilemma models developed by Paul Roe and other scholars. Building upon 
them, this research reconceptualises the low-uncertainty societal dilemma, the 
high-uncertainty societal dilemma and the real security threat, a category which is 
separated from the situation of the security dilemma. Factors of state-led 
modernisation and international intervention as the independent variables are also 
integrated into the framework. This original work is valuable for several reasons:   
 
(1) It provides concise concepts to identify ethnic conflict.  
(2) It provides an analytical framework examining relationship between state-led 
modernisation and intervention and the security dilemmas; degree of conflict is 
arguably predictable. 
(3) It presents conceptual pathways to analyse outcomes of coexistence and conflict 
outbreak. 
  
With the help of collected primary and secondary sources, this research will 
contextualise and analyse Sino-Tibetan interactions at different times and categorise 
the scenarios. Those with both actors showing benign stances and falling into 
compatible security requirements will be categorised as a low-uncertainty societal 
dilemma. Those with both actors showing benign stances but falling into 
zero-sum-like security scenario, will be categorised as a high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma. The following chapters begin our empirical studies with the next chapter 





Societal Dilemmas:  




This chapter examines a historical period from the PRC’s annexation of Tibet to the 
outburst of the Lhasa Rebellion, which is also termed as the Tibetan National 
Uprising.249 Scholars have previously investigated this period from the angle of either 
the Cold War or broader international politics.250 Drawing on such a foundation, this 
chapter utilises an explanatory approach from security dilemma theory and cover 
domestic and international levels. It also brings more Chinese language sources to the 
current studies. This chapter also discusses the role of Taiwan, which is seldom 
analysed in previous literature. This chapter suggests that since the CCP began its 
modern Chinese nation-building with Tibet as a target, Sino-Tibetan relations has been 
locked into a cycle of security dilemma.  
 
Through this review, this chapter identifies the low-uncertainty societal dilemma and 
high-uncertainty societal dilemma in order to feature the Sino-Tibetan relationship. 
This chapter argues that the dynamics of this transition were related to Beijing’s 
imposition of a ‘democratic reform’, manifested as a radical modernisation251 in 
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Tibetan areas and external intervention in the Tibetan issue.   
 
Firstly, in the aftermath of the conclusion of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, 
Sino-Tibetan relations experienced years of positive interaction. This was related to 
the Chinese practice of preserving Tibetan society and Tibetan compromise over its 
own sovereignty. Since the mid-1950s, however, when the series of socialist 
campaigns were launched across Chinese physical and ethnic borders, the ‘democratic 
reform’ part of this crusade reached Tibetan regions outside Tibet and local resistance 
incurred. Soon, the violent plot evolved into a deep concern in Tibet, in spite of the 
place being untouched. With waves of refugees from the neighbouring areas flooding 
into Tibet, tension between Beijing and the government of the Dalai Lama escalated. 
Increasingly, conflicts erupted in the reformed areas again and again, intensifying 
nagging suspicion and pain whenever efforts were made to placate anxiety.  
 
Secondly, the presence of international intervention in Tibet complicated Sino-Tibetan 
relations. This chapter points to the absence of external assistance which was followed 
by Sino-Tibetan conflict mitigation, whereas the appearance of external actors caused 
the opposite result. In the examination, when New Delhi, Washington and Taipei were 
perceived by Beijing to play a role behind the Tibetan fights, the CCP was uncertain 
about Chinese security and then doubled its campaigns and repression. Linking this 
factor to the aforementioned increased Tibetan concern, Beijing-Tibet tension was 
further heightened.   
 
Finally, threat perceptions between Beijing and Tibet escalated. On an unexpected 
agenda, riots broke out in Lhasa and then on the whole territorial scale of Tibet in 





The chapter follows a chronological sequence and is divided into six sections. It starts 
with a discussion about PRC’s annexation of Tibet, narrating the CCP’s motivation 
and intention in line with the Chinese nation-building project. It also discusses 
China’s strategy at the domestic and international levels and presents Tibet’s lack of 
external help during that span of time. In the next section, the chapter examines 
Sino-Tibetan interaction after the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, after 
which a positive relationship along with occasional uncertainty was discernible in the 
early-1950s. The chapter identifies it as a low-uncertainty societal dilemma. Next, the 
chapter analyses the emergence, starting from the mid-1950s, of tensions arising from 
the CCP’s socialist campaigns toward modernisation. As it will be demonstrated, the 
storm in Eastern Tibet affected the growing Tibetan sense of uncertainty in Tibet. 
Moreover, Beijing’s uncertainty over support e.g. from New Delhi, Taipei, and 
Washington via CIA is put into discussion. The onset of the high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma is recognisable. Then, the process erupting from the 10th of March and the 
Dalai Lama’s escape to India in 1959 is reviewed. In conclusion, this chapter draws on 
the implication of the fracture of Sino-Tibet relations.  
 
‘Peaceful Liberation’: Historical Origin of Societal Dilemma in Tibet 
 
In October 1949, the CCP was no longer a marginal political party nor a mere 
competing power with the Kuomintang (KMT) regime of the Republic of China, but 
became the Chinese new political centre, the ruling authority of the newborn People’s 
Republic of China. This circumstance thereby reshaped the CCP’s mind to pursue 
China's unification and territorial integrity. While it had a political ideology distinct 
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from the previous regimes, the CCP inherited their historical legacy to conduct a 
consensual historical agenda.252 Aligned to this thinking, the CCP regarded the 
autonomous Tibet as a land that must be taken back under control.  
 
For the CCP, its action contained implications of nationalism and security. As Liu 
points out, apart from constituting an ongoing process of a people’s revolutionary war 
overthrowing the KMT regime and the foreign imperialists, the liberation of Tibet at 
this time brought two implications. First, it was part of the transformation of the 
Chinese empire geo-body into a modern nation-state. Second, it was engaged in the 
emerging Cold War politics.253 Given these factors, the CCP Chairman, Mao Zedong, 
aimed at resolving the sovereign dispute of Tibet as a priority. 
 
Before the foundation of the PRC, in September 1949 the CCP released a statement in 
the People’s Daily, asserting that “Tibet is part of the Chinese territory, and the 
People’s Liberation Army must liberate it.”254 This statement was regarded as the 
CCP’s deliberate response to the Tibetan government (Kashag), which had expelled 
all officials from the Republic of Chinese in July.255 From Beijing’s perspective, 
Tibet’s behaviour signaled an intention of cutting all legal ties with China by turning 
its de facto independence into a de jure one. Beijing’s internal document at this time 
reported that Tibet was enhancing contacts with ‘the imperialists’.256 While the ethnic 
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Tibetan areas, except for Tibet, had been occupied by the PLA, and the 10th Panchen 
Lama, the second ranked Tibetan Buddhist leader, inferior to the Dalai Lama in the 
Geluk Sect, expressed his full support of the PRC, Beijing was still cautious to the 
Kashag’s step.257 To show its defensive essence, Beijing mainly resorted to political 
means, though in the meantime military means was also taken for deterrence. 
Guaranteeing to retain the status quo of the societal systems of Tibet, the CCP 
demanded negotiations on several occasions.258 Along with this purpose, multiple 
efforts throughout domestic and international levels were made.  
 
First of all, at the domestic level, the CCP carried out a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy 
urging negotiation. For one thing, monks and Tibetan communists were assigned to 
persuade the Kashag to accept Beijing’s conditions. For another, the PLA troops were 
deployed surrounding Tibet.  
 
The CCP suggested that its commitment was in line with the Common Program of The 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which was issued as temporary 
Constitution on the 21st of September 1949. The Program addressed that all ethnic 
groups within the PRC, regardless of their individual size of population, were 
regarded as being equal, and all ethnic groups must be united to fight against Great 
Han-nationalism and Narrow local-nationalism, which, in its essence, meant 
ethno-nationalism. The Program also framed the legal basis for setting up ethnic 
autonomous regions though it denied the secession rights for ethnic groups. The 
Common Program not only served as the supreme guideline for policy-making but 
also subsequently retained its key points in the Constitution of 1954. 
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Secondly, at the international level, the CCP adopted various means deterring Tibet 
from obtaining foreign aid. On the 20th of January 1950 the Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson of the PRC publicly warned that the issue of Tibet is China’s domestic 
affair, and any state providing help to Lhasa will be labeled as an enemy of China.259 
An intimidating signal was demonstrated explicitly in this way.  
 
At this time, Mao sought to include his action towards Tibet in the border cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. During the discussion over the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, the Alliance and Mutual Assistance in January 1950, Mao submitted his 
proposal to Stalin.260 Given the context of the Cold War, Moscow was convinced that 
the CCP’s occupation of Tibet would bring an advantage to the whole socialist camp 
and surpass its capitalist rivalry. The consideration drove the USSR to side with the 
PRC.261  
 
Beijing’s new alliance with Moscow achieved its expected outcome. Major powers 
turned to silence and behaved cautiously in showing support for Tibet.262 Facing the 
Tibetan request for assistance, both the US and Britain claimed to take the Indian 
position as their standpoint.263 The Indian government expressed its sincere sympathy, 
though only provided Tibet with very limited weapons as support.264 When the 
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Tibetan delegations requested the Indian Prime Minister Nehru for more assistance, 
Nehru remained in his stance. Further, he claimed that the Indian government would 
recognise Tibet as part of China.265 
 
The UK government not only discouraged Lhasa’s attempt of sending missions to 
London, but also on another occasion told the Indian delegation that the UK would not 
support Tibet’s application for entering the United Nations.266 London’s action was a 
result of its concerns on the possible backlash from the Soviet Union and ‘China’ (at 
the time it was represented by the KMT regime based in Taiwan), which we will touch 
later on; its ongoing construction of diplomatic relationship with Beijing may also be 
a factor. 
 
Given the lack of substantial external support, Lhasa had to turn to Beijing, contacting 
the PRC ambassador Yuan Zhongxian in New Delhi, for an initial negotiation.267 
However, the negotiation cannot be called successful. The Tibetan representatives, by 
taking a standpoint that the Sino-Tibetan relationship was of a priest-patron nature, 
refused to accept the conditions of the PRC. Apart from willing to compromise over 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet, Tibetans opposed the Chinese arrangement of 
stationing the PLA in Tibet. In addition, they debated with Yuan over whether Tibet 
was an independent country.268 Without reaching a consensus, on the 6th of October 
1950 Beijing decided to increase pressure on Tibet by adopting military action. Then 
the PLA marched its troops and occupied Chamdo on the 24th of October.269  
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The PLA’s strike not only shocked Tibetans, but also the international community. 
While the PLA invaded Chamdo, Mao also ordered the North East Frontier Force as 
the Chinese Volunteer Army, to fight against the US-led UN troops alongside North 
Korea in the Korean Peninsula. Mao’s military actions both in China’s eastern and 
western regions drew international attention. Given that many countries were avoiding 
any involvement in severe conflicts in Asia, the Kashag fell into a difficult situation. 
As a consequence, China’s participation in the Korean War significantly impeded 
Tibet’s acquisition of any further international aid; which will be seen in the 
discussion of Tibet’s appeals to the UN below. 
 
The UN discussed the Tibetan appeals twice in 1950, but both of them turned out to be 
failures for the Tibetan side. The causes were multiple, but they can be summarised as 
a mixture of three aspects. The first one was related to the Korean War and the broader 
Cold War environment, which although led to the UN’s help in South Korea, 
prevented major powers from intervening in Tibetan affairs. Secondly, the PRC’s 
dealing with the individual administrations, India in particular, accounted for this 
result. Thirdly, Taipei’s insistence of China’s sovereignty over Tibet may have played 
a role.   
 
The first Tibetan appeal took place in November 1950, but it was denied immediately 
as Tibet was not a member of the United Nations; the UN only accepts issues raised 
by member states of the Security Council or any member states within the UN.270 
Therefore, with the help of El Salvador, Tibet almost gained access to the committee 
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agenda.271 Eventually, however, the appeal was deferred to the General Assembly.272  
 
The major powers’ stances over Tibet on this occasion mattered. Initially, it went 
without saying that the Soviet Union did not and would not support Tibet given the 
formation of the Moscow-Beijing alliance, though the latter was not a member in the 
UN at that time. In addition, while Taipei, whom the Chinese representative belonged 
to at the time, condemned the CCP’s aggression, it did not provide substantial 
assistance to Tibet. In fact, Taipei also deterred this appeal. The reason was that both 
the KMT and the CCP shared the same standpoint asserting that ‘Tibet is part of 
China.’273 For Taipei, since Tibet was under China's sovereignty, it should not be 
treated differently from any other province of China occupied by the CCP. In order to 
balance humanitarian support for Tibet and insist on Chinese sovereign integrity, the 
case of Tibet was ultimately narrated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime as evidence of a 
manifesting "Soviet Union’s Communist ambition in China."274 Such a stance was 
also maintained by Taipei during the second Tibetan UN appeal in December 1950. 
Therefore, the Soviet Union’s support for the CCP and the KMT regime’s insistence 
on China’s sovereignty over Tibet led to the adjournment of Tibet’s appeal in the UN.  
 
Other significant powers including Britain, the USA, and India did not show their 
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support to the Tibetan appeal due to their own respective national concerns.275 First, 
the long-term standpoint of the UK government was that it would accept China’s 
sovereignty over Tibet on the condition that China recognised Tibet’s autonomy. If the 
Chinese government damaged the autonomy of Tibet, the UK government would 
consider supporting Tibet’s independence. At this time, faced with the CCP’s military 
action,the British Foreign Office suggested that London support Tibet. The Office 
stated that the PRC had violated the autonomy of Tibet and the Office also suggested 
that the latter had sufficient quality as a ‘state’ in accordance to the meaning of the 
“United Nations Charter” by clarifying Tibet’s past interactions with other states in 
history.276 However, when knowing about the assertion from the CCP that it would 
occupy Hong Kong, if the UK aided Tibet, the British government decided to 
reconsider its standpoint concerning its interests in Asia. 277  Eventually, Britain 
announced that it would follow the government of India on this issue. 278 
Consequently, when the Nehru government expressed its non-willingness to support 
Tibet, the UK government did not adopt the suggestion from the British Foreign 
Office.  
 
Elsewhere, the main reason for Washington’s decision was related to its diplomatic 
alliance with the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Cold-War confrontation. The 
huge costs if the US decided to assist Tibet were taken into account as well.279 First of 
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all, Washington could hardly provide support to the Dalai Lama in public because it 
had to consider Taipei’s standpoint. In fact, Washington did think of helping Tibet’s 
independence from China, but such behaviour provoked discontent from Taipei; for 
the latter, the plan could be a violation of its own China policy. Secondly, the US took 
the possible reactions from the Soviet Union into account. At that time, the US was 
engaged in the Korean War and was battling with the PRC army. The American 
government did not want to escalate to a higher degree of conflict with the communist 
camp over the Tibetan issue. Thirdly, although Tibet had a clear geopolitical value for 
defending the communist camps, the cost was too high from the viewpoint of 
Washington. Therefore, the US did not support the Tibetan appeals but instead, 
declared a statement of anti-communism. Adopting a similar stance as the UK, the 
American government referred to India’s attitude on this issue. When Washington 
understood the perspectives from London and New Delhi, who decided not to support 
Tibet, the US made its decision not to intervene.280  
 
Even though during the process, the US government gradually increased further 
contact with the Dalai Lama and his government. The Americans became interested in 
the role of Tibet by considering its strategic importance in the anti-Communism 
movement. Subsequently, the US government decided to unofficially support Tibet.281 
This decision forged its future policies towards the Dalai Lama, and also led to the 
activities of the CIA in Tibet from the mid-1950s.    
 
Connecting the dots, India played a decisive role in the UN discussion process. 
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Despite the fact that the Indian government had regular and close contacts with the 
Kashag and had expressed its concerns about the CCP’s military actions several times, 
the Nehru administration decided not to provide Lhasa with support and thus caused 
the Tibetan appeals to fail. Nehru’s hesitations to side with Tibet were, partly, related 
to his personal ideology. For one thing, Nehru felt sympathy for socialist China and he 
believed that China would not adopt military action. In addition, his anti-imperialist 
stance rendered his aversion to external intervention from western states. From his 
perspective, India and China had suffered from imperialism for centuries, and both 
sides should share an anti-imperialist ideology towards each other. When the PRC was 
founded, Nehru’s government not only recognized the PRC but also built official 
diplomatic relations from April 1950. Moreover, Nehru believed that India could play 
an important role in world affairs, especially as India was involved in mediations in 
the Korean War. Nehru did not want the problem of Tibet to create more severe 
conflicts.282 These factors strongly influenced India’s decision. 
 
Also, Beijing’s strategy discouraging New Delhi to adopt the proactive policy was 
successful. Regarding Tibet, India inherited the main policy of the British Raj, which 
recognised Tibet’s autonomy under China’s sovereignty.283 On several occasions, 
India expressed to Beijing that it had no territorial or political ambitions towards Tibet 
and all it was concerned about was the maintenance of its existing rights in Tibet.284 
In its response, Beijing implied that Indian interests would not be changed if India 
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supported China. Furthermore, India’s support for the PRC would reinforce the 
development of Sino-Indian relations. In this way, Beijing convinced New Delhi that 
supporting Beijing would benefit India’s national interests. In a letter dated 16th of 
November, the PRC government noted that  
 
 
As long as our sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for 
territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the 
friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and 
that the problems regarding to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and 
cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our 
mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.285 
 
 
This letter implied that India could maintain the privileges it inherited from the 
colonial period in Tibet if it supported the PRC. From the Indian perspective, the 
controversy over the India-Tibet/China border issue concerning the McMahon Line 
could also be resolved. Moreover, India expected that, by its support, the PRC would 
admit India’s position on Sikkim, which has been occupied by India since 1949.  
 
Consequently, the Indian government made a statement in the UN, saying that India 
would not support Tibet, since currently there was no better solution, and Korea was a 
more important issue. Given this statement, the British delegation in the UN 
subsequently proposed that the Tibet Question should be deferred. This proposal 
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obtained wide support.286 Through a unanimous vote, the UN General Assembly 
decided upon the deferment of Tibet’s first appeal. 
 
Lhasa’s second appeal to the United Nations was discussed in December 1950 and 
also raised by El Salvador.287 At this time, the Kashag again sought support from 
Britain, the United States and other countries. Several Buddhist countries, including 
Thailand and Myanmar, stated that they could help, but had to consider the attitudes of 
major powers. Due to the fact that the key actor, India, still did not support Tibet, the 
British government and the US maintained their previous standpoints. Although the 
US government at the later stage decided to further intervene in the Tibetan issue, its 
offering was unofficial and limited at this particular time.288 In the end, the appeal 
failed. 
 
Faced with the CCP’s demands and its domestic and international commitments, the 
Tibetan government’s reaction was based mainly on resorting to international 
intervention but obtained only little support. As a result, Lhasa was compelled to 
negotiation and to hand its sovereignty out in exchange for the preservation of the 
status quo over various aspects without a defined timeline or agenda, signed in the 
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The 17-Point Agreement and Sino-Tibetan Insecurity Mitigation 
 
This section further analyses Sino-Tibetan interaction in the early 1950s. While Tibet 
handed its sovereignty to China, the Sino-Tibetan relationship then manifested mildly 
and easily for years, contrary to the appearance of tension and conflict later on. This 
section argues that the CCP’s modest stance was significant.  
 
Along with its international intervention blockade in Tibet, the CCP continued 
demanding negotiations. In addition, the PLA showed their extreme respect for the 
captured Tibetan solders and Tibetan religion and customs. They also made strong 
propaganda about the ‘good Han people’, differing from the ‘old Han people’, 
meaning the KMT regime.289 The Common Program was also repeatedly explained 
and delivered to Tibetans, emphasising that the existing Tibetan societal system would 
be maintained; an ideal communist blueprint was depicted to Tibetans.290  
 
Tibetans had to reconsider their whole condition. For one thing, they did not acquire 
any substantial international assistance, whereas the CCP made a promise. In addition, 
knowing that the second appeal to the UN failed, the Dalai Lama decided to accept the 
condition that Tibet was part of China. Consequently, from Yadong he sent a 
five-person representative team led by Ngawang Jigme to Beijing in March 1951.  
 
The bilateral delegations held rounds of negotiations from April to May; on the 23rd 
of May 1951 both sides finally signed the Seventeen-Point Agreement in addition to 
two separate agreements (entitled Fu Jian 附件 ). According to these separate 
                                                     




agreements, the Kashag was instructed to limit the size of its Tibetan force. In addition, 
the Dalai Lama could choose his residence in the first year of implementing the 
agreement. In fact, an implication of this point was that if the Dalai Lama decided to 
leave Tibet, the Agreement would still be put into practice.291 In summary, the 
conclusion of the Seventeen-Point Agreement affirmed Tibet’s sovereign status 
associating China with Tibetan acquiescence.  
 
The completion of the Seventeen-Point Agreement featured an important 
reconciliation between the Chinese and Tibetan societal security needs. For one thing, 
China’s concern was assuaged. According to the Agreement, Tibet’s external affairs 
would be handled by Beijing and Beijing could set up a Military and Administrative 
Committee (which was not realised but a Tibet Work Committee was alternatively 
established afterwards) in Lhasa. The PLA could be stationed in Tibet. All these points 
satisfied the CCP’s major pursuit for territorial unification and sovereignty over Tibet. 
In addition, the Seventeen-Point Agreement also provided for important implications 
for the PRC’s Tibetan policy because it set up the legal principle and framework for 
carrying out socialist transition in Tibet in the future but with no  definite date.292 To 
ensure its validity, the Agreement left a flexible space; if the Dalai Lama refused to 
agree to the terms of the Agreement and escaped to another place, the Chinese 
government could self-interpret that the Dalai Lama was choosing his residence.293 
Such discussion may only serve as a thought-test, but it manifested that the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement fitted Chinese key interests.  
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On the other hand, Tibetan concerns were addressed because the status quo, including 
culture, socio-political systems, monastery systems, and the ‘status, functions and 
powers’ of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama would be preserved. The 
Agreement noted that socialist reforms would only be embarked upon after the 
agreement of the Tibetan government and leadership. In this way, while Tibet’s 
original symbolic incorporation of China was not realised, the major element of 
autonomy seemed to be fulfilled. 
  
The final step for Mao Zedong was to persuade the Dalai Lama to accept the 
Agreement to further reinforce its legitimacy. Mao was concerned whether the Dalai 
Lama would refuse to the terms of the Agreement, by hearing that the US had 
contacted the Dalai Lama and suggested that he does so.294 To prevent this occurrence, 
Mao designated General Zhang Jingwu to meet with the Dalai Lama, who had moved 
part of the administration to Yadong after the Chamdo battle. When Zhang arrived to 
this frontier city close to India, he repeatedly clarified the questions and points of the 
Agreement which were points of controversy and gave his word on behalf of the CCP 
to the Dalai Lama to alleviate uncertainty. By considering all the conditions, the Dalai 
Lama then accepted the Agreement and returned to Lhasa. This result again reflected 
Beijing’s victory in unifying the Chinese state and affirmed a new era in Sino-Tibetan 
relations.  
 
For years, the Sino-Tibetan relationship coexisted after 1951 and this relied on several 
aspects. In addition to the constant absence of international intervention, China’s 
restrained attitude towards conducting ‘democratic reform’ and broader socialist 
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transformation should be accounted as well. The making and practice of the CCP’s 
Tibet policy at this time was aligned to an official principle termed as ‘Promotion with 
Cautious Step (shen zhong wen jin 慎重稳进)’. This principle was adjusted with 
another term ‘Promotion with Slow Step (shen zhong huan jin 慎重缓进)’ which was 
initially proposed to tackle affairs related to Inner Mongolia in 1947 and then it was 
applied into other ethnic minority regions. The main concepts of the Promotion with 
Cautious Step were the gradualism and unification of ethnic minorities. In particular, 
the CCP highly valued cooperation with these traditional figures and ethnic elites 
named them as the ‘ethnic upper strata’.295 To a larger extent, this line of principle 
was still consistent with Mao Zedong’s idea of peaceful liberation. 
 
The gradualism strategy here refers to integrating Tibet into the PRC’s national 
framework without setting a timeline.296 Mao fully understood that building the 
relationship with Tibetans while winning their trust was a priority. Commenting on the 
situation, CCP members and cadres faced in Tibet in the early 1950s, he said:  
 
 
Currently we do not have the material basis for completely implementing the 
content of [17-Point] Agreement, nor do we have the basis of mass, and nor do 
we have the basis of upper-class. [Under these conditions] Carrying out 
[socialist] reforms can only receive more disadvantages than benefits.297  
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Mao believed that the social conditions of traditional Tibetan society at that time were 
not appropriate to introduce socialist campaigns. Given that there were distinct 
differences between Tibet and other Chinese provinces, Mao emphasised more local 
stability. From this aspect, imposing socialist reforms could be put into a later agenda. 
In fact, such an approach was not only adopted in Tibet but could also be seen in other 
ethnic minority regions. 
 
In this way, what the CCP needed to do was to perform a friendly and active attitude 
in advancing the bilateral relationship with the Dalai Lama and his government and 
strengthening their cooperation. The CCP understood the significance of religion and 
traditional customs for Tibetans across the whole society (for both ordinary people as 
well as the nobility), and thereby showed a full compromise in these realms. However, 
this does not mean that Beijing abandoned its promotion of socialism. Rather, by 
increasing its interactions with local Tibetans in a low-profile, the central authority 
aimed at attracting more people to accept the official ideology. Plenty of organisations 
including Youth Association and Women's Association as well as Chinese Buddhist 
Association were established in Tibet under this background for developing local 
networks.  
 
Beijing and Tibet rapidly improved their connections in the first few years on the basis 
of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. For Beijing, the Agreement offered a legal tie for 
the central government to enter Tibet; for Lhasa the Agreement provided access to 
Chinese resources for initialising primary modernisation, e.g. traffic constructions, 
economic productions, upgrading those constructions which had already been 
promoted by many Tibetan elites in the period of the 13th Dalai Lama who created 
Tibet’s de facto independence in the first-half twentieth century. Thereby, a great 
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number of important infrastructures were outlined, including the Qinghai-Tibet 
railway which was constructed in the 2000s.  
 
Generally speaking, the Sino-Tibetan relationship at this time was peaceful and the 
Tibetan government kept a relatively high degree of autonomy. Administratively, its 
relationship with Beijing featured as the local-central relationship; in practice, both 
sides at this time run independently but had to negotiate in many aspects.  
 
During this period, occasional debates occurred not only between the Kashag and the 
Chinese Communists in Lhasa, but also inside themselves. First, in the Tibetan camp, 
some officials still opposed the conclusion of Seventeen-Point Agreement. While the 
Agreement guaranteed the preservation of traditional Tibetan currency, military and 
national flag, some Tibetan officials strived to obtain a higher degree of autonomous 
right and they were quite concerned about the existence of the PLA. Once they 
realised that the Dalai Lama himself was willing to remain in a positive relationship 
with Beijing and even willing to promote reforms in Tibet, they feared over the status 
of the traditional Tibetan system in the future. The People’s Council, an organisation 
founded for welcoming the Dalai Lama’s return from Yadong in 1950 and led by two 
Kashag members Lukhangwa and Lobsang, began to launch demonstrations. In the 
end, the Dalai Lama had to remove these officials from his government to prevent 
further tensions.298 In addition, political competition and attitude towards promotion 
of socialist reforms took place between the Northwest and Southwest Bureaus among 
the stationed Chinese communists. As the result, the central government instructed 
that all local affairs should be under Beijing’s command and insisted that local 
reforms should go through the consent of the Tibetan government. This case again 
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reflected Beijing’s caution. These events as a whole did not result in any further 
political crisis in Lhasa. 
 
In 1954, following a group of Tibetan Inland-visit teams who expressed their pleasant 
experiences,299 the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama visited Beijing. They attended 
the first session of the National People’s Congress that would pass the PRC 
Constitution of 1954 and would elect the national leaders. Subsequently, the Dalai 
Lama was elected as a deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, and the Panchen Lama was elected as its member; both served in 
high ranks in the PRC government but in reality, they were equipped with limited 
power.300  
 
The two Tibetan figures were treated with high levels of respect on every occasion. It 
was said that the CCP arranged vintage stuff that the previous Dalai and Panchen 
Lamas might have used in the Qing period for them.301 Clearly, the central authority 
tried to ‘represent’ a harmonious scene between the ancient emperor and the religious 
figures. Moreover, the two figures met with the CCP senior leadership individually or 
together, including Mao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Li Weihan.302 During this time, 
Mao repeatedly reassured that the central government must consult Tibetan opinions 
before making policies in Tibet.303 In his autobiography, the Dalai Lama recalled that 
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he received a lot of positive images and understandings about China during this 
journey. He even developed a strong interest in Marxism and believed that its idea 
could be combined with Buddhism.304 
 
In summary, in the first several years after the signing of the Seventeen-Point 
Agreement, the Chinese and Tibetans, by attaining their core demands, were able to 
co-exist. Interactions between Beijing and Tibet were moving forward positively and 
at the same time, the PRC formed good relationships with its neighbouring countries.  
 
However, certain negative factors remained and gradually eroded Beijing-Tibet 
relations. First of all, the basis of mutual trust was still fragile under the current of 
coexistence. Tensions between both sides occurred occasionally, especially in regards 
to the stationed PLA . In addition, some Chinese internal reports mentioned that local 
Tibetans doubted the real purpose when the CCP invited the Dalai Lama and the 
Panchen Lama to Beijing; there was gossip about the CCP trying to kidnap religious 
figures.305 Uncertainty and fear were clear. Secondly, whereas socialist reforms were 
not carried out in the region of Tibet, in line with the promise of the Seventeen-Point 
Agreement, the reforms in fact had been implemented in the rest of the PRC, 
including those Tibetan areas in other provinces. Within the current context of positive 
relationship, the bilateral sides reached the “Decision to Establish Preparatory 
Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR).” Defined as an authoritative 
body for consultation and planning during the transitional period before the 
establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Shakya suggested that it marked 
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Tibet’s ‘separateness and special situation’ different from other regions of ethnic 
minorities.306 However, as will be presented, the implementation in these areas soon 
provoked a heavy sense of uncertainty and provoked rifts in the nascent Sino-Tibetan 
positive development. When the Tibetans in Tibet heard about the violence and 
suffering occurring there, they began to worry about their future.  
 
Growing Uncertainty by ‘Democratic Reform’ 
 
Destroying trust can always be easier than building it. Whereas Beijing and Lhasa 
were gradually moving closer, several events fueled uncertainty and suspicion 
between them and rapidly overturned the nascent stability.  
 
The collapse of the coexistence between the CCP and the Tibetan regime was caused 
by complex factors on both domestic and international levels. Putting them together, 
the first aspect regarded the CCP launch of democratic reform in the Tibetan areas of 
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, meaning Eastern Tibet. Treated as part of the 
Chinese provinces, rather than ‘Tibet’ defined by the Seventeen-Point Agreement, 
these vast areas were imposed the democratic reform starting from 1954.307  
 
The substance of democratic reform was about radical change in property and land 
redistribution targeting local landlords and traditional elites as well as monasteries and 
temples, with certain exceptions. It was subject to the CCP’s comprehensive plan 
about modernisation. Along with this, farmers’ and herdsmen’s livestock and their 
weapons were likely confiscated under the name of socialism. Also, thousands of 
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hundreds of people were classified into different class groups and many classified 
landowners faced public humiliations and persecutions by the ‘education of class’ and 
‘class struggle’. These practices immediately broke the CCP’s relationship with the 
minority and brought about great grievances in these areas.308  
 
Jianglin Li traced the dynamics that led to the emergence of groups of Tibetan 
guerrillas standing up against the CCP at this time.309 According to her investigation, 
the confiscation of land and property in the name of wealth redistribution, the taking 
away of weapons for protecting national security, and the radical intervention in 
traditional life and customs of tribes and villages, severely damaged Tibetan society in 
these regions. The launch of a class struggle movement destroyed their lives and 
resulted in large numbers of deaths. Moreover, the communist struggle against monks 
and the damaging of temples and monasteries labelled as superstition, further affected 
Tibetan fear and antagonism. As Buddhism occupies a core role in traditional Tibetan 
society, many Tibetans could not accept the CCP’s commitments at all. In this way, 
their anger and their decision to defend their home were fuelled. Li’s research echoes 
what Norbu points out, the eagerness to protect their traditional society from socialist 
campaigns constituted the main origin of Tibetan revolts across different areas.310  
 
The incurred opposition and resistance from local Tibetans did not ease the CCP’s 
concessions. Rather, the PLA forces reacted with further intensive besiegement. 
Consequently, a cycle of opposition-repression formed and violence spread into the 
whole reformed Tibetan areas. 
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Hearing about the loss, suffering, and fights against the reform, people in Tibet, 
including the Dalai Lama himself, were shocked. As a result, doubt and negative 
perception of democratic reform, which was conceived to be implemented in the 
future in Tibet, was also formed.  
 
In the meantime, a dispute between the CCP and the Dalai Lama’s government over 
the scope of ‘Tibet’ was raised. From the perspective of the Dalai Lama and many 
Tibetans, Tibet should not only be defined as the area under the administration of 
Lhasa, but should have also include the entire land where Tibetans reside. In this case, 
when Tibetans escaped from the reformed areas and petitioned the Dalai Lama for 
putting their home under his rule to prevent the democratic reform, the Dalai Lama 
regarded this requirement as justifiable.  
 
However, from Beijing’s view such an idea was unacceptable. For one thing, the 
communists stood on an administrative standpoint and did not accept an ethno-graphic 
view. The senior leadership insisted on a historical narrative; that since the Qing 
dynasty, these Tibetan areas with the exception of central Tibet, had been incorporated 
into Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan at different points in time. In this way, they 
were not regarded as part of Tibet. 
 
Indeed, the Chinese authority’s insistence over historical cause contains its sense of 
uncertainty. Underlying its words, the CCP was concerned about the sincere intention 
of the Tibetan government. From the perspective of Beijing, if such a vast land was 
allowed to be applied by the Seventeen-Point Agreement, there would be more 
territory immune to the CCP’s policy and this would help create a greater Tibet. For 
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Beijing, the implication would be loss of control. On one occasion, Chou Enlai 
expressed this uncertainty clearly. He stated, ‘A unification of all Tibetan areas would 
pose an implication of Tibet’s independence and that is unacceptable’.311  
 
Given that both sides could not negotiate a shared notion about the scope of Tibet, the 
Dalai Lama and his government as well as many people reduced their confidence in 
Chinese promises.  
 
With the establishment of PCTAR since April 1956, a trial was released that Beijing 
was preparing to conduct democratic reforms in Tibet. In this context, this message 
further aliened Tibetan trust in the Chinese. There might have been a 
misunderstanding that the Tibetan leadership would agree to the implementation of 
socialist reforms in Tibet; Beijing might have assumed their agreement given the 
successful visit of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama during the National People’s 
Congress in 1954.312 The political competition among the CCP officials embedded in 
the context of Mao's Hundred Flowers Campaign and Anti-rightist Campaign in 
launching the various socialist movements in other provinces may also account for the 
development.  
 
Relating this plan to the situated political background, Shakya suggests that the 
inauguration of the PCTAR could have eroded the status, function, and power of the 
Tibetan government.313 At that time, the Tibet Work Committee launched a series of 
propagandist statements on Tibet Daily and provided an agenda proposal to Beijing.314 
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In addition, the Committee recruited and mobilised more than 45,000 people for 
preparation work. All these implied that Beijing may put the trial into reality.  
 
The sudden increase of cost and population added a huge burden to local society. As a 
result, officials in the Tibetan government expressed their concerns about the reforms. 
Representatives of the Great Three temples and a group of leading Tibetans also 
submitted their petition to the Kashag.315 Being harassed by fear and foreseeing 
potential crisis in the future, the Dalai Lama started to worry.316 Whereas both the 
Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were assigned into top positions of the PCTAR, 
they did not have enough power to counter Beijing if the central government decided 
to change Tibet’s status quo.  
 
The Dalai Lama sought advice and intervention from Nehru in New Delhi when he 
participated in the 2500th Anniversary of Buddha’s Birthday in November 1956,. The 
Dalai Lama also made an inquiry if he could stay in India. Nehru discouraged his idea.  
 
During his visit to India, the Dalai Lama showed a high degree of anxiety in his 
performance. He met with a group of Tibetan diaspora elites, including the former 
Kashag officials Lhukhangaw, Tsipon Shakya, Lobsang Gyentsen and the Dalai 
Lama’s brother Gyalo Thondup. At that time, these émigrés had established the 
Committee for the Benefit of Tibet, which was devoted to the Tibetan Independence 
movement. Taking this opportunity, they tried to persuade the Dalai Lama to stay in 
India in order to repudiate the CCP in public. However, the Dalai Lama was hesitant 
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to make this decision.317 He consulted the paramount Nechung Oracle, the State 
Oracle of Tibet for advice. At that time, the reply he received from the oracle was 
“return to Lhasa.”318  
 
Hearing about the Dalai Lama’s behaviour, Chou Enlai immediately flew to New 
Delhi from Beijing. He guaranteed the Dalai Lama that the central government neither 
changed its standpoint nor had any desire to violate its promises in the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement. Chou ascribed everything as a miscommunication and 
repeatedly suggested that the Central would not carry out democratic reforms in Tibet 
in the upcoming years. Taking all conditions into account, the Dalai Lama returned to 
Lhasa.  
 
Realising the local situation in Tibet, before Chou’s departure to India, Mao Zedong 
reassured Tibetans by instructing an order to Party members in Tibet. This instruction 
was known as the ‘Instructions regarding Democratic Reform in Tibet (Guanyu 
Xizang Minzhu Gaige De Zhishi 关于西藏民主改革的指示)’ dated the 4th of 
September 1956, hence known as ‘4 September Instruction (Jiu Si Zhi Shi 九四指
示)’.319 To make it clear, the Instruction reaffirmed the local CCP cadres to prioritise 
the United Front work, pursuing to win the trust of the Tibetan upper strata. Mao 
reasserted that socialist reforms would be carried out only under the condition that the 
ethnic leadership expressed a genuine agreement to do so. Subsequently, Mao issued 
an official order known as the statement known as “Remaining the Status Quo for Six 
Years (Liu Nian Bu Gai 六年不改)”, explicitly noting that socialist reforms would 
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not be implemented in Tibet in the upcoming six years. In the internal meetings, Mao 
and other senior leadership claimed that if the Tibetan elites still objected to the 
reforms six years later, the reforms could be further postponed.320  
 
Goldstein commented that the compromise made by the CCP leadership was obvious. 
The purpose behind was to calm tensions. He said: 
 
 
Beijing was clearly making a major effort to restore a positive relationship 
with the Dalai Lama and his elite, by letting them continue to administer Tibet 
internally without the threat of reforms and a competing PCTAR hanging over 
their heads. Tibet was deemed too important strategically to risk precipitating 
a full-scale uprising merely to speed up the time when reforms would start.321  
 
 
Following Mao’s instruction, relevant policies were immediately committed. Firstly, 
more than 92% of Party cadres and members and most established units preparing for 
democratic reform were either stopped or removed. The stationed troops also 
withdrew 70% of its total numbers.322 Also, the CCP allowed the reactivation of some 
closed institutions of the Tibetan government. However, several key questions were 
still left without further instructions, given that Mao’s instruction was merely 
‘postponement’ of the reforms rather than ‘cancellation’. The instruction temporarily 
alleviated substantial concern for Tibet, but essentially, the Chinese compromise could 
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not help to completely eradicate the root of problems.    
 
In the meantime, it was said that the CCP faced some questions internally. It was 
claimed that the postponement of reforms contradicted the original contents of the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement, which did not regulate the time-line and only suggested 
that the reforms should be conducted by the free will of Tibetans. Taking this in regard, 
Mao’s concession could be more than an expression of attitude.323 It showed that the 
CCP was completely not in favour of dealing with the dispute with Tibet by force. 
Rather, it was taking any alternative approach to prevent conflict. In its statement on 
the 14th of May 1957, the CCP stated: 
 
 
What we call about democratic reform……if being conducted without the 
sincere agreement from the upper leadership and the necessary support from 
the mass it will become enforcement, and we will be responsible for its 
implement. This is a contradiction to our principle that…..declared in Report 
about People’s Republic of China Constitution Draft. It also disobeys the 
eleventh point of the 17-Point Agreement. If we do this, peacefully fulfilment of 
reform is impossible…..to fulfill reform through war and mobilisation of mass 
is the least way we are likely to adopt in the ethnic minority areas.324  
 
 
Given the reality that the democratic reforms were still ongoing in neighbouring 
regions and the government only ‘postponed’ but not ‘withdrew’, ethnic tension could 
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resurge at any time. To make things clear, the Tibetan senses of uncertainty and 
insecurity remained, rather than faded away. For them, worry and fear for the reform, 
perceived as threats to their value and culture as well as other aspects of society, were 
beyond words. For the Chinese government, on the other hand, implementing socialist 
reforms in Tibet was in line with its broader national integration agenda so 
compromise also created pressure on the central government. Consequently, due to 
their individual considerations, it would be hard for both sides to reach a 
reconciliation.  
 
The dual goal aimed at uniting the Tibetan leaders, especially the Dalai Lama, while 
promoting a socialist ideology in Tibet were to some extent internally contradicted. 
On the one hand, due to the needs of a United Front work, the CCP valued the 
opinions of traditional Tibetan leaders. As Mao elaborated, the CCP did not have 
strong enough conditions to connect with either the upper or the lower classes in Tibet 
and he believed that building cooperation and forging friendship with these elites was 
the most appropriate option.325 On the other hand, the implementation of communism 
and a socialist transformation were the main goals for the CCP, attracting and 
mobilising the masses to join and win the civil war with the KMT regime during 
wartime. When the PRC government began to carry out socialist reforms throughout 
China, except for in Tibet, many communist cadres and its followers could not 
understand the party’s decision to compromise. From their perspective, Tibetan 
religion and traditional values were perceived as feudal products, which should be 
discarded. Meanwhile, faced by the local resistance in Amdo and Kham, Beijing was 
undecided whether it should continue its United Front Work with these traditional 
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ethnic elites or turn to its mass line as in other regions in China.326  
 
In this way, the adoption of a stance became very difficult for Beijing. Liu implied that 
at the end, the Chinese leadership sided with the socialist line, by explaining why 
suspension of democratic reforms in Tibetan areas outside Tibet was not realised.327 
In addition, Goldstein suggests that the continuity of imposing democratic reforms 
showed Beijing’s mind to set a model for Tibet. He says: 
 
 
Ganzi came from a different historical background, was not geopolitically 
significant, and had already started reforms, so Beijing decided it was not 
feasible to let Ganzi also be a beneficiary of this new [postponed] Tibet policy. 
While Mao and the Central Committee knew, of course, that events in Ganzi 
would have consequences for Tibet, they were convinced that this new policy of 
taking reforms off the table and allowing the old government and traditional 
socioeconomic system to continue for the foreseeable future would be a 
powerful enough force to overcome those consequences.328  
 
 
The Chinese expectation did not come true. Rather, knowing about the conflicts 
occurring in those Tibetan regions, Lhasa condemned Beijing over violation of the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement. Once again, both sides fell into furious debates. Tibetan 
anxiety and sense of uncertainty were boosted to distrust and fights. Finally, this led to 
the occurrence of the 10th of March Revolt 1959.  
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This section analysed the effect of democratic reform on the formulation of sense of 
insecurity within the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Below, this chapter discusses how the 
presence of international intervention at this time intensified their interaction.  
 
Increasing Transnational and External Intervention in Tibet: India, 
Taiwan, and the US 
 
In the early 1950s, the PRC central government employed a sophisticated strategy to 
hinder Tibet from acquiring external aid to achieve its ‘liberation’ commitment. 
Beijing kept this standpoint while enhancing its diplomatic relationship with 
neighbouring countries, with India as the main focus. However, seeing New Delhi’s 
accommodation of exiled Tibetan dissidents, Beijing doubted the Indian intention 
behind Tibet. Also, Beijing noticed the existence of Taipei’s and Washington’s 
willingness to be active in aiding Tibetan guerrilla forces in the mid-1950s onward. 
All these external actors further raised the CCP’s perception of threat. This section 
briefly presents China’s achievements over Tibet in association to its foreign 
relationship. It then analyses how these external interventions e.g. India, Taiwan and 
the US to Tibet pressured China. 
 
To stabilise its position in Tibet, Beijing made multiple efforts to keep positive 
Sino-Indian relations. This stance was in line with India’s interest. In its response, 
India demonstrated a friendly attitude to China, and prioritised the subject of Tibet.329 
At the time, manners considered to help strengthen the bilateral friendship were 
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welcomed from both sides. On the 29th of April 1954, Beijing and New Delhi signed 
the Panchsheel Treaty,330 which was also known as the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. Significantly, these five points contained: “mutual respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,” “mutual non-aggression,” “mutual 
non-interference each other’s internal affairs,” “equality and cooperation for mutual 
benefits” and “peaceful coexistence.” Given that “Tibet region of China” was 
addressed in the content of the Treaty, an implication was that New Delhi officially 
recognised China’s sovereignty over Tibet, instead of the ‘sovereignty ‘ that was hold 
by the British Raj.  
 
In 1955, China was invited by India to participate in the first Asian and African 
Conference, the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. At the conference, the Chinese 
Prime Minister Chou Enlai called for the spirit of “recognition of the similarity and 
tolerance of the diversity” consistent with the Panchsheel.331 Nehru, echoed Chou, 
and also promoted the spirit of the Panchsheel Treaty along with his proposed 
international ‘Non-Aligned Movement’. At this moment, the Sino-Indian bilateral 
relationship reached an acme. There was a saying that went: “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai! 
(India and China are good brothers).”332  
 
However, the developing Sino-Indian relationship was not without hiccups, in which 
Tibet still occupied a central place. In fact, China remained cautious about India’s 
words and practices towards Tibetans. Seeing more and more Tibetan anti-Beijing 
dissidents, including members of Committee for the Benefit of Tibet, moving to India, 
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and developing a pro-Tibet independent movement, Beijing doubted New Delhi’s 
intentions. The foundation of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” turned out to be unstable.  
 
From 1956 onwards, the Chinese suspicion of India became severe. In the aftermath 
of Beijing’s launch of democratic reforms, the situation that traditional elites and 
religious figures from Eastern Tibet fleeing China to India increased. When the Indian 
government invited the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to attend the Buddha 
Jayanti celebration, initially through the crown prince of Sikkim, the Chinese 
government was reluctant to permit this journey.333  
 
Moreover, faced by Indian media and journalist reports that showed apparent 
sympathy and support for Tibetans, the Chinese government was angered.334 In July 
1958 the Chinese government sent a note to the Indian government requesting its 
regulation of these ‘anti-China’ agents, organisations and activities.335 The note also 
implied Beijing’s mild criticism. Considering New Delhi’s response being nothing 
more than fudge, Chinese discontent was further enhanced.   
 
From the perspective of New Delhi, support by Indian civil society for Tibet had 
nothing to do with it. The Indian government always reclaimed its consistency with its 
standpoint. That is, New Delhi sought to maintain a positive relationship with Beijing. 
Such a posture can be observed by Nehru’s repeated discouragements of the Dalai 
Lama’s proposed stay in India.  
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Indeed, the Indian government had its own security concern. At that time, the 
Sino-Indian border was not yet demarcated. Although India was crafting a positive 
relationship with China, Nehru and the senior officials kept their eyes on the PLA 
since its entry into Tibet. In its association, the Indian allowance of Tibetan émigré 
could be considered a balance of humanitarian aid and national interest. Gyalo 
Thondup suggests that he was not allowed to organise anti-Beijing political activities 
publicly in India, but he could cooperate with the Indian intelligence department in 
collecting information from Tibet. That satisfied the bilateral interests.336  
 
However, it seemed to Beijing that the existence of a large number of anti-China 
Tibetan organisations in India as well as New Delhi’s inactiveness were an alternative 
form of supporting Tibet. With the outbreak of the Lhasa Rebellion and the Dalai 
Lama’s journey to India, Beijing firmly believed that India played a role behind the 
Tibetan rebellion. Subsequently, India’s commitments to Tibetans and the unresolved 
bilateral border dispute became a source to the Sino-Indian War of 1962.  
 
In addition to India, Taiwan was another actor constituting a concern for Communist 
China. While the KMT regime, compared to India and other significant actors such as 
the US, might have been less powerful and could have only provided limited materials 
to Tibetans, its action might have generated asymmetric political implications from 
Beijing’s view.  
 
For one thing, Taipei’s occupation of Chinese representatives in the UN was essential. 
At that time, Taipei’s stance over Tibet, if adapted, might have an enormous effect on 
China’s de jure sovereignty. Despite the fact that the KMT’s commitments to Tibet 
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was following its constitutional framework, meaning that it insisted on the Tibetan 
issue belonging to Chinese domestic affairs, 337  Beijing never omitted Taipei’s 
position.  
 
Secondly, as a former ruling authority, the KMT’s power in China was uncertain for 
the CCP. Incorporating its assistance plan for Tibetans into the whole project of 
‘Recovery of Mainland (fangong dalu 反攻大陆)’ and anti-communism, Taipei was 
very proactive in building connections to the Tibetan émigrés and guerrillas in Tibetan 
regions.338 The Taiwanese government was also keen on propagandising its efforts.339 
According to the Taiwanese source, Taipei started its airdrop of weapons and materials 
into Tibetan regions from 1952.340 In the subsequent years Taipei continued airlifting 
support to Tibetan guerrillas groups, including Four Rivers Six Ranges, a guerrilla 
force mainly composed of Khampas, the Tibetans from the Kham area.341 During the 
time, Taipei also looked for employing intensively joint military activity with the US, 
though it did not know that in reality, the US government conducted its own actions 
privately.  
 
Beijing’s acknowledgement of Taiwanese existence was explicit. For one thing, 
Taipei’s operations were not successful every time, but they were occasionally 
captured by the CCP.342 In addition, the Chinese leadership mentioned Taiwan on a 
variety of occasions. For example, in his letter to the Dalai Lama dated 18th of August 
1956, Mao claimed that the KMT regime played a role in the Tibetan riots in 
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Sichuan.343 In a directive to the Tibet Work Committee, the CCP Central Committee 
asserted that they believed that Taiwanese agents were behind the rebellions in 
Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu.344 In a Soviet Report about the Tibetan resistance in 
1959, the Chinese source also suggested that Tibetans were communicating with 
Chiang Kai-shek's troops.345   
 
The next powerful actor that raised Beijing’s perception of threat was the US, which 
conducted its action mainly via the Central Intelligence Agency. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the US government, under the bi-power international structure of the 
Cold War, raised its interest in Tibet. From the beginning, the US government did not 
want to confront the CCP and the USSR because of Tibet. Also, it had to take the 
attitude of Taipei into consideration, which meant that the US government could not 
support Tibet by treating it as an independent country.346 These factors led to the US 
adoption of a low-profile stance.  
 
In December 1955 President Eisenhower authored the CIA to employ means to 
undermine international communism. In 1956, aligned with this instruction, Secretary 
John Foster Dulles approved the plan assisting Tibetans.347 In the same year, the US 
government contacted Gyalo Thundrup and through him, the CIA started to recruit 
Tibetan commandos. The CIA provided them with training courses, initially in Saipan 
                                                     
343 Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe and Zhonggong Xizang Zizhi Qu Weiyuanhui, Mao Zedong Xizang 
Gongzuo Wenxuan, 150. 
344 Liu, “A Misty Cold War in the Himalayas,” 306. 
345 History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 238, ll. 42-48 (R. 8929); 
translated from Russian by David Wolff. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 30, “Report by Yuri 
Androov, ‘On the Situation in Tibet’,” March 31, 1959. 
346 Han, Contestation and Adaptation, 133. 
347 John Knaus,“Official Policies and Covert Programs: The US State Department, the CIA, and the 
Tibetan Resistance,” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 3 (2003): 68. 
157 
 
Island in the western Pacific, and then Colorado in the US. 348  Starting from 
September 1957, the CIA returned the trained commandos to different places in Tibet. 
They were instructed with two main tasks. One was to enquire into the Dalai Lama’s 
personal willingness to solicit US assistance; according to current literature, he never 
replied. The other task was to build direct connections with the local guerrillas.349  
 
One of the most significant aided guerrilla groups was the Four Rivers Six Ranges, 
which also received assistance from Taiwan. As Mcgranahan points out, the founding 
of this group contained two implications: it not only served as a unification of 
disparate Tibetan guerrillas, but also served as institutionalisation of international 
resistance network. 350  In the subsequent years, the US government airdropped 
military provisions, radios and medicine. In its inauguration in May 1957, the group, 
with the introduction of officials of Kashag, met with the Dalai Lama and paid their 
respects, requesting his help to include Amdo and Kham in the scope of ‘Tibet’ to stop 
democratic reforms.351 Through access of Tibetan officials, members of Four Rivers 
Six Ranges entered Lhasa, and some served in the Kashag. With the dropping of aid 
by the CIAand the possible encouragement of Tibetan officials, the Four Rivers Six 
Ranges impeded the CCP’s democratic reform commitments and conducted armed 
attacks on the PLA in the reformed regions.352 The Chinese central government was 
enraged and demanded that the Kashag restrain the guerrilla forces.  
 
The CCP regarded the US as a main rival since the Korean War. In the early 1950s, 
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Beijing kept its eyes on Washington and wondered at its ability to engage in the 
Tibetan issue.353 When sensing that the US did play a role in the Tibetan rebellions, 
Beijing had to re-estimate the whole situation. Because American involvement was 
clandestine and conducted mainly via air operation, it did not help Tibetans to counter 
their disadvantage in the fights against the Chinese army. However, the American 
presence put great pressure onto the Chinese.354 Shakya holds a similar viewpoint. He 
suggests that as Beijing perceived the American involvement in the Tibetan riots, the 
implication surpassed the riots themselves. It turned out to be “an international 
conspiracy to undermine the victory of the Communist Party in China. Moreover, it 
presented a direct threat to China’s security.”355 Revealing the CIA’s role in Tibet as 
early as in 1974, Allman notes that such threats created by the CIA-guerrilla 
insurgency were intolerable for Beijing. As a result, China became tougher towards 
the resistance.356  
 
These state actors mentioned above formed complicated cooperation networks with 
the Tibetan émigrés and the guerrilla forces. The Indian goal was to balance its 
geopolitical security and its relationship with China. Taiwanese action was related 
with its anti-CCP plan. The American main objective was to harass and undermine 
communist China.357 Accurate information regarding cooperation among these actors 
is still unclear. However, it can be maintained that the Indian accommodation of 
Tibetan émigrés and the presence of Taiwan and the US have together intensified the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict during this time.  
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The Spark of Conflict: The Lhasa Revolt in 1959 
 
After 1958, Sino-Tibetan relations worsened. As Beijing continued its intense socialist 
transformation in Eastern Tibet, Tibetan resistance grew and in a short span of time, 
refugees crossed the border to Tibet. Local skirmishes occurred more frequently and 
spread into the frontier of Tibet. In addition, while external aid to Tibetans increased 
morale and resources, this enhanced Beijing’s determination of suppression. As a 
result, the individual implementations formulated an action-reaction circle, and the 
circle generated a great sense of uncertainty and this sense infected most people in 
Tibet. For one side, the Tibetan government expanded its army claiming a need for 
security; for another, the stationed PLA strengthened their training and always kept 
full alarm.358 Rumour, distrust, and a violent atmosphere from different aspects 
intensified anxiety and fear.  
 
Under these conditions, the masses as well as the leadership envisaged that warfare 
would happen in Tibet. After Ngabo, the senior Kashag official, returned to Lhasa 
from his company with the Dalai Lama to India andrequested to join the Communist 
Party in secret. He suggested to Phuntsog Wangyal, the senior Tibetan cadre of the 
CCP, “The situation in Tibet is not certain so if a time should arise when the PLA has 
to withdraw from Tibet, you should take me and all my family members back to 
China.”359 On another occasion, Mao expressed a similar warning, “In the present and 
the upcoming years we would face the challenge to struggle with our enemy to win 
the masses and we have to train our armed capability. Years later…we might have a 
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final battle.”360 Such a perception of calm before the storm pervaded. 
 
At this turbulent time, Beijing instructed the Kashag to quell the Khampa turmoil. 
From the Chinese perspective, the rebels might trust and listen to the Kashag; also, it 
wanted to give the impression that the central government was still in cooperation 
with the Tibetan government.361 Conversely, many Tibetan officials perceived this 
instruction as a Chinese ploy to repress Tibetans.362 As a result, Tibetans presented an 
inactive attitude. Moreover, because many officials were sympathetic to the opponents, 
some were privately collaborating with them. 363  Viewing Tibetan reactions, the 
Chinese government interpreted that the Kashag was in collusion with the rebels.364 
Shakya asserts, “The Tibetans hoped that that Khampa revolt might persuade the 
Chinese to withdraw and allow Tibetans to reassert some authority. The Chinese, on 
the other hand, knew that any compromise would be seen as a sign of weakness.”365 
Uncertainty and the phenomenon of security dilemma were fully featured. 
 
In March 1959, an invitation from the Chinese leadership of the Tibet Work 
Committee and the Tibet Military Command to the Dalai Lama for a dance 
performance turned to be an unpredictable fuse to the full scale demonstration in 
Tibet.366 On the eve of the performance, a rumour drawing that the PLA was 
conspiring to abduct the Dalai Lama and detain him in Beijing suddenly circulated. 
On the 10th of March, the performance day, a large Tibetan crowd gathered outside of 
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Norbulingka, the Dalai Lama’s summer palace, to prevent his attendance. Moreover, 
the crowd assaulted some Tibetan officials and Lamas that were seen to side with 
Beijing. The scuffle rapidly became a disturbance on the streets of Lhasa. Turning to 
this point, the crowd vented their emotions: the survival of Tibetans would rely on the 
absence of Chinese. The crowd was mobilised at this time. On an occasion, some 
people began yelling: 
 
 
The danger comes from the presence of the Communists. The Chinese and 
Tibetans cannot live together. The only lasting solution is if the Chinese are 
forced out of the country. As long as the Chinese remained in Tibet, the 
danger to the Dalai Lama would always be there.367 
 
 
To examine the behaviours, the Dalai Lama is not only regarded as a ruler but 
alsoconsidered a symbol of Tibetan society and identity.368  
 
In the following several days, tension between Tibetans and the local PLA escalated. 
For one thing, the Tibetan crowds armed themselves. On many occasions people took 
over governmental buildings, calling for the independence of Tibet. Many Tibetan 
officials and elites then joined the groups. On the other side, witnessing that situation 
the PLA inside Lhasa were put on full alert. The CCP also assigned troops from other 
regions and deployed them outside Tibet.  
  
                                                     




The circumstance of anxiety and the floating sense of uncertainty can be exemplified 
by the Dalai Lama’s behaviour on the eve of his escape. From the 10th of March 
onwards, the Dalai Lama consulted the Nechung Oracle at least three times. Given 
this frequency, the Dalai Lama’s sense of uncertainty and helplessness reflected that 
he felt compelled to seek answers from the god. In his visit to India in 1956 he also 
consulted the Nechung Oracle once more. At this time, when he acquired the result of 
“Go, Go, Tonight” on the 17th of March, the Dalai Lama, with his family members 
and close followers immediately fled the palace.369  
 
Consequently, the Dalai Lama’s escape from Lhasa marked the collapse of 
Sino-Tibetan coexistence. The fights in Lhasa continued although the Dalai Lama had 
left; in fact, the conflict reached a higher level and turned into bloody warfare. The 
stationed PLA fired on the Potala Palace. The accurate number of victims during the 
riot is still unclear. In the meantime, the outbreak of the Lhasa Rebellion/National 
Uprising drew attention from the international community and soon brought about 
severe criticism on the CCP’s oppression. A debate was then launched in the UN 
Assembly that we will discuss in next chapter.  
 
At the first press conference after the Dalai Lama arrived in India at the end of March, 
he denounced the Seventeen-Point Agreement; he also declared the establishment of 
the Tibetan Government in Exile, which was officially moved and developed in 
Dharamsala, north India in 1960. On the other side, viewing this collapse of the two 
regimes’ coexistence, the Chinese government denied the Dalai Lama’s accusation. 
Alternatively, Beijing crushed all rebels in Tibet, announced the dismantlement of the 
Kashag, and replaced it with the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of 
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This chapter examined the first decade of the territorial and administrative 
incorporation of Tibet into the PRC. In previous studies, the international factor was 
centralised and most scholars point that it is significant in terms of adding fuel to the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict.370 Building upon this body of literature, this chapter presents 
the domestic factors as well as the dynamic interactions between Beijing and Lhasa. 
Moreover, through security dilemma theory, this chapter provides a comprehensive 
outline about the evolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. 
 
This chapter argues that Sino-Tibetan relations at this time initially showed the 
scenarios of low-uncertainty societal dilemma before evolving into high-uncertainty 
societal dilemma. As presented, the relationship featured a fair degree of coexistence 
with the involved bilateral sides contemplating mutual understanding in the first half 
of the decade. However, with Beijing’s implementation of democratic reforms and the 
presence of external aid to Tibetans, senses of uncertainty emerged from both sides 
towards each other and these negative senses damaged the nascent positive 
relationship. In between, anxiety about security and the survival of ethnicity/nation 
emerged and strengthened. Finally, armed conflict broke out with the consequence of 
the Dalai Lama fleeing and the CCP’s crackdown in Tibet in March 1959.  
 
However, the coming of Beijing’s direct rule did not bring about the elimination of 
conflict, but instead the Sino-Tibetan relationship was brought into a state of security 
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dilemma engaged in a more complex environment. In the next chapter we will discuss 







Socialist Transformation and Ethnic Conflict in Tibet, and 




In this chapter, this thesis examines Sino-Tibetan ethnic tension and conflict which 
took place in the years between 1959–1979, i.e. the two decades since the Dalai Lama 
left Tibet until Gyalo Thondup met Deng Xiaoping. Given the political sensitivity of 
the themes and lack of access to historical material, previous studies have put the 
focus on the international aspects of the conflict. Using Chinese sources of historical 
material and fresh literature, this chapter contributes to the literature by presenting the 
domestic scene. Also, building upon studies on the Cold War, this chapter analyse the 
international influence of the Cold War on the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Furthermore, 
security dilemma theory is applied to examine the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Taking a 
chronological narrative, this chapter suggests that the bilateral relationship in this 
period featured three security scenarios: high-uncertainty societal dilemma, real 
security threat, and low-uncertainty societal dilemma.  
 
Firstly, this chapter argues that China’s way of ‘democratic reform’ and its increasing 
international isolation regarding the Tibetan issue led to a high degree of societal 
security uncertainty about the Sino-Tibetan relationship. While the PRC authority 
aimed to stabilise the situation in Tibet, the reactions of Tibetans show that the efforts 
reached limited success. The eagerness to construct socialism and its overemphasis on 
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stability by the Chinese side contradicted Tibetan demands for preserving their 
traditional identity. 
 
Secondly, this chapter analyses the Sino-Tibetan relationship in the Cultural 
Revolution. This chapter argues that this is not a case of security dilemma. Rather, the 
notion of a real security threat will be used here. 
 
Thirdly, the scenario of low-uncertainty societal dilemma is identified in the 
Sino-Tibetan interactions of the 1970s. By analysing certain events, this chapter 
suggests that while both sides were still located in the security dilemma, their 
practices effectively calmed tensions and paved the way for further conversation. 
 
This chapter is arranged as follows: It starts with China’s intrusion in Tibet after the 
crackdown on the Tibetan revolt of 1959. This section focuses on China’s imposition 
of socialist campaigns and anti-rebellion policy and the resulting Sino-Tibetan tension. 
The Panchen Lama’s criticism manifesting Tibetan discontent and the CCP’s reaction 
are discussed. This chapter then discusses the PRC’s policies against the background 
of the Cultural Revolution. Given the Chinese malign behaviour towards Tibet, this 
chapter contends that the concept of security dilemma is inapplicable to analyse the 
case; the Sino-Tibetan relationship of certain years is identified as a real security 
threat. Next, the chapter turns to discuss the foreign policy dimension of China’s Tibet 
policies in the 1960s. This section analyses significant events, including the 
Sino-Indian border conflicts, the Sino-Soviet rift as well as the UN resolutions 
regarding Tibet. In the next section, this chapter discusses the growing contacts 
between Beijing and the Tibetan Government in Exile in the 1970s to draw signals 
about the improvement in the bilateral relationship.  
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The Anti-rebellion Campaign and Socialist Transformation of Tibet 
 
In chapter three, this thesis analysed that the Chinese imposition of ‘democratic 
reform’ and the Chinese way of socialist modernisation in Tibetan areas outside Tibet 
resulted in the perception of threat for Tibetans in Tibet. Concerned about their 
traditional way of life, customs, and religion that were facing radical challenges, many 
Tibetans in Tibet, along with armed resistant from other Tibetan regions, stood against 
the CCP. The situation tuned out to be a large-scale conflict in March 1959. With the 
Dalai Lama’s escape to India, the PLA cracked down on the demonstrations in Lhasa; 
shortly after, the Chinese authorities announced the practice of democratic reform in 
Tibet.371 Whereas Beijing had previously suggested the postponement of the reform 
in Tibet as a concession to the Dalai Lama and, more generally, to the Tibetan people, 
the CCP leadership changed its tactic.372 The result, as shown in this section, was a 
pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty and confrontation.  
 
Since March 1959, China’s main goal was to incorporate Tibet into the PRC state and 
transform it into a socialist society resembling other provinces and regions at a pace as 
fast as it could. On the 28th of March, Beijing issued an order dismissing the Kashag, 
the original Tibetan government, and instructed the Preparatory Committee of the 
Tibet Autonomous Region to take over the administration. The Panchen Lama, 
another Tibetan spiritual leader and vice director of the PCTAR, was appointed as its 
deputy director.373 On the 8th of April 1959, the PCTAR endorsed the Order of 28th 
of March.374 In the same month, the second National People’s Congress of the PRC 
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declared the outset of democratic reform.375 
 
In its practice, the launched democratic reform was deliberately conceived as an array 
of campaigns in different areas of Tibet and targeted objects across traditional figures 
of authority and the masses. In addition, the anti-rebellion policy continued and mixed 
with the practice of democratic reform.376 Thereby, as the second meeting of the 
PCTAR in July 1959 instructed an array of policies, socialist transformation and 
suppression of Tibetan dissidents were seen throughout them.377 
 
To be specific, the policies included: (1) ‘Three antis and two eliminations (san fan 
shuang jian 三反双减)’ campaign. It focused on the agricultural areas, where the 
government “opposed the rebels, the system of corvee labour, serfdom, and eliminated 
rents and interests;” (2) ‘Three antis and two benefits (san fan liang li 三反两利)’. 
This campaign was implemented in the nomadic areas, in which the government 
“opposed the rebels, the system of corvee labour, serfdom, and benefited the livestock 
workers and the livestock owners;” (3) ‘Three antis and three liquidations (san fan san 
suan 三反三算)’. It was carried out in monasteries and temples, where the government 
“opposed the rebels, the feudal privileges, the feudal deprivation, and exterminated 
political oppression, class oppression and economic deprivation.” In particular, monks 
and lamas were required to obey the leadership of the CCP and pledge to contribute to 
the state’s territorial integrity and ethnic unity; (4)‘Four antis and two eliminations (si 
fan shuang kian 四反双减)’. The campaigns were implemented in towns and cities, in 
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which the government aimed to oppose “the rebels, feudalism, feudal deprivation, and 
feudal privileges,” and eliminate traditional taxes.378 
 
Carrying out these comprehensive yet distinctive policies, the CCP disseminated its 
power into the local level and heightened its social control in Tibet. Significantly, by 
the redistribution of a great deal of land owned by landlords and the manorial 
aristocrats, the state cut existing ties among monasteries and villages. Alternatively, 
the CCP built a new vertical relationship between the state and Tibetans.379 Moreover, 
the Chinese government abolished old institutions adopted by the Kashag and 
replaced them with new versions; these included the adjustation of administrative 
districts and the Tibetan currency.380 Furthermore, the CCP fostered a large number of 
Tibetans cadres, who afterwards were assigned to the local governments and 
organisations.381 In this way, local Tibetan society was structurally reconfigured 
within a few years since 1959. 
 
The CCP presumed that these multiple means could help stabilise Tibet. However, 
several factors prevented the realisation of this plan. Firstly, the radical state-led 
modernisation activated ethnic tension. As discussed in chapter three, the rapid 
changes in the societal landscape outside Tibet resulted in uncertainty in Tibet. Now, 
similar changes occurred in Tibet. In addition, the negative effects of the anti-rebellion 
policy also added fuel to the sense of insecurity for Tibetans. The relationship between 
Tibetans and the Chinese government became worse. 
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Acknowledging the resulting negative effects, the Panchen Lama listed the main 
setbacks afflicted by the ‘democratic reform’ and the anti-rebellion campaign. He 
pinpointed that the reform had caused severe damage on Tibetan society and 
Buddhism. Significantly, many socialist campaigners had little understanding of 
Tibetan culture. It seemed that, from their perspective, most things derived from 
traditional Tibet should entirely give way to ‘modern’ phenomena. Thousands of 
monasteries were ruined and many monks and nuns were arrested because they 
questioned the campaign. Given that Buddhism was deeply embedded in Tibetan 
society and played a meaningful role in Tibetan culture and custom, many Tibetans 
felt strong sympathy and anger when faced with these radical policies. 382  The 
Panchen Lama criticised the disorder caused by the anti-rebellion campaign. As he 
pointed out, under the banner of ‘fighting the rebels’, the PLA troops arbitrarily 
arrested people who were suspected to have engaged in the revolt of March 1959. 
These indiscriminative purges generated a sense of unsettlement among Tibetans.383 
Overall, the Chinese commitment triggered Tibetan discontentment and antagonism 
towards the government. 
 
The Panchen Lama, one of the paramount figures for Tibetans, wanted to raise these 
setbacks at a meeting with major CCP leaders. In 1962, he submitted a comprehensive 
observation of not only Tibet, but also of the other Tibetan areas; in the meantime he 
also proposed suggestions to correct the policy flaws. The submitted proposal is 
known as the “70,000 Character Petition (Qi Wan Yan Shu 七万言书)” that the 
Panchen Lama presented at a meeting attended by major CCP leaders, including Zhou 
Enlai, Li Weihan, Xi Zhongxun, Zhang Jingwu, Zhang Guohua, and other Tibetan 
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officials including Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme.384 However, the Central government did 
not accept his advice. Rather, Mao severely criticised the Panchen Lama, blaming him 
as an obstacle to the Chinese socialist campaign.385 
 
The reasons for this treatment were various and the existing literature believes that the 
increasing radicalisation of China’s domestic environment was a significant factor. To 
mention it briefly, at the Lushan Conference of 1959, Chairman Mao decided to 
launch a new anti-right campaign as his response to those who planned a 
reexamination of the revolutionary program. Perceiving these ideas as a threat to his 
personal authority and as a plot to compromise with the capitalist line, Mao purged the 
then defense minister Peng Dehuai from his position by targeting him as the leader of 
an anti-Party clique and committed an internal purge of those who had connections to 
Peng. In 1962, Mao Zedong reaffirmed the significance of ‘class struggle’ at the 
Beidaihe Conference. On this occasion, Mao attacked other senior officials for their 
‘surrendering profile toward the class enemies’. Under such a background, Mao 
accused the Panchen Lama and his submission of the 70,000 Character Petition, as a 
conspicuous anti-Party figure and reactionary.386 In this view, the Panchen Lama’s 
tragedy was related to the historical context in which it was situated. 
 
Furthermore, a perception that the Panchen’s proposal contained ethno-nationalism 
existed among the CCP. According to an internal document, at the meeting dated the 
21st of August 1962, members of the Tibet Work Committee criticised the Panchen 
Lama as below: 
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The goals for his proposal: The first one is to vent his emotion. The second is  
to fight for power, win the heart of the masses, and increase his influence to 
seek more ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’….He is looking for power not only in 
Tibet. Moreover he aims to build a Tibetan country that incorporates all 
Tibetan areas.387  
 
 
As such, the Panchen’s behaviour was interpreted as a posture threatening the state. In 
this way, his purge was related to the Chinese concern about the Tibetan 
nationalism.388  
 
In addition, the intensified Sino-Indian border dispute and war, which broke out 
around the same time, further constituted a delicate situation for the Panchen Lama. 
As Tibet was the main cause to the border confrontation, the Panchen Lama, given his 
importance, became a sensitive subject. According to an internal report, the top 
leadership was concerned about his loyalty. In particular, when they found that the 
Panchen Lama still privately praised the status of the Dalai Lama, their doubt was 
further reinforced.389 The CCP’s purge of the Panchen Lama was attributed to his 
‘counter-revolutionary essence’, though an uncertainty about his intention deserves to 
be taken into account.390  The effect of the Sino-Indian border dispute will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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The Panchen Lama’s sufferings here should not only be considered a personal loss of 
power but also a vivid reflection of intensifying Chinese distrust of traditional Tibetan 
leadership. As a Tibetan spiritual figure and one of the PRC’s state leaders, the 
Panchen Lama was not even invited to attend the 14th National Day celebration in 
1963. On the occasion of the 7th PCTAR in the following year, he was publicly 
accused to have committed ‘anti-people and anti-country crimes’. In December 1964, 
the third meeting of National People’s Committee announced the removal of the 
Panchen from the leadership of the PCTAR. Meanwhile, the State Council also 
announced the withdrawal of the Dalai Lama from the PCTAR and the NPC.391 All 
these resolutions reflected that these members of the ‘patriotic upper class’, especially 
the traditional elites containing religious and cultural aspects, were no longer relied 
upon as local collaborators or agents.392 Rather, the Chinese authorities from then on 
turned to people with more secular features or to the CCP self-trained Tibetan 
cadres.393 This phenomenon reflected the CCP’s trust of those assumed to share a 
similar ideology. 
 
Having developed complicated networks through the party and various other 
organisations for years, Beijing could fully deliver its variety of policies throughout 
Tibet. When Mao launched the nationwide ‘socialist education movement’ at the end 
of 1962, the local government in Tibet correspondingly launched a campaign of the 
‘three big educations,’ mixing propaganda of class consciousness, patriotism and 
socialism. The practice of mobilisation from the central to the local revealed that a 
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vertical administrative system had been built. The PLA troops stationed in Tibet and 
other neighbouring provinces could also provide the Chinese government with an 
armed force strong enough to deal with any potential opponent. Under these 
conditions, the Central government announced the establishment of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region in 1965. 
 
The founding of the TAR did not mean that Tibetans had been granted autonomy; 
instead, this titular empowerment marked that the PRC further institutionalised its rule 
in Tibet.394 In addition, the founding itself provided a coherent statement for the PRC 
government to tackle a variety of questions relating to its ruling legitimacy and 
commitment to protect ethnic minorities. For one, Beijing could claim that the regime 
had complied with its own position on ethnic policies and that Tibetans enjoyed 
autonomous rights. Beijing also claimed that it had fulfilled its promise in the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951, in which Article 3 stated that “The Tibetan 
people have rights to exercise autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central 
People’s Government.” Since 1965, the existence of the TAR became supporting 
evidence for Beijing to refute any doubts about its promise to Tibetans. Beijing also 
took the establishment of the TAR to deny the demands from the TGIE in the bilateral 
negotiation, which can be seen in chapter five. 
 
On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP reshaped the entire social landscape of 
Tibet. Given the radical imposition of these policies, however, the atmosphere of 
uncertainty increased. Shortly after, the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution oriented 
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the situation towards a further violent scenario, to which the concept of security 
dilemma was inapplicable.  
 
The Cultural Revolution in Tibet and Real Security Threat 
 
This section discusses the Sino-Tibetan relationship in the Cultural Revolution, 
understanding it as a continued and tense confrontation. Analysing China’s adoption 
of an assimilation policy towards Tibetans, this section argues that the situation in this 
period, in particular in the late-1960s, is identified as a real security threat. A 
circumstance containing irreconcilable antagonism is illustrative of this. 
 
As a dramatic tragedy in modern PRC history, the damage caused by the Cultural 
Revolution is inestimable. Tibet was unable to be exempted from this crusade. With its 
traditional legacy and religious characteristics, which were claimed to be feudal, Tibet 
became one of the most severely afflicted regions. 
 
The origins of the Cultural Revolution is due to multiple factors.395 Domestically, the 
political struggles amid the Central leadership in Beijing became more violent. On the 
16th of May 1966, Mao Zedong and his supporters issued the “516 Statement (516 
Tongzhi 516 通知),” which not only reconfirmed the indisputable authority of Mao, 
but also encouraged people to carry on class struggle. Warning that reactionary forces 
were awaiting an opportunity to destroy the proletarian dictatorship, Mao insisted on 
the necessity of launching a higher degree of revolutionary campaign.396 Hearing that 
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the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution Committee was established in Beijing, 
students and regional CCP members formed local branches all over China. The new 
revolutionist wave soon spread nationwide. On the international side, the Sino-Soviet 
rift since the late 1950s led to a dispute over the ideological line between Beijing and 
Moscow, in which both sides insisted that their policies followed orthodox 
Marxism. 397  Falling into a propagandist contestation, Mao accused the Soviet 
communists of being revisionist. As a consequence, the CCP continued the 
revolutionary struggle.398 Under such a background, therefore, the prospect of a 
further radical campaign was sensible. 
 
From the beginning, the Cultural Revolution in Tibet was merely a reflection of 
Beijing’s instructions, given the fact that the local officials did not engage in the 
power struggle among the CCP top leadership. However, the crusade itself quickly 
evolved into violence between three factions: Nyamdrel (together/alliance), Gyelog 
(overthrow/rebel), and the PLA stationed in Tibet. At the different times, Beijing also 
played a role.399 
 
During the peak of the Cultural Revolution, in 1967-68, the local situation in Tibet 
showed as power battles amidst different factions, in which Han people always led the 
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fights. For another, everything related to Tibet was always regarded as the old and 
backwardness, and thus easily rendering attacks from the mobilised masses.400 
 
During this time, Tibetan society met with extreme means of suppression and 
assimilation to Chinese socialism. The principle of ‘Promotion by Cautious Steps’ 
revealed in the early 1950s to guide the policy for ethnic minorities was completely 
replaced with ‘class struggle’. The slogan ‘The ethnic question is essentially a class 
question’, raised by Mao, became the supreme doctrine for ethnic policy. In this way, 
it implied that the government essentially withdrew its recognition of ethnicity as a 
category under this context. Alternatively, ‘political attitude’ and ‘class background’ 
became the main labels used to distinguish people.401 Any language, religion or 
custom that could feature ethnic characteristics was forbidden. Also, the system of 
ethnic autonomous regions was suspended. The extreme and offensive tendency 
illuminates a broader picture.402 In fact, Tibet was not a case in isolation. Rather, 
other ethnic minority regions, including Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Yunnan, were 
facing the same forces. Dreyer argues that the top leadership decided to resolve the 
long-term sensitive ethnicity questions through the eradication of the distinctiveness 
of ethnic groups.403 
 
Considering this practice, the concept of ‘cultural genocide’ can be used to conceive 
of Tibetan sufferings.404 As such, anything that could manifest Tibetan characteristics 
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was highly inhibited. In addition, Chinese authorities constantly mobilised Tibetans to 
take part in various socialist campaigns. Names of roads, streets, as well as of 
significant occasions were adjusted to fit socialist values. For example, the mountain 
Chagpori was renamed as mountain Victory, in memory of the anti-rebellion campaign; 
Norbulingka, the Dalai Lama’s palace, was turned into People’s Park. Also, Tibetans 
were not excluded from the fierce struggles of the Red Guards. Many were engaged in 
the competing factions. After the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee, 
social order was restored but the mobilisation of people for socialist campaigns 
continued.405 All these operations from different aspects caused serious damage to 
Tibetan culture and tradition, especially to Buddhism. 
 
In the previous section, this chapter noted that, when Beijing embarked on its socialist 
transformation in Tibet beginning in 1959, religion was targeted by some campaigners 
with irregular threats of disorder. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, 
circumstances became tougher, and Buddhism faced planned destruction. Mao 
proclaimed the campaign “against the four olds” (ideas, culture, customs, and habits), 
and as a consequence, everything associated with ‘old Tibet’ was often targeted. All 
camps of the Red Guards asserted to throw the old away in the name of modernisation 
and progress. A great deal of monasteries and temples were vandalised, including the 
three main monasteries of Sera, Drepung and Gaden.406 Even Jokhang temple was 
occupied by the Red Guards and the PLA and turned into a meeting place.407 Most 
religious ceremonies were suspended. For ordinary people, the worship of Buddha 
was even distorted into the worship of Mao.  
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In a report contained in the UK National Archives, quoting some journalists who 
visited Tibet in the late 1970s, Tibet was described as a colony of the PRC, and the 
local religious situation was described as such: 
 
 
After being totally suppressed during the Cultural Revolution, religious 
practice is now again permitted, but under severe constraints. Of 2,469 
monasteries and 110,000 monks in 1960, 10 monasteries and perhaps 1-2,000 
monks remain. No men have entered religious training since 1960. Lamas 
interviewed by journalists explained that they practised their religion under 
the Party’s guidance as units subordinate to the ‘Office for the Preservation of 
Cultural Relics’…The remaining few temples opened 3 times a week during 
working hours, and as they were officially designated as museums, an entrance 
fee had to be paid by worshippers.408 
 
 
In another report, officers from the UK Embassy in Beijing expressed their personal 
experiences in Lhasa: 
 
 
In other monastery, a staggering complex of buildings which once housed          
10,000 monks and now, the Chinese said, musters 200, we had an opportunity 
for questions. Mr. Health asked the senior monks (not a lama) whom he had 
regarded as the spiritual leader of his faith since the Dalai fled. The monk 
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replied “formally Chairman Mao Zedong and now Chairman Hua Guofeng.409 
 
 
While these reports were not written during the Cultural Revolution, they can help us 
to conceive of the relics of certain distorted religious practices.  
 
In his statement on the anniversary of the national uprisings of 1967 and 1969, the 
Dalai Lama criticised the Cultural Revolution’s intentions and action to ‘wipe out 
traces of Tibetan culture’410 and ‘the totality of Tibetan identity’.411 Tsering Woeser 
also decried the situation in Tibet as a ‘human genocide’ to express the degree of 
destruction. 412  Through interviews with former Red Guards and monks, Wang 
Lixiong argued that many Tibetans during that period became thoroughly alienated 
from their traditional way of life rather than being mere passive participants.413 
Drawing on these observations, it is to be pointed out that, beyond the image of people 
acting in anarchy during the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans and Tibet were both 
experiencing a fundamental crisis of societal survival. 
 
Facing the capricious revolutionist storm accompanied by factional strife and the 
militarisation of Tibet, some Tibetans in nomadic and rural areas stood up to fight and 
vented their anger by assaulting either local administrations or units where the PLA 
stayed. To a large extent, these were direct reflections of the aim of local Tibetans to 
address their sufferings. In 1969, such assaults happened in 52 out of 71 counties of 
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the TAR.414 In Changdu City, Banbar County, it was reported that more than two 
thousand people attacked and temporally occupied the local government.415 The 
Nyemo Revolt, a well-known incident, occurred at this time.416 Led by Thrinley 
Choedron, a nun who claimed to restore Buddhism, the revolt spread to more than 18 
counties and lasted for 8 months.417 All these rebellions subsequently provoked brutal 
suppression and thousands of participants (and suspects) were either arrested or 
executed.418 These rebellions and the subsequent suppression then incurred more 
rebellions and suppression. Tibetans chose to seek exile in the neighboring countries 
while some joined the guerrillas.419  
 
By examining the situation of this period, China’s actions towards Tibet could be 
regarded as aggressive. The Sino-Tibetan relationship in the late-1960s was extremely 
difficult. Shakya contended that the apparent Tibetan discontent towards the CCP was 
real. He stated that “The constant attack on the Tibetan culture…...had eroded the 
Tibetans’ confidence in their own value system. The Chinese Communist cadres had 
set about transforming every aspect of Tibetan behaviour but what they saw as social 
education was considered by the people an attack to their way of life.”420 In his 
analysis, the Cultural Revolution brought about not only disorder, but also 
psychological and physical destruction of Tibetan society.421 
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China’s Foreign Relations and the Tibetan Issue 
 
Thus far, the above sections have discussed the high-uncertainty societal dilemma and 
the real security threat which manifesting themselves in the Sino-Tibetan relationship 
in the 1960s. The examination has mainly focused on domestic dimensions of the 
issue. Aiming to paint a comprehensive picture of the dynamics affecting the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship, the section below presents the Chinese external politics at 
that time. This section is going to show that, parallel to the time when China carried 
out its socialist crusades in Tibet, the escape of the Dalai Lama and of a large number 
of Tibetans resulted in a series of domino effects on China’s relations with its 
neighboring countries, including India and the Soviet Union. Further, the Tibetan issue 
was appealed to in the UN several times by patrons of Tibet. These complex events 
related to Tibet, embedded in the Cold War structure, were perceived by Beijing as 
challenges to Chinese sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and nation-building 
project in Tibet. Substantially, these factors accounted for Beijing’s tough attitude 
until its improvement of international and domestic politics. 
  
The Tibetan Factor in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Sino-USSR Rift  
 
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 is considered one of the most important and sensitive 
topics in modern Sino-Indian relations, and the Tibetan factor occupied a significant 
position.422 In addition, when the relationship between China and India deteriorated, 
the China-USSR relationship also became worse during this time. Indeed, there were 
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many factors resulting in the Sino-Soviet split, and Beijing’s discontent with 
Moscow’s standpoint on the Sino-Indian dispute, which related to Tibet, was one of 
them. As a consequence, India and the USSR became opponents of China in the Cold 
War context and their behaviour towards Tibet was a matter of concern for the 
Chinese.423 
 
Following the Tibetan revolt of March 1959, Sino-Indian relations rapidly declined. In 
chapter three, this thesis presented that the Chinese government always doubted 
Indian intentions on Tibet and perceived its accommodation of Tibetan émigrés as 
assistance to the Tibetan resistance. Chinese uncertainty was not dispelled with the 
crackdown of the Tibetan revolt. Rather, Beijing regarded the arrival of the Dalai 
Lama and his followers in India as evidence that New Delhi did play a role. Further, 
Nehru’s sympathetic tone for the Tibetan uprising and the provision of asylum to the 
Dalai Lama and a large number of other Tibetans424 provoked a tough response by 
Beijing. On the 6th of May 1959, an article entitled “Revolution of Tibet and 
Philosophy of Nehru” was published in the People’s Daily. The article criticised New 
Delhi’s ‘expansionism’ and ‘Anglo-American imperialism’ behind the scenes. 425 
Around the same time, occasional conflicts broke out along the boundary area, where 
only a Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the PRC and India existed instead of a 
demarcated line. From then on, the Tibetan issue and the Sino-Indian border dispute 
further entwisted and resulted in the war of 1962.  
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The border dispute between China and India can trace its origins to the Simla 
Conference held in 1914, when the British Raj signed the McMahon Line with the de 
facto representative of Tibet. At that time, the Chinese authority was the third 
participant at the conference and did not sign the treaty,denying its legitimacy.426 
Decades later, the dispute was inherited from previous regimes by the independent 
Indian government and the PRC respectively. While the friendship between China and 
India in the early 1950s seemed to dilute the sensitivity, the border was still not 
demarcated. After the conclusion of the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, the Indian 
Prime Minister Nehru instructed his government to establish a ‘firm and definite’ 
northern frontier with China, which was marked as ‘undefined’ before. Conversely, 
the PRC marked the line as terra irredenta after 1954. Though both sides noticed this 
tension, they did not urge their counterparts to the negotiation table.427 
 
Out of consideration for its own geopolitical security, the Indian government is always 
concerned with the situation in the Himalaya region, in particular in Tibet. In addition, 
Indians traditionally regard the Himalaya Mountains as a spiritual and holy sphere.428 
Based on these factors, the increasing presence of the PLA throughout Tibet after the 
Lhasa revolt immediately increased the Indian government’s concerns and 
apprehensions. On the other side, the CCP was alarmed with Indian intentions and 
behaviours.429 
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In the fall of 1959, military clashes erupted in the Longju region, the disputed eastern 
section of the border and in the region of Aksai Chin in the western part. While at first 
both Beijing and New Delhi upheld the Panchsheel principles towards each other, 
trying to calm confrontation, tensions between China and India further escalated as the 
leaders of both states vowed to defend their national interests. Propaganda in the two 
countries began to operate by denouncing each other as imperialists. Diplomatic 
contacts seemed to lose its function for bilateral communication. 
 
In 1960, Chou Enlai visited New Delhi to negotiate a deal. He proposed that India 
could take the eastern part while the western sector belonged to China, which then 
failed.430 The situation evolved into a standoff, and the strong pressures from the 
domestic civil society deteriorated the rift. In 1961, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru 
declared the adoption of the ‘Forward Policy’, instructing Indian troops to move 
forward to the disputed front-line when facing questions in Parliament.431 In its 
response, Beijing warned New Delhi to stop this policy.432 Nehru refused to accept 
this request. Instead, he ordered more troops to move towards the frontier and set up 
garrisons in their own ‘territory.’ From the perspective of Nehru, his strategy aimed to 
force China to make more concessions in the negotiations.433 Nevertheless, he was 
unable to reach such an expectation. In the end, Beijing did not return to the 
negotiation table but launched an attack on the Indian garrison.434  
 
In October 1962, the Chinese troops crossed the Himalaya Mountains and quickly 
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defeated the stationed Indian forces and occupied the disputed regions. In November, 
the PLA completely defeated the Indian troops in the eastern and the western lines,. 
Claiming to show China’s good will, Beijing finally did not further attack India but 
withdrew the PLA back to the previous LAC in December.435  
 
While the armed conflict took place in a short span of time, its consequences were 
significant and generated negative impacts on Sino-Soviet relations. Shen Zhihua 
argues that Beijing’s perception of Moscow siding with New Delhi was a key 
element.436 
 
Having allied itself with China, the USSR was concerned with the Sino-Indian border 
question. However, Moscow’s adoption of a neutral position in the Sino-Indian border 
question was perceived by Beijing as a substantial support for New Delhi.437 On the 
occasion of his attendance to the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the foundation 
of the PRC in October 1959, the then Soviet leader Khrushchev emphasised that he 
did not support India, but he also expressed his disagreement with Beijing’s 
commitment to adopt military means to deal with the dispute with India. 438 
Khrushchev pointed out that the Chinese behaviour would not only cause regional 
instability but would also push New Delhi towards the West. The Soviet leader 
criticised the CCP top leaders, asserting that it was unwise for China to haggle over 
such a tiny stretch of land with India.439 Moreover, Khrushchev criticised Beijing’s 
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wrongdoings on issues relating to Tibet. He commented that Beijing committed a 
mistake by allowing the Dalai Lama to flee to India thereby escalating Sino-Indian 
tension. All these points infuriated the Chinese leadership. In their responses, the CCP 
Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, the marshal, the then foreign minister Chen Yi, and others 
reproached Khrushchev for having treated China unfairly. They also expressed that 
Khrushchev’s stance on China’s sovereignty regarding Tibet and the territories 
disputed with India was unacceptable.440 As Jian Chen describes, “at this point the 
meeting deteriorated into complete disorder as leaders from both sides attacked their 
alliance partners.”441 
 
This episode did not happen coincidentally. Rather, it was a result of discontentment 
between Beijing and Moscow that had accumulated for years. Previously, both sides 
debated over the Soviet Union’s proposal to form a joint submarine flotilla with China 
and to build a long-wave radio station on Chinese territory in 1958.442 While the 
Soviet side repeatedly clarified to the Chinese leaders that the proposal was not made 
with the intention of controlling China, the latter remained cautious and did not accept 
such explanations.443 In addition, with regard to the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, as 
the PLA suddenly shelled the islands of Kinmen without having informed Moscow in 
advance, the latter expressed its dissatisfaction with Beijing. Although Mao insisted 
that this was China’s internal affair, the Soviet leader apparently did not accept it.444 
Also, Beijing was angry about Moscow’s cancellation of its provision for China with 
technical material for producing an atomic bomb. 445  While this withdrawal of 
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assistance belonged to Khrushchev’s efforts to relieve the tension of the Cold War — 
he even visited the US to meet President Dwight Eisenhower, Mao regarded this as a 
compromise of Moscow with the ‘imperialists’. Moreover, the previous public 
devaluations of the Great Leap Forward by Khrushchev at the 21st Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and his request to Peng Dehuai, to alter the 
practice of the Great Leap Forward, all gave the CCP leadership the idea that the 
Soviet aimed to put pressure on China’s policies.446 All these events took place before 
and during Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in October 1959, when the Sino-Soviet 
alliance fell apart. 
 
In 1960 the Soviet Communist Party publicly criticised the CCP regarding its 
domestic policies on Tibet, and its ‘nationalist’ stance within the China-India border 
dispute.447 In its response, the CCP insisted on its correctness and published articles 
on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birthday. Seemingly, both parties 
maintained an image of unity, but in practice they had already split.448  
 
Overall, the Sino-Indian conflict had several implications. Before, within and after the 
war, the Tibet factor mattered. For one thing, it demonstrated that the CCP had ruled 
out potential Indian intervention in its nation-building operation in Tibet. As Taylor 
argued, the Chinese leaders perceived the intensification of the territorial dispute as an 
effort by India to maintain influence within Tibet and challenge Chinese authority. 
India’s provision of asylum for the Dalai Lama, from the perspective of the CCP, also 
posed a challenge to the CCP’s ruling legitimacy in Tibet. India’s whole territorial 
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claims were also strongly related to China’s sovereignty over Tibet.449 
 
For another, the escalation of the border dispute complicated the triple relationship 
China-Tibet-India. The previous symbol of friendship between China and India in the 
early 1950s turned out to be a symbol of conflict. Given the occurrence of the border 
war, New Delhi provided a higher degree of aid to Tibetan refugees. After 1962, the 
Tibetan Government in Exile acquired essential support from the government in India 
in a number of fields, including finance, education and cultural protection.450 After 
1962, the Indian government became comparatively active in facilitating Tibet in its 
voting behaviour in the UN which will be outlined further below.  
 
In association with this, India changed its previous non-aligned diplomacy. Separately, 
it built stronger cooperation with both the US and the USSR.451 The former was the 
traditional rival of communist China, while the latter had broken with China over their 
attitudes towards India (and Tibet) and over the socialist ideological line. The sparking 
of armed conflict over the island of Zhenbao in 1969 finally terminated their alliance. 
Therefore, in the 1960s, China was diplomatically isolated, which partly accounted for 
China’s Tibet policy domestically. 
 
The UN Resolutions on ‘The Question of Tibet’ 
On the one side, the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute endangered China’s 
relationships with its neighbours; on the other the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetans 
seeking to bring the Tibetan issue to the UN devalued China’s international image. 
Since his arrival in India in March 1959, the Dalai Lama looked for international 
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recognition of Tibet’s independence by major countries including the US, UK, India 
etc. Having decided to support the Dalai Lama, however, the US was only willing to 
promote the issue with regard to Tibetan human rights. As argued by Goldstein, the 
US government consistently adopted two approaches in its Tibet policy in the Cold 
War. Strategically, the US administration cautiously and consistently supported 
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. On the other hand, tactically, the US government’s 
provision of aid to exiled Tibetans was claimed to be purely motivated by human 
rights violations. Not only was the US’s political and economic support aligned with 
this line, but this way of operation also substantially restricted the framework of the 
Tibetan issue in the international politics arena. Finally, the Dalai Lama and the exiled 
government compromised as the issue of Tibet could finally be expressed. The TGIE 
showed a similar standpoint when they looked for promotion of the Tibetan issue by 
the British or Indian government.452 
 
In 1959-1965, the United Nations General Assembly passed three resolutions over the 
Tibetan issue, which were respectively, the ‘Resolution 1353 (XIV)’ (1959), 
‘Resolution 1723 (XVI)’ (1961), and ‘Resolution 2079 (XX)’ (1965). These 
resolutions were mainly based on three reports by the International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ) and highlighted the violation of human rights and freedom in Tibet, 
suggesting that ‘Tibetans were oppressed to enjoy their traditional autonomy and even 
the right to self-determination’.453 However, none of them could challenge China’s 
ruling sovereignty over Tibet. Moreover, while Taipei, which took China’s seat at the 
UNO at that time, showed sympathy for Tibetan suffering, and the ROC representative 
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supported the resolutions, Chiang limited the standpoint to the area of human rights. 
That is, Taipei would not support Tibet independence. 
 
The first resolution was proposed by Ireland and Malaysia and passed on the 21st of 
October 1959. The resolution was based on the first report of the ICJ entitled “The 
Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law” and the statement of the Dalai Lama. In its 
content, this resolution identified that Tibetans have a distinct culture and religion and 
enjoyed traditional autonomy but their fundamental human rights “have been forcibly 
denied.” The conclusion juxtaposed human rights violations in Tibet to the essential 
meaning of the UN Charter and the United Declaration of Human Rights, stressing 
their connections.454 
 
The second resolution was sponsored by Ireland, Malaysia, Thailand, and El Salvador. 
It recalled the resolution 1353 (XIV) and showed a more radical stance than the first 
resolution. In terms of Tibetan human rights, the resolution stated that these include 
the right to self-determination.455 This seemed to be the only case that may be 
understood relating the Tibetan issue to the question of Chinese sovereignty. However, 
no more discussions about it have been conducted afterwards. 
 
The third UN resolution on the question of Tibet was proposed by more countries, 
including Ireland, Malaysia, Thailand, El Salvador, Malta, Nicaragua, and Philippines, 
and this resolution was passed on the 18th of December 1965. Reconfirming the 
previous resolutions, the content of the third resolution reaffirmed the resolution 1353 
(XIV) and the resolution 1723 (XVI). Yet the conclusion of it did not touch on the 
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sovereign status of Tibet.456 
 
Why did these resolutions not discuss the legal status of Tibet and instead, mainly 
focused on fundamental human rights and freedoms? Lin suggests that the standpoint 
of Taipei which insisted on Chinese sovereignty might play a role.457 Given the 
political sensitivity of sovereignty, without specific conditions, most countries would 
not intervene on issues related to it. As the delegation of Thailand stated: 
 
 
…The question of Tibet with which we are now confronted is essentially 
another issue of human rights concerning the Tibetan people, who have 
forcibly been denied even the most fundamental human rights and freedoms. In 
this particular connexion, those who oppose the role and competence of the 
United Nations in this question have contended that Tibet is an integral part of 
Communist China. In their view, it therefore follows that consideration of the 
case constitutes a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter which 
reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state ..." 458 
 
 
It is thus clear that if the UN focused on the issue of sovereignty, another debate about 
Tibet would appear; namely, whether or not Tibet is an independent country. Since 
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1950, this question was discussed and then denied, this question would be hard to be 
raised again. Major involved powers including the US, UK, and India were also 
unwilling to re-discuss this question. By observing the vote of ‘China,’ we could also 
interpret that the resolutions were approved by Taipei, which essentially adopted the 
same stance as the PRC insisting that “Tibet is part of China.” As a result, these UN 
resolutions mainly concentrated on the issues of human rights, but not on sovereignty. 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet was still not challenged. When the PRC entered the 
United Nations and replaced Taipei in 1972, it became almost impossible to discuss 
such an issue.  
 
India’s Appeal to the UNCHR concerning Tibet, 1969-70 
In the late 1960s, the TGIE continued to seek support from UN members and took any 
opportunity to raise their issue in the United Nations. However, out of consideration 
for relations with the PRC, most countries did not want to publicly refer to the Tibetan 
issue in terms of sovereignty. The government of India, for example, was said to “have 
great sympathy for the Tibetan cause,” but to “consider that such an item would only 
create trouble for them with the Chinese.”459 Its attitude, described in the words of the 
UK government, was “chary,”460 and was applicable to the mentality of other states. 
Understanding the international situation but also aiming to address the issue, the 
TGIE suggested that it would accept an appeal on the Tibetan issue in any form.461 
The raise of Tibet in association with human rights thus occurred in this context.  
 
Moreover, given that the Cultural Revolution was launched in China at the same time, 
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some countries expressed their concerns regarding Tibet. As Thanat Khoman, the 
foreign minister of Thailand stated in his speech in the General Debate at the UN on 
the 10th of October 1968: 
 
 
     ……the systematic and brutal persecution conducted against the fundamental        
     human rights and freedom of the Tibetan people by the Peking [Beijing] regime    
     has continued unabated, perhaps with increased intensity. The launching of the   
     cultural revolution wreaked even greater havoc in the distinctive cultural and  
     religious life of the spiritual people of Tibet. Revered places of worship have  
     practically all been destroyed or converted into headquarters for conducting  
     suppression and oppression. Famine and starvation stalked the land and wiped    
     out the native Tibetans at the same fast rate as forcible exile or murder by the    
     Peking [Beijing] authorities.......we deeply deplore the tragic development in  
     Tibet and strong hope that practices which lead to the deprivation of the  
     fundamental human rights and freedom of the Tibetan people will cease.462 
 
 
Furthermore, the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the late 1960s 
influenced the attitude of some countries on the Tibetan issue. On the 3rd of April 1967, 
Tashkent Radio, a Soviet source, reported that Beijing violently oppressed a Tibetan 
insurgency, killing hundreds of Tibetans and destroying many monasteries. The report 
concluded that “the Tibetans would continue their struggle for survival and 
independence and their liberation struggle, like that of other nationalities, would never 
                                                     




be subdued.”463 Given that the USSR used to support the PRC in the previous three 
UN Resolutions, this report demonstrated that the Soviet Union may have shifted its 
position as a result of its rift with China. After the Sino-Russian split in 1969, other 
Soviet sources including “Radio Peace and Progress,” “Tashkent Radio,” and 
“Literary Gazette” aired more similar reports.464 As a result of the PRC’s changing 
relationship with other socialist states, the TGIE’s lobbying attempts in many 
countries received more positive responses. 
 
In 1969, the representative of the Dalai Lama received support from the Indian 
government. According to the official documents of the UK Foreign Office and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Indian government seemed to be willing to 
adjust its attitude from recognition of China’s ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet, into a 
recognition of China’s ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet. It also proposed to raise the Tibetan 
issue in the session of the Human Rights Commission in the United Nations of 1970, 
and requested support from the UK government.465 
 
Reviewing the Indian memorandum dated the 29th of August 1969, this chapter argues 
that India’s proposal was a result of negative Sino-Indian relations, the PRC’s 
international relations at that time, and India’s long-term concern about the situation 
of Tibet. The first reason, as India claimed in the memorandum, was China’s 
destruction of bilateral friendship between China and India, which was totally against 
the will of the Indian former Prime Minister Nehru, who originally aimed to build a 
close friendship with China since the founding of the PRC. Inasmuch as the 
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government of India hosted the Dalai Lama and Tibetan diaspora, the Chinese 
government thought that India intervened in its internal affairs. The subsequent 1962 
Sino-Indian war regarding the boundary between India and Tibet further worsened 
Sino-Indian relations. Thus, India viewed the PRC as a potential rival. The second 
reason was related to the first factor — China’s huge assistance to India’s rival, 
Pakistan. From the perspective of India, the PRC’s alliance with its enemy affected 
India’s security. Thus, India must keep an eye on the PRC. The third factor was 
increasing tension between the PRC and the USSR. This time, India strengthened its 
cooperation with the USSR after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The 
deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship provided a chance for India. In addition, India’s 
long-term sympathy for Tibetans was an additional factor. Overall, the memorandum 
urged that India should bring the Tibetan issue up at the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights (UNCHR) and revise India’s Tibet policy.466 
 
The development of this appeal could be partly perceived as a triumph of the TGIE’s 
lobbying in India. 1969 marked the tenth year of the Lhasa revolt, and that March, 
some Indian congressmen who supported Tibet decided to organize a “Parliamentary 
Group for Tibet” in commemoration.467 On the 8th of April, during a debate on 
whether India should further support Tibet or not, Dinesh Singh, the then Minister of 
External Affairs of India, claimed that “though it is not appropriate for India to 
promote the independence of Tibet from India’s soil, India would support it either in 
the UN or elsewhere.”468 
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Following this debate, the Indian Parliamentary Group for Tibet was officially formed 
inside the parliament. On the 29th of August, the group sent the memorandum to 
Indira Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister, requesting that India adopt more 
proactive policies on the Tibetan issue, and that India bring the issue to the Human 
Rights Commission in the UN. With regard to India’s Tibet policy, it meant that India 
should only acknowledge China’s suzerainty over Tibet. This position was different 
from India’s previous attitude, as it had officially recognized China’s sovereignty over 
Tibet since 1954. In September, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Dinesh Singh met with the Dalai 
Lama and discussed the submission of the Tibetan issue to the UN. In March 1970, the 
Indian representative filed the Tibetan issue to the UN Human Rights Commission and 
acquired the support of the USA and the Philippines. 
 
However, this resolution eventually did not challenge the PRC’s exercise of 
sovereignty over Tibet, nor did it damage the PRC’s governance. At this point, the 
violent conflicts of the Cultural Revolution in Tibet ceased and the Revolutionary 
Committee was established. This committee had several Tibetans appointed as senior 
officers. The PLA controlled the local situation, and the CCP continued the 
implementation of socialist reforms. Also, the agricultural and economic production in 
the TAR increased though the transformation also led to severe damages of Tibetan 
traditions. These factors contributed to the consolidation of the CCP’s power in Tibet. 
Most importantly, due to the fact that the Indian government only raised the Tibetan 
issue in the form of a human rights issue, the appeal did not change the status quo 
regarding China’s sovereignty. In addition, the fact that the PRC was not yet a 
member of the UN was also a key factor. The resolution could not regulate a 





…in practice nothing could be done about Tibet, even as a human rights case, 
perhaps not even when Communist China became a member of the UN. To 
raise it would therefore be an empty gesture.469 
 
 
Positive Signs in Sino-Tibetan Relations   
 
Turning to the 1970s, the Sino-Tibetan relationship gradually showed some positive 
signs of change. Through selected events, this section argues that a scenario of 
low-uncertainty societal dilemma appeared. As can be seen, while the Cultural 
Revolution finally ended in 1976, a signal of mitigation could be initially grasped in 
the Chinese attitude towards the Dalai Lama’s first visit to Western Europe. In this 
way, both sides interacted through various and possibly indirect accesses and 
occasions. This development should be aligned to the background of Beijing’s 
acquisition of China’s seat in the UN and of the TGIE’s efforts to raise international 
concerns for the situation of Tibet. The renewed environment in which China was 
situated should account for the authorities’ adoption of an accommodating stance over 
Tibet, which created a positive atmosphere. Both sides then called for direct contacts 
and friendship.  
  
The Dalai Lama’s First European Visit and Beijing’s Attitude 
Given the development of the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing alternatively turned to 
improve its relations with the West and received the latter’s welcome for such a 
transition. In 1972, following a secret visit of the US Secretary of State Henry 
                                                     
469 Ibid, “Col. C. H. Toye to Miss Warburton,” June 26, 1969, 
199 
 
Kissenger, President Nixon visited the PRC, paving the way for the normalisation of 
Sino-American relations in 1979. At this time, Beijing and Washington shared the 
same goal to defend themselves against the USSR. 470  Subsequently, the PRC 
successfully entered the UN in 1971, replacing the seat of the Republic of China. 
Since then, building a formal relationship with Beijing became necessary for other 
major powers as well. 
 
Beijing began to prepare its application to entering the UN since the establishment of 
the PRC. As a member of the socialist camp, the PRC initially relied on support from 
these countries. However, the representatives of Taipei and their allies successfully 
blocked the PRC’s admission for two decades. With the evolution of the Cold War and 
Beijing’s increase acquirement of recognition from newly independent developing 
countries, the PRC was able to take the seat in the United Nations and become a 
permanent member of the Security Council.471 Having completed these achievements, 
the PRC expanded heavily on its international influence. 
 
Seeing this development, the TGIE planned its response. The US’s long term financial 
and armed aid for Tibetan guerilla groups based in Mustang, Nepal, via the CIA, was 
cut off in the context of the Sino-American rapprochement.472 In order to raise higher 
concerns and introduce the Tibetan issue to more people in the West, Dharamsala and 
its international supporters in different countries conceived of the plan that the Dalai 
Lama should visit Western Europe. His first trip took place in 1973. Before this tour, 
the Dalai Lama had only undertaken religious visits to Japan and Thailand in 1967 and 
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to Thailand in 1972. 
 
The Dalai Lama’s schedule in the UK was organised by the TGIE and the Tibet 
Society, a London-based NGO which had been concerned with the Tibetan issue for a 
long time. From the beginning, the main goal of this society was to persuade the UK 
government to raise the Tibetan issue in the UN after the PRC had acquired its 
position.473 In its response, however, the UK government claimed that it lacked the 
capability to affect China, even though it disagreed with the PRC’s policy in Tibet. R. 
B. R Hevey, an officer of the Far Eastern Office, clearly expressed London’s position 
when he wrote that ‘supporting Tibet may be risky and could damage the UK’s 
relations with the PRC.’ As he stated:  
 
 
Our formal position is that we have in the past recognized Chinese 
suzerainty over Tibet only on the condition that Tibet retained its autonomy. 
The Chinese claim is that Tibet is an ‘autonomous region’ of the People’s 
Republic of China. They regard criticism of their policies in Tibet as 
interference in their internal affairs. It is not in our interests to give Peking 
[Beijing] gratuitous offence in a matter which is of no direct concern to 
ourselves (except in a general humanitarian sense) at a time when our 
relations are improving in many fields…474 
 
 
Understanding the attitude of the UK government, the Tibet Society turned to 
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requesting the Dalai Lama’s visit to Great Britain. At first, the UK government was 
concerned that his visit may have a negative impact on its relations with China, but 
ultimately the government accepted this proposal. Noting the reasons for granting a 
visa to the Dalai Lama, the UK government contended that it was based on the Dalai 
Lama’s statement claiming that this visit would only be for private and religious 
purposes.475 Afterwards, other European countries permitted the Dalai Lama to carry 
out his schedule on similar grounds.  
 
In fact, the UK Foreign Office consulted the Chinese government during the process, 
aiming to understand what its reaction would be. Beijing’s response was surprisingly 
relaxed. It “agree[ed] that we could not keep him out, although the Chinese will 
protest.”476 Contrary to its previous stance, the Chinese government at this time 
seemed to soften its voice. Five years earlier, when the Dalai Lama visited Japan, 
Beijing had explicitly threatened the tour organiser, claiming that ‘this is indeed a 
malign behaviour, a provocation to China,’ and it warned that ‘all resulting bad  
consequences should be at its own risk’. At that time, China mobilised several 
demonstrations in Japan and tried to hinder the tour. Beijing also accused the US and 
Indian governments of being the organisers of the tour behind the scenes.477 Thus, the 
Chinese response to the Dalai Lama’s visit this time was dramatically different.  
                                                     
475 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 21/1014, “Memorandum of H. H. The 
Dalai Lama,” Proposed visit of The Dalai Lama of Tibet to United Kingdom (1972). 
476 Ibid, “H. Davies to Mr Clark,” November 29, 1972. 
477 People’s Daily, “Xiang Riben Dumai Xinwenshe Tichu Yanzhong Jinggao, Bixu Liji Tingzhi Fanhua 
Xingdong ([China] Warns Yomiuri to Stop Anti-China Activities), People’s Daily, October 03, 1967; “Mei 
Ri Fandongpai Gaoqi Suowei Xizang Mibao Zhanlanhui Cedong Fanhua, Riben Geming Renmin Qianglie 
Kangyi Fanhua Zhanlanhui, Geming Renmin Zai Zhanlanhui Gaochang Maozhuxi Yuluge Jielou 
Fandongpai Fanhua Yinmou (US-Japanese Reactionary organise so called 'Tibetan Treasure Exhibition' 
Conspiring Anti-China Activities, Japanese Revolutionary People Against It and Sing Mao Song), 
People’s Daily, October 7, 1967; “Dao Riben Gao Fanhua Panguo Huodong Zaodao Riben Geming 
Renmin Fennu Yu Zema Panfei Dalai Zai Riben Renmin Nuchisheng Zhong Gunhui Yindu (Protested by 
the Japanese Revolutionary People for Organising Anti-China Activities, The Betrayer Dalai Lama Flees 




The response of India, showing a low profile, only stated that “[India] had not heard 
of this idea, but unlikely to object if it were a private visit.” One in line with the other, 
it seemed that neither side were willing to jeopardise this tour. 
 
More intriguing things followed. After a whole year’s preparation, the 14th Dalai 
Lama conducted his first visit to Western Europe from September to November 1973 
and he stayed in London for a few days. During the tour, he met with local Tibetan 
communities and NGOs as well as with other religious groups, but he did not meet 
with political leaders in these countries (except for the Pope in the Vatican). This 
result was consistent to his previous memorandum, which had suggested that this visit 
was “purely on a private basis and non-political in nature.”478 
 
The implications of this visit for Beijing-Dharamsala interactions are meaningful. 
Beijing’s behaviour in particular deserves further examination. During the period of 
his visit, some UK media (e.g. The Economist) began to report the possible return of 
the Dalai Lama to China, who had expressed his willingness to do so.479 It was even 
reported that Beijing had contacted the Dalai Lama through the Chinese Embassy in 
London and that Chinese officers stayed at the same hotel of the Dalai Lama during 
his stay.480  
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Furthermore, there was another report quoting a journalist that a female relative of the 
Dalai Lama already visited China. This was seen as the first step for the return of the 
Dalai.481 On the one hand, it matters whether these reports were correct or not, on the 
other, they signalled that there was a positive development in the interactions between 
Beijing and Dharamsala. It is still unclear whether the CCP’s new contacts with the 
Dalai Lama really emerged when he visited London. However, around the same time 
there was a meeting between a Tibetan official, Kundeling Kalon, and an official from 
China’s Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong.482 Afterwards, the Dalai Lama played a 
role in the dissolution of the Tibetan guerrillas in Nepal, which irregularly harassed 
the PLA stationed in border areas.483 
 
At that time, there were reports demonstrating that the Chinese government seemed to 
loosen its control in Tibet.484 In 1972, some Tibetan monasteries began to be repaired, 
and some formerly denounced Tibetan leaders re-appeared and even resumed their 
positions in certain institutions. In addition, according to a Nepalese officer, in the 
early 1970s, the economic construction in Tibet was becoming more progressive than 
before.485 All these points above showed a thoroughly different picture from what the 
Soviet sources were depicting. At the time, the Soviet media tended to draw a brutal 
picture about Tibet.486 
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China’s Reformed Tibet Policy and the Tibetan Fact-finding Teams  
With the death of Mao and the immediate collapse of the Gang of Four, the Cultural 
Revolution finally ended in 1976. The political atmosphere in China gradually became 
more open than the previous decade and the new round of Party leadership adopted 
more moderate standpoints regarding international and domestic policies. In relation 
to this, many incidents reflected the improvements of conditions in the TAR. On the 
eve of the 10th anniversary of the TAR’s founding, the Beijing government claimed 
that the Party had completed impressive achievements on several items, especially in 
the economic area. According to the UK National Archives, which cites the original 
Chinese source, in the agricultural area, grain production and livestock in 1973 
doubled from its output in 1959.487 The TAR also became self-sufficient in certain 
products such as timber, woolen fabrics and leathers. In addition, compared to the 
educational situation of 1965, the number of primary schools increased 70 percent in 
1974.488 UK officials expressed their approval in these documents. However, the 
officers also expressed their concerns about the serious destruction of Tibetan 
Buddhist traditions.489 In Beijing, the denounced United Front Work Department 
reappeared and resumed its functions on ethnic minority affairs. Li Weihan, who was 
purged due to the Panchen Lama’s submission of the “70,000 Character Petition” to 
the Party, was reappointed as the First Director of the Department. Ulanfu, a 
Mongolian senior CCP member who had been denounced during the Cultural 
Revolution, was also re-appointed as the Director of the Department. These new 
adopted policies and appointed officials by the CCP seemed to hint that more 
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progressive policies would be implemented in Tibet in the future. 
 
During this period, more positive signs began to appear with regard to Beijing’s 
attitude towards Dharamsala. In May 1977, Reuters reported that the CCP government 
publicly commented on the possibility of the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet. At a 
meeting with a Japanese delegation, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, then the vice chairman 
of the Revolutionary Committee, announced that the Dalai Lama could return to Tibet 
if he stood with the people.490 Though this precondition sounded vague, it showed a 
breakthrough in the TGIE-Beijing interaction. 
 
In the late 1970s, the CCP government implemented more moderate policies, some of 
which were related to Tibetans. In 1978, the most vital event was the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party. It was at this meeting that 
Deng Xiapoing became the effective leader of the country and started the Reform and 
Opening Up policy. At the same time, the Chinese government opened Tibet to foreign 
visitors and agreed to issue visas to Tibetan refugees through its Embassy in Delhi, 
India. These policies were important. Since 1959, the Chinese government had for a 
long time closed the border of Tibet and every foreign visitor needed to have travel 
permission in advance. And during their stay in Tibet, they would be under 
surveillance. The Chinese government permitted very few visitors. This relaxation 
symbolised a huge change in China’s Tibet policy.491 In return, when the Dalai Lama 
visited the Soviet Union and Mongolia in June 1979, he expressed a tender attitude 
towards a possible solution to the Tibetan issue.492 
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This is not to say that the Chinese government left unlimited space for the TGIE. 
Rather, Beijing was still concerned about its intentions and behaviour. As such, 
Beijing tacitly tested the water through different events and prevented the TGIE from 
expanding its influence on the international stage if their activity contained political 
implications. For example, in 1977, before the official normalisation of the Sino-US 
relationship, the TGIE established a Tibet office in New York City. This event resulted 
in an immediate protest by Beijing to Washington. In response, the US government 
restated that this establishment of the office was not approved by the US [federal] 
government, and Washington did not recognise the political status of the TGIE. In the 
statement, Washington reaffirmed that “we respect the territorial integrity of China, 
and none of our policies or actions is based on the premise that Tibet is not part of 
China.”493 This chapter argues that, although Beijing adopted a moderate policy in 
certain areas, the CCP still stood its ground. While Beijing improved its relations with 
the TGIE, it limited the scope of the Tibetan issue to Chinese domestic affairs. 
 
Throughout this time, the CCP strengthened its direct contacts with the government of 
the Dalai Lama. On the 1st of March 1979, Gyalo Thondup was invited by Li Juisin, 
the representative of Deng Xiaoping, to Beijing. In this visit, Gyalo Thondup met with 
Deng, who expressed that the CCP was going to conduct fundamental reforms. Deng 
stated that the Chinese government could discuss any issues regarding Tibet as long as 
Tibetans did not seek independence. Deng also suggested that the Dalai Lama could 
send a delegation to Tibet to investigate the current situation before he took the 
decision; Deng’s proposal was soon accepted by the TGIE. 
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In August, it was the first time that a team representing the Dalai Lama arrived at and 
officially visited the all Tibetan-speaking areas in China, creating official and direct 
contact between Beijing and Dharamsala. The Chinese government promised that they 
would improve the local situation in Tibet, invest in local industries, and assign more 
Tibetans to the Regional People’s Government and Standing Committee of the 
Regional People’s Congress, which had replaced the regional Revolutionary 
Committee established during the Cultural Revolution. It was one of the most 
important events in the evolution of the Tibetan issue, since it had been twenty years 
since a delegation of the Dalai Lama visited Tibet. The representative team was 
composed of Kalon Juchen Thupten, Phuntsog Tashi Takla, Lobsang Samten, Tashi 
Topgyal, Lobsang Tharga. It was said that this representative team received an 
enthusiastic welcome by local Tibetans whereever they went. Followed by this first 
achievement, there were three additional delegation teams who visited Tibet in the 
1980s, which we will discuss in the next chapter. Generally, this period can be 
regarded as a warm period in the interactions between Beijing and Dharamsala.494   
 
While the positive interactions between Beijing and the TGIE increased, the PRC 
government still only allowed a very limited international space for the Dalai Lama. 
At this time, both sides appeared to have a tacit understanding. In January 1979, China 
and the United States officially recognised each other, and both sides quickly formed a 
consensus of cooperation on a variety of issues. One of these was that the Tibetan 
issue would not hamper Sino-American relations. At same time, the TGIE also 
completed a proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to the United States. Similar to his visit 
                                                     




to Europe in 1973, the Dalai Lama’s first visit to the USA was mainly for a “private” 
purpose, and this schedule was understood by Beijing.495 This may be the reason for 
Deng’s description that the Dalai Lama’s visit was “a small matter.”496  
 
To sum up, relations between Beijing and Dharamsala were moving in a positive 
direction in the 1970s. With China’s increased domestic political reforms and its 
growing relations with the West, the PRC showed a more open attitude when tackling 




To sum up, this chapter argues that two scenarios of security dilemma: 
low-uncertainty societal dilemma and high-uncertainty societal dilemma, and the 
exception: real security threat, distinctly manifested themselves in the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship in the 1950s-1970s. 
 
From the beginning, this chapter examined the socialist transformation of Tibet after 
the escape of the Dalai Lama to India. As have shown, the PRC government strongly 
suppressed Tibet and doubted Tibetan resentment and intentions. Beijing did not make 
any compromise when the Panchen Lama, who was appointed as the leader of PCTAR, 
listed the disadvantages of socialist reforms and petitioned change by the Central 
government. Furthermore, the Panchen Lama was purged due his criticism.  
 
The situation deteriorated during the period of the Cultural Revolution, when all of 
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China was in the grips of the Red Guards. The Tibetan language was forbidden on 
public occasions. Attacks on anything related to tradition were pervasive and the 
armed confrontations amongst all factions in Tibet only brought about a further severe 
dismantling of traditional Tibetan society. In this process, Tibet was further 
transformed into a socialist system and integrated into the PRC state. By the Chinese 
practice, Tibetan society and identity were under a survival crisis. 
 
This chapter also examined China’s foreign policies regarding Tibet and Beijing’s 
interactions with the Tibetan Government in Exile. From the examination, it concludes 
that China’s external rifts with India, the USSR, and the West resulted in the latter 
actors’ help to the TGIE in various ways, which then accounted for Beijing’s domestic 
tough suppression along with its domestic embroilment in forms of socialist 
campaigns. As shown, Tibet also played a role in Beijing’s relationships with these 
neighbouring regimes and the rest.  
 
In the fourth section, this chapter analysed that an improved international environment 
for Beijing had influential sequence on the Beijing-Dharamsala relationship. Signs of 
conflictual mitigation were illuminated through an examination of Sino-Tibetan 
interactions in the 1970s. This chapter analysed the Dalai Lama’s visit to Europe in 
1973 in the context of China’s increased engagement in the international arena. By 
exploring this case, this chapter argues that the PRC allowed a larger international 
space for the TGIE though confining it to a non-political area. Beijing and Dharamsala 
might have begun to build a new relationship during the Dalai’s European journey. 
With time, we see an occurrence of visits of the TGIE’s representative teams to Tibet 
in 1979. This chapter argues that this incident was a result of increased interactions 
between Beijing and Dharamsala over several years. At this time, the CCP adopted a 
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series of moderate international and domestic policies that improved the likelihood of 
engagement. Considering the developments in the Tibetan issue over the following 
decades, it is impressive that Beijing and the TGIE formed a very positive interaction 
during the 1970s. 
 
However, the CCP’s socialist transformation of Tibet and the Cultural Revolution laid 
seeds of conflict for the future. In contrast to Tibetans in Tibet, Tibetan communities 
in exile have gradually settled down in India and in other host countries. The exiled 
Tibetan government and its cooperation with NGOs started to unite the Tibetan 
diaspora, keeping their social, spiritual and political ties with traditional society.497 
This attempt of preserving Tibetan identity stood in accordance with the 
socio-political reforms imposed by the Dalai Lama, who also introduced the concept 
of democracy to the communities. As a result, exiled Tibetans had a different 
experience distinct from Tibetans living inside the PRC, who suffered from the CCP’s 
constant mobilisation. While Dharamsala aimed to construct a unified Tibetan national 
identity in exile, the CCP made every effort to de-politicise the identity of Tibetans in 
Tibet and transform it to be part of the Chinese national identity.  
 
As McConnell argued, the Tibetan émigrés had been “a population-in-waiting ready to 
return to Tibet,” “a population-in-training to govern in the homeland,” and “a 
population-as-cultural-repository.”498 When they were able to return to Tibet at this 
time, with Chinese allowing western foreigners and journalists to enter Tibet, they all 
noticed the sufferings of modern Tibet and raised strong resentment as well as lack of 
trust. While the CCP began improving the material conditions in Tibet since the late 
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1970s, these messages revealed by a growing number of foreign tourists and the 
returned Tibetan émigrés created lively debates about Chinese government policies. 
After the 1980s, the previous interactions between Beijing and Dharamsala were 
influenced by such debates, which to some extent hindered the bilateral relationship 
from moving forwards. This thesis will analyse the full process in the next chapter. 
 
Overall, by reviewing these selected cases, this chapter finds that during the 1970s, 
China’s relationship with the TGIE grew as it became more engaged in the 
international community. At this point in time, the CCP had a relatively relaxed Tibet 
policy and loosened its control in the TAR. Analysing these events, we see how 
bilateral interactions adjusted over time. After the visits of the Dalai Lama to the West 
and other countries, the international space for the Tibetan issue seemed to be wider. 
Nevertheless, it was also limited to personal and religious areas by the PRC’s 
operation. In this context, the Sino-Tibetan relationship developed positively in the 
1970s. The first delegation representing the Dalai Lama in China was a milestone in 
the interactions between Beijing and Dharamsala interactions. Compared to events 







Revivification of Societal Dilemmas:  




At the end of the last chapter, this thesis discussed low-uncertainty societal dilemma 
that manifested in the 1970s. This chapter will examine the subsequent evolution in 
the 1980s-1990s and focus on the post-Reform and Opening Up era when both the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Tibet Government in Exile enhanced contacts. It 
pays attention to the enacting Chinese policies and fact-finding teams from the TGIE 
as well as the organised Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations. Moreover, this chapter 
identifies the transition when low-uncertainty societal formulation gradually turned 
into high-uncertainty societal dilemma. Three aspects lead to the discussions. 
 
Firstly, in the early 1980s, Beijing’s modernisation in Tibet, together with a variety of 
policies that overthrew the previous far-left standpoint, brought about positive 
circumstances for Sino-Tibetan relations. Secondly, divisions over the status of Tibet 
within the rounds of Sino-Tibetan negotiations overshadowed progress and triggered 
mutual doubts. Thirdly, increased international attention on the issue of Tibet further 
escalated tensions between Beijing and Tibetans.  
 
This chapter is structured as such: following the introduction, it examines selected 
Chinese policies regarding Tibet, including two Tibet Work Forums in the early 1980s. 
Then, the chapter traces the history and evolution of Sino-Tibetan contacts and raised 
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negotiations. It illustrates how tensions escalated in the bilateral interaction process 
due to the strain of raised demands from both sides. Next, the fourth and fifth sections 
narrate the domestic and international aspects underlying the onset of ethnic tension. 
Prior to the conclusion, the sixth section charts revived Sino-Tibetan confrontation 
and the third Tibet Work Forum. It argues that an adjusted standpoint and commitment 
dominated Chinese policy-making towards Tibet and the TGIE in the mid-1990s, 
which posed a threat to the latter from then on.  
 
Launch of New Modernisation Projects and Tibet Work Forums 
 
Deng’s new Reforms 
While new modernisation projects were launched in the early 1980s, they did not 
cause concerns over societal survival for Tibetans. Firstly, during that period, these 
policies were explicitly aimed at promoting ethnic culture. Secondly, the policies were 
instructed to fall in line with a principle that went by the slogan ‘Recuperation and 
Multiplication’ (xiuyang shengxi 休养生息); where implementation was conditioned 
to prior Tibetan agreement.499 Thirdly, historical context mattered. Considering the 
last period of the Cultural Revolution, the policies were perceived to be comparatively 
modest for Tibetans. Thus, objectively and subjectively, state-led modernisation did 
not constitute as a source to trigger a sense of uncertainty in Tibet.  
 
Emerging from a decade of extensive political mobilisations during the Cultural 
Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, the new leadership in the post-Mao Chinese Communist 
Party, reflected upon the chaos brought by leftist politics. The resulting negativity over 
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the destruction and distortion of Tibetan society was given a lot of attention. In this 
way, Deng adopted a moderate stance over Tibet and launched a series of policies 
aimed at befriending Tibetans in and outside China.500 In addition, he shifted the main 
focus to modernisation, in which economic development was set as the primary 
goal. 501  Through these innovated policies that covered both psychological and 
material aspects, Deng yearned to alleviate Tibetan grievances provoked by the 
Cultural Revolution. Apart from this approach, he aimed at uniting all Chinese citizens 
from diverse ethnic backgrounds to create a solid Chinese state.502 
  
Initially, the Chinese government built a fresh and friendly political environment. It 
was during this period that a wave of ‘Bring Order to Chaos (bo luan fan zheng 拨乱
反正 )’ pervaded throughout the state. 503  The Chinese authority initiated vast 
statements and policies, denying any continued practices applying to class struggle in 
Tibet. In this context, the Chinese government released an enormous number of 
former Tibetan officials and elites from incarceration, as well as influential figures 
who were dismissed from their positions. These individuals included the 10th Panchen 
Lama, who was purged in 1964. Following his release in 1978, the Panchen Lama was 
appointed a member of the standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Committee. Later that same year, the Chinese government released 
another group of former Tibetan officials who served in the Dalai Lama’s government 
before 1959 and were imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese 
government announced rehabilitation and compensation policies for those who had 
been mistakenly accused during the Cultural Revolution. By 1979, over 2,300 people 
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in Tibet received compensation.504 
 
Around the same time, the Chinese government revived administrations, institutes, 
offices, and various organisations responsible for ethnic groups. The State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission thus resurged from suspension. As a significant event, the 
National Frontier Defense Work Conference was launched in 1979, noting the Party’s 
standpoint that autonomy rights for ethnic minorities were guaranteed.505 In this way, 
Beijing reset its legal basis to produce relevant ethnic policy. The Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law was officially passed in 1984. 
 
Moreover, by assuming its profit, Deng prioritised modernisation construction in 
which economic development occupied the central position. Deng was a believer in 
developmentalism. In his view, a state’s international status was decisively shaped by 
its level of modernisation. In a speech to CCP cadres, Deng stressed that the 
achievement of modernisation for a state served as its ‘resources’ in hand, which could 
work as a “key foundation being able to tackle faced and potential international and 
domestic challenges.”506 He stated that economic development could help the state to 
increase resources, accumulate power, and dominate international competition with 
major Chinese rivals. This affirmative stance upheld modernisation and dominated 
CCP’s policies since the Reform and Opening Up era and those involved with 
Tibet.507 In 1950, Deng claimed that economic development could win the hearts of 
ethnic minorities and thereby unite all citizens. He stated: “Ethnic minorities want to 
acquire benefits…...They would not intend to make trouble if their economic problems 
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are resolved.” 508  Deng presumed that economic development could serve as a 
panacea and only brought about positive outcome; indeed, he downplayed the 
potential existence of negative effects by developmentalism. In the 1980s-1990s, 
economic development was instructed to be a primary task. In association to this, the 
CCP produced distinct inducement policies for Tibetans and launched a variety of 
conferences. The most significant were the Tibet Work Forums, which began in 1980 
and are still held today.  
 
The First Tibet Work Forum 
The First Tibet Work Forum was launched on 14-15 March 1980 and marked a new 
milestone in China’s Tibetan policy. Being reappointed to high-level positions, the 
majority of resurgent Tibetan officials and traditional figures attended this forum, 
where they were encouraged to propose suggestions to Tibetan affairs.  
 
In its responses to these calls, the CCP Central highlighted ‘essential needs of Tibetan 
cadres and people’ for policy-making. The Central, again in public, denied the notion 
that ‘the ethnic issues are essentially class issues’ set by Chairman Mao, but replaced 
it with a recognition of ‘uniqueness and complexity to ethnicity issues’.509 The 
Chinese authority thereby empowered a higher degree of autonomy for the TAR, 
suggesting that it could impose and adjust policies that differed from other regions and 
which relied on self-defined local conditions. From a cultural aspect, the authority 
initialised a variety of inducement policies, including compensation and proposals to 
restore Tibetan language and Buddhism. For administration offices in the TAR, the 
Tibetan language was proclaimed as an official language in addition to Mandarin. The 
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instructions for fostering more Tibetan cadres, as well as the strengthening of united 
front work for exiled Tibetans, were also stressed.510 These points illustrate the CCP’s 
readiness to improve inter-ethnic relationship.  
 
Corresponding to the instruction unveiled at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the attendants at the First Tibet 
Work Forum proclaimed the pursuit of economic development and outlined a series of 
policies. Amidst the various proposals, transportation was targeted. Given the 
consideration of Tibet’s geographical isolation from other regions of China, the CCP 
prioritised improvement and construction of traffic infrastructure between Tibet and 
inland provinces. As can be gleaned from the document “Tibet Work Forum Notes,” 
the government planned to investe in not only inter-provincial highways and roads, 
but also in the aviation industry.511 By doing so, Tibet was expected to effectively 
strengthen its connection to neighbouring areas. Understandably, a heightened traffic 
network could be of benefit for China’s geopolitical strategic deployment, given that 
Tibet is situated in the frontier region.  
 
Indeed, these economic-strengthening-driven policies were intertwined with a call for 
Tibetan loyalty. During his visit to the Tibet Autonomous Region on the 29th of May 
1980, the CCP’s General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, proclaimed the intent to build a 
‘united, prosperous and civilised new Tibet.’512 In his subsequent instructions, Hu 
announced that ‘the Central government would exhaust every means to boost Tibet’s 
development and increase local fiscal subsidy by 10% every year.’ Similar to Deng, 
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Hu also emphasised the link between economic development and ethnic unification, 
believing that they can mutually enhance one another. He suggested that China’s 
modernisation in Tibet could not be achieved without cooperation from the Tibetan 
minority. 513  Several years later, this statement, became the content for ‘Two 
Inseparables’, a slogan that argued that Tibetans were inseparable from Han and other 
ethnic minorities.514 
 
Second Tibet Work Forum 
Three years later, the CCP Central Secretariat convoked the Second Tibet Work Forum 
from the 27th of February to the 28th of March 1984, with the aim of reviewing 
achievements accomplished since the First Tibet Work Forum. In reality, it served as 
an insistence and reconfirmation of Beijing’s moderate stance over Tibet. Whereas the 
tone had been previously set, the Chinese document and scholarly literature reveal that 
some questioned the policy of the Central line.515 It was because of this context that 
the Chinese authority once again justified its standpoint.  
 
Firstly, the Chinese authority claimed that Tibet contains five aspects of 
distinctiveness compared to other Chinese regions, regarding geography, history of 
feudalism combined with theocracy, composition of population, influence of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and Tibet’s international attraction, which have to be fully accounted for 
when conducting policies. In particular, the Party Central pointed out that Tibet was 
isolated and had been imposed direct-rule by the state since the late 1950s. There 
existed a societal gap between Tibet and other areas. In addition, Tibetans constitute 
the majority population in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism features as the main religion in 
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Tibetan society and deeply influences their customs and life. In this way, ethnicity and 
religion are factors that must be kept in mind. In association to these, Tibet easily 
draws international attention, especially in terms of being regarded as China’s rival.516 
Given this statement, it can be seen that the authority intended to defend the 
legitimacy of the preferred policy for Tibet.  
 
Portraying a more tender gesture compared to the First Tibet Work Forum, the Party 
Central befriended exiled Tibetans and applied its domestic preferential policies to 
them. Those who had been overseas and worked for the Dalai Lama’s government 
were now redefined as ‘patriotic upper people’. In this way, the CCP not only pursued 
their return to China but also claimed to care for their families dwelling in China.517 A 
major point narrating the Central government’s treatment was that “loving the country 
is the only measure” or “it does not matter loving the country early or late.”518 The 
practice of redefinition was, without a doubt, Beijing’s new United Front Work 
strategy for Tibetans.  
 
In association with the cultural aspects, the Chinese authority continued its assistance 
and financial funding for the rejuvenation of Tibetan Buddhism and restored a number 
of monasteries, temples and religious rite practices. The Tibetan language also 
continued to be promoted and used in public institutions as an acknowledgement of 
Tibet as a bilingual society.519 
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In terms of economic development, Beijing imposed a higher degree of liberalisation 
than before. In the document entitled “[Second] Tibet Work Forum Notes,” the 
Chinese government addressed a point termed as ‘Two Opens (liang ge kai fang 两个
开放),’ that referred to connecting Tibet, through trade, with its neighbouring states 
including India, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, and domestically enhancing the 
network involving Tibet with its bordered provinces and regions, including Xinjiang, 
Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. 520  In addition, the Central government further 
institutionalised its pairing-aid projects for Tibet. Back in 1979, the National Frontier 
Defense Work Conference pledged to enrich Tibet with the aid of the whole state.521 
Now, nine provinces and cities including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Sichuan, and Jiangsu were designated to support Tibet’s 
local construction plans with finance and specialist experts.522 Through these plans, 
the Chinese government expected to accelerate immediate local modernisation 
construction and rapidly transform Tibet’s economic mode from closed and dependent 
into an open and independent system.523  
 
Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, the majority of policies were bound to the task 
of improving the inter-ethnic relationship. In this context, the notion of ‘Two 
Inseparables’ was further proclaimed. As Zhu Xiaoming, attendant of the Second Tibet 
Work Forum stated,   
 
 
[Regarding Tibet’s] economic liberation, at first Tibet has to be open to other 
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domestic provinces…..and bring the advanced technology and experiences of 
these brother ethnic groups and regions back into Tibet. Through the 
combination between their respective natural resources and capitals, all 
ethnicities of China will move towards prosperity together. With the 
development of socialist construction, every ethnic group has received and 
absorbed advantages from others. Indeed we are inseparable……Both such 
‘two inseparables’ and ‘centrality of interests of Tibetan cadres and Tibetan 
people’ share the same precondition and ultimate goal, and that is to 




The above statement demonstrates that for the purposes of ethnic unification, the 
Chinese government’s commitment and gesture was geared towards Tibetans not only 
in China but also those exiled. At this time, the Chinese authority adapted and 
redefined the scoop and implication of its Tibet policies. As pointed out, such 
behaviour can also set a good model for Beijing’s interactions with Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. Besides, economic development had been centralised as a significant task and 
utilised to gain Tibetan support. The next section discusses how Tibetans, the Dalai 
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Increasing Standoff in Beijing-Dharamsala Dialogues  
 
This section analyses the contact and contradictions between Beijing and Dharamsala, 
since the Chinese authorities handed in a signal of intent. It charts the details in their 
interactive process and presents how tensions occurred. Bilateral divisions over the 
future status of Tibet, which raised mutual suspicions, played a key role.  
 
As chapter four discussed, the Deng Xiaoping Administration initialised willingness to 
improve the situation over Tibet by intialising policies targeting Tibetans in and 
outside China, loosening control, and ensuring that the United Front Work sought the 
return of exiled communities.525 Claiming to put aside diverse political standpoints, 
Beijing now insisted on the recognition of Chinese sovereignty as a precondition and 
stressed mutual ties when facing these dissidents.  
 
In his meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama on the 12th of 
March 1979, Deng reportedly conveyed his welcome to the return of the Dalai Lama 
and exiled individuals. He expressed that the foremost bottom line for the CCP was 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet. “Except for the independence, everything is 
negotiable. Everything can be discussed,” Deng said.526  
 
The success of this meeting was perceived to be a breakthrough from both sides.527 
From Beijing’s perspective, positive contact with exiled Tibetans, the Dalai Lama in 
particular, would be helpful in legitimising its rule and uniting Tibetan society.528 In 
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addition, positive interaction between Beijing and the Dharamsala could serve as a 
model to impress Taiwanese leaders and citizens, raising their interest in unification 
with China in the future.529 Beijing also aimed to present a message to people in 
Hong Kong in that their distinct system would be reconcilable with the Chinese 
communist system.530 
 
Increasing interactions with Beijing was also sought from the side of Dharamsala. 
Followed by the meeting between Deng and Gyalo Thondup, the first ‘fact-finding’ 
delegation team from the TGIE sought to comprehend the situation in Tibet and 
Tibetan prefectures in neighboring provinces in 1979. It was reported that during this 
visit, the team enjoyed wide popularity among Tibetan crowds in Lhasa and Qinghai. 
Participants paid religious tribute with great passion or expressed their suffering; some 
even shouted Tibetan nationalist slogans.531 Recalling their visit, Juchen Thubten 
Namgyal, the leader of the first delegation team, stated that the communist officials 
were surprised to see such ecstatic worship from local Tibetans, given that the CCP 
imposed its direct rule for about two decades. He stated,  
 
 
The day after the delegation reached Lhasa, it went to Jokhang. We went to 
the terrace and from there we saw that thousands of people had gathered [at] 
the Jokhang. They were very enthusiastic, so we went down and tried to meet 
the people…532  
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Even though the experience faced by the delegation was beyond Beijing’s 
expectations, the subsequent fact-finding visits continued from 1980 to 1985. The 
second delegation led by Tenzin Tethong and the third team headed by Jestun Pema, 
visited Tibet in May and in July 1980. Afterwards, the fourth delegation, headed by W. 
G. Kundeling, visited ethnic Tibetan areas in Qinghai and Gansu provinces in 1985. 
Similar to the first, these delegations received ecstatic welcomes wherever they 
appeared.  
 
From the outset, the Chinese government regarded such phenomena either as way to 
vent discontent against the previous leftist line, or a sudden revival of religious fever. 
Rather than consider political implications, the CCP recognised this as the negative 
impact of the Cultural Revolution and they committed efforts to minimise the impact. 
As a result, the Party Central instructed policies to the local government in terms of 
befriending to traditional elites and figures, hence more freedom to Tibet were 
granted. 533  For example, Document No. 19 of 1982, “About Our Country’s 
Perspectives on Religion and the Basic Policies in Socialist Period” clearly 
demonstrated the Party’s standpoint. At that time, the Chinese authority addressed its 
high tolerance towards religion. The document noted that if religion had no intention 
to challenge the state, its activities will be allowed.534 Afterwards, the CCP expressed 
concerns with Tibetan demands, uncertain over their real intention.  
 
In 1981, Hu Yaobang met with Gyalo Thondup. On this occasion, Hu proposed a 
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Five-Point Communique as a solution over Tibet that focused on the Dalai Lama. Hu, 
on behalf of the Chinese authority, again expressed his support for the return of the 
Dalai Lama and his followers. He gave his word that the Dalai Lama’s status would be 
maintained as it was before 1959, and that he would be appointed as vice president of 
the National People’s Congress and vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference. As a national leader, the Dalai Lama’s residence would be 
arranged in Beijing and he could occasionally visit Tibet.535  
 
Hu spoke in a tone of readiness whilst establishing a framework that the Tibetan issue 
consisted mainly of disputes over the Dalai Lama and the return to China of exiled 
Tibetans .536 Such content, however, was not accepted by the Dalai Lama and the 
TGIE. Even though the CCP recognised that Tibet had a distinct ethnocultural identity, 
it was suggested that the line of empowerment was vague and therefore relevant 
affairs must still be “under the united leadership of the central government.”537 This 
Five-Point Communique came to outline instruction for the CCP to negotiate with the 
delegations from the Tibet Government in Exile.538 
 
As well as the visits of the fact-finding teams, several rounds of talks between Beijing 
and the Dharamsala took place simultaneously. The first exploratory negotiation team, 
comprising of Juchen Thubten Namgyal, 539  Phutsok Tashi Takla, 540  and Lodi 
Gyaltsen Gyari541 visited Beijing to discuss solutions to the Tibetan issue in 1982. 
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However, their preliminary talks with officials from the United Front Work 
Department did not achieve any impressive results, since both sides reportedly failed 
to achieve an agreement.542  
 
Issues around Tibet’s autonomy and unification of all Tibetan regions were strongly 
debated. Firstly, by referring Ye Jianying’s “Nine-Point System towards Taiwan,” 
Tibetan delegations proposed to apply the model of ‘one country, two systems’ to 
Tibet.543 In the received response, the Dharamsala’s suggestion was vehemently 
denied by Beijing, who claimed that this mode was designed for solving institutional 
differences between socialist mainland China and capitalist Taiwan. Given that Tibet 
had been liberated and undergone socialist reform, this premise could not be applied 
to this case.544  
 
In addition, both sides debated for a proposal calling for the amalgamation of three 
traditional Tibetan provinces into a single administrative entity. Advocated by the 
Dharamsala’s delegations, a creation of such unitary administration now referred to as 
a unification of ‘great Tibet’,545 could genuinely satisfy the needs of all ethnic 
Tibetans. Once again, however, such suggestions were refused by the representatives 
of the Chinese United Front Department as they insisted that Tibet had been granted 
autonomy.546 Instead, Beijing’s delegations aimed to orient discussion to the Dalai 
Lama’s return based on the Five-Point Communique. This stance was not acceptable 
                                                                                                                                                        
negotiation representatives with Kalsang Gyaltsen, responsible for the negotiation with officials from 
Beijing in 2002-2011. 
542 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 21/2057, “R F Wye to N J Cox Esq on 
Tibet,” November 15, 1982. 
543 Arpi, Dharamsala and Beijing, 77-79. 
544 Ibid, 80. 
545 Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, 71. 
546 Arpi, Dharamsala and Beijing, 80; Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 
21/2057, “R F Wye to N J Cox Esq on Tibet,” November 15, 1982. 
227 
 
to Dharamsala, since the Dalai Lama explicitly refused to limit the scope of the 
Tibetan issue to his own status.547 As the outcome, both sides agreed to have a further 
round of negotiations. 
 
Two years later, the same members of the Tibetan delegation arrived in Beijing for the 
second exploratory talks in October 1984. However, no further progress was made in 
this meeting between the TGIE and the United Front Work Department represented by 
Yang Jingren and politburo member Xi Zhongxun. 
 
Following the topics in the first negotiation, the delegations of Dharamsala proposed 
to make Tibet a de-militarised area, a ‘zone of peace’,548 which subsequently became 
a part of the Dalai Lama’s Five-Point Peaceful Plan delivered at the US Congress in 
1987 and the Strasbourg Proposal at the European Parliament in 1988. 549  The 
delegations also referred to a plan regarding the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet in 
1985.550 Beijing’s response was to deny the zone of peace. In addition, the Chinese 
government repeated the point that Tibet had been granted autonomy and they also 
reasserted that the rearrangement of all Tibetan administrative districts was 
unacceptable since such adaptation would involve vast territories and cause high  
costs.551 The Beijing delegation also refused the proposal of the Dalai Lama’s return 
stating that Tibet was under intensive modernisation construction so the timing was 
inappropriate.552 Instead, Beijing firmly reiterated Hu’s Five-Point Communique. 
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Given these clear divisions, the negotiation ended without any breakthroughs.553 
 
The stagnation of dialogue to a large extent reflected incongruence in mutual 
acknowledgement and the increasing sense of uncertainty. Beijing and Dharamsala 
talked cross purposes in terms of the agenda, though their concerns on the well-being 
of Tibetans overlapped. Beijing seemed to welcome the return of the Dalai Lama and 
Tibetan exiles though a framework had been settled based on Hu Yaobang’s 
Five-Point Communique. Observing Beijing’s strategy in these discussions, it is 
argued that regime security concerns were a key standpoint. As Tsering Topgyal 
contends, ‘raising questions beyond the scope of personal status would potentially 
raise questions about the CCP’s ruling legitimacy’. He argues,  
 
 
Acknowledging the existence of a ‘Tibet issue’ destroys the neat ideologically 
constructed edifice of liberation, equality, unity, legitimacy, stability and Tibetan 
contentment, and the sense of closure that Beijing has propagated in front of the 
Chinese and international Publics. It would revive…questions….that Beijing 
believes it had left behind.554  
 
 
As a result, the reaction of the CCP was to refuse Dharamsala. Indeed, concerns 
regarding Beijing’s legitimacy were sensed by the central authority, who expressed no 
recognition of the political status of Dharamsala. This also explains why the Chinese 
authority claimed that negotiations took place only between the delegations of the 
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Central government and the Dalai Lama himself, rather than the Tibetan Government 
in Exile.555 In addition, as Tibet was under Beijing’s control, Beijing could use this 
advantage to force Dharamsala to accept its conditions and ultimately, it could 
dominate the negotiating agenda.556 All these conditions may have driven Beijing’s 
firm stance not willing to make compromise. 
 
Scholars argue that the previous conflict and mistrust between Beijing and 
Dharamsala negatively impacted negotiations. According to this perspective, the 
contradiction between the ‘one country, two systems’ mode and the existing ethnic 
regional autonomy was not the main reason for Beijing’s repeated rejection of the 
Dalai Lama’s suggestions. Rather, the CCP was concerned about Dharamsala’s 
demands for ‘high degree autonomy’ and the unification of all ethnic Tibetan areas. 
The authorities were uncertain whether such demands were to be Dharamsala’s 
alternative approach to achieving Tibetan independence.557 Given that Tibet once 
reached de facto independence prior to 1949, the CCP could not tolerate a repetition of 
history. In this logic, any idea that may involve implication of independence, be it past, 
present or future, was sensitive and unacceptable. Dialogue degenerated into 
stalemate. 
 
Conversely, the delegations of Dharamsala must insist that negotiations should discuss 
Tibet’s status for all ethnic Tibetans. Goldstein believes that the ethnographic 
constitution of exiled Tibetan refugees might play a role. In his view, given that many 
refugees were from transregional Tibetan areas and not the current TAR, it would be 
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extremely difficult for the TGIE to limit the discussion to the Dalai Lama’s personal 
status without arrangement for ethnic Tibetans in China.558 When they raised this 
proposal to Beijing, however, the latter then perceived the negative implication and 
reacted with rejection; therefore, a major predicament formed.  
 
The insight of asymmetric power relations is useful to draw the logic of predicament 
here. According to their viewpoint, the differences in size and condition would lead to 
differences in attention and perception of interest as well as the interaction.559 In this 
case, while both sides showed willingness to contact, a consensus was hard to reach 
given the distinct positions. 
 
With time, both Beijing and Dharamsala agreed to continue new initiatives in order to 
break the deadlock. The assignment of Gyalo Thondup by the TGIE forged new 
connections to the Chinese government in 1986.560 Given his previous role since 1979 
as the bilateral bridge between Beijing and the Dharamsala, the CCP responded more 
favorably. Both sides pursued renewed dialogue in 1987.561 
 
However, such a concurrence of events soon overshadowed this burgeoned interaction 
once more. Aiming to increase its capacity and impose pressure on Beijing, the Dalai 
Lama and the TGIE launched a campaign of internationalisation of the Tibetan issue 
through their global networks, including refugee communities, Buddhist centres, and 
various sympathetic NGOs pursuing external aids. The Dalai Lama himself also 
utilised his charisma to draw public attention to the Tibetan issue when visiting abroad. 
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Their commitments achieved success in the West and the Dalai Lama gained the 
opportunity to deliver his “Five-Point Peaceful Plan” in the US in 1987,562 as well as 
in the “Strasbourg Proposal” in France in 1988.563 These factors amounted to heavy 
pressure on the Chinese authorities who reacted in fiercely. The relationship between 
Beijing and Dharamsala soon degenerated when several anti-governmental protests 
occurred in Lhasa in the late 1980s and Beijing construed these as a conspiracy by the 
West and the Dalai Lama.564  
  
Regarding the breakout of unrests, senior Chinese officials initially still attributed 
them to the side-effects of the Cultural Revolution.565 Issuing the “Decisions on the 
Issues about Three Temples in Lhasa and Jokhang,” Beijing designated the Panchen 
Lama to defuse the monks and nuns and the government granted a larger opportunity 
for Buddhist practice.566  
 
However, considering the increased demonstrations and a severe pro-Tibet 
independence protest during the Great Prayer Festival, some cadres suggested that the 
demands were irreconcilable and should not be tolerated. The Party was concerned 
that the situation would spiral out of control. After an investigation by Qiao Shithe, the 
Secretary of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Beijing adapted 
its yearly policy of uniting upper-class leaders. In his report, Qiao Shi suggested that 
the Party should protect its interests and dominate its policy-making rather than 
making concessions to opponents. He viewed the ethnic tension and demands from 
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activists, even from the ‘upper class’, as a contradiction to the Party. In December 
1988, the Central government concurred with his viewpoint.567 
 
1989 was an important turning point, not only for the Tibetan issue but also China’s 
pro-democratic movement. Two significant and connected events happened that 
deeply affected Chinese politics and Beijing’s foreign relations. In March, a new wave 
of Tibetan demonstrations occurred in Lhasa and incurred harsh oppression from the 
government. Martial law was imposed locally for an entire year. Around the same time, 
demonstrations calling for political reforms began to occur in other Chinese cities. On 
the 4th of June, Beijing’s brutal crackdown over student demonstrations appalled the 
global audience. Governments worldwide harshly criticised Beijing’s actions and 
imposed sanctions.568 These events were regarded as a violation of human rights and 
were met with critical international concern.  
 
In October 1989, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Dalai Lama, commending 
his long-term struggle for Tibet and the practice of non-violence.569 For pro-Tibet 
campaigners and Tibetan ethno-nationalists, receiving the award symbolised 
international support and this victory could impose greater pressure on the Chinese 
government. Beijing, however, did not react as expected.  
 
Waves of pressure, domestically and internationally on Chinese human rights and 
issues regarding Tibet caused governance insecurity for Beijing.570 By the end of 
1989, the Central Politburo, led by the General Secretary Jiang Zemin, held a meeting 
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in Tibet. On that occasion, the CCP leadership decided to put political stability and 
economic growth as the priority and measures for setting policy regarding Tibet; in 
fact the authority tightened social control. 
 
Thus far, a transition of Sino-Tibetan interactions from mitigation to tensions has been 
explored, during which the involved actors constantly changed their standpoints and 
tactics surrounding set goals. The scenario of tension turned into substantial 
confrontation in which one actor aimed to destroy the other. A more accommodating 
attitude towards the Dalai Lama and the TGIE entirely gave way to the concept of 
confrontation. This phenomenon will be discussed in relation to the Third Tibet Work 
Forum. Domestic and international regulatory factors will be explored. 
 
Chinese State Tense Modernisation and Tibetan Backlash 
 
This section discusses the significant dynamics that radicalised the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship. It focuses specifically on the domestic aspect of China’s modernisation 
construction and considers derived negative effects in detail.  
 
Modernisation was a key component in China’s steady strategy to demonstrate its 
friendliness as well as served as a way of integrating Tibet. Praising its own 
achievement, the PRC’s Ethnic Minorities Policy and Its Practices of 1999 addressed 
that “Through its experience and practice over the past fifty years, China has proven 
that it is on a correct track…..the commitment of reform and open and modernisation 





Nevertheless, the real situation is far more complex. Scholars noted that the uneven 
distribution of economic growth and broader modernisation, was having a negative 
effect on Tibet and Tibetans, including marginalization.572 Tibetans adopted defensive 
measures to the established policy structure in various forms of demonstration, aiming 
to overcome these difficulties. However, their acts were regarded as challenges to the 
Central authority and thus provoked the latter’s stronger will to adhere to established 
policies. A spiral interaction was manifesting.  
 
High Dependence on State 
Reasons for the Tibetan sense of marginalisation were plentiful. A noticeable factor 
concerned Tibet’s inability to develop an independent fiscal system. For a long period 
of time, Tibet’s finances relied heavily upon subsidies from the state. In 1980-1993, 
the Central government even subsidised 100% of Tibet’s yearly revenue.573 Aiming at 
improving this dependence, Beijing sought to stimulate Tibet’s local economy and so 
provided public infrastructure and channeled external capital through subsidies and 
various assisting projects. The Chinese government helped to increase the total gross 
domestic product of Tibet on a yearly basis. From 1994 to2000, Tibet’s GDP rate 
increase was more than 10%, on average574 The personal average income of Tibetans 
also experienced improvement during this period. However, these improvements were 
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questionable due to Tibet’s rate of financial self-sufficiency and the average personal 
revenue of Tibetans being lower than the rest of China. 575  Moreover, an 
understanding that the main drive of Tibet’s economic growth was determined by 
policies of subsidy and investment from Beijing and other supporting inland provinces 
proved difficult for Tibet to gain agency on economic affairs.576 From this aspect, the 
economic reform during this period did not achieve the main task of setting up the 
Tibet Work Forums to create a self-reliant Tibetan economic model. Rather, financial 
dependence on Beijing remained. As we will examine in the next chapter, the 
imposition of the project Western Development (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发) after 
2000 strengthened this tendency.  
 
Economic Development to Societal Changes 
The sheer torrent of subsidies from the Central government and external investment 
significantly reshaped Tibet’s industrial structure. By 2000, around three-quarters of 
the population in the TAR were working for the primary sector. While agriculture and 
husbandry employed the majority of the Tibetan population, the contribution of the 
primary sector to the GDP gradually declined.577 By 1991, it still occupied 50.8% of 
local GDP. Nevertheless, after the Third Tibet Work Forum began to call for 
acceleration in the transformation of Tibet’s economic system, the secondary and 
tertiary sectors received massive investment and in 1997, local GDP subsequently 
surpassed the primary sector. By 2005, the primary sector only contributed 19.1% of 
the local GDP.578 The relevant issues in this period did not only include resource 
distributions amidst industries, but also included impacts that resulted from this 
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transformation. Given this aspect, income inequality along with urban-rural division 
was likely to surge.  
 
The income gap also existed among different ethnicities in Tibet, which brought about 
widespread dissatisfaction regarding ethnic isolation. When the government 
transformed the industrial structure and introduced market competition, local Tibetans, 
with their lack of technical skills and high rate of illiteracy, tended to hold an inferior 
position within the labour market. Due to its geographic isolation, Tibet was less 
developed than other regions of China. As mentioned previously, the central subsidies 
and assisting projects mainly invested in the second and tertiary sectors were 
dominated by construction and administrative costs. 579  Yet, since these 
institutionalised investments were provided for by external members of the dominant 
Han Chinese ethnicity and industrial structures were essentially shaped by conditions 
adapted to the mainstream Han Chinese culture, such as Mandarin fluency and 
connections to government or business networks to inland provinces. This preferred 
dimension and its reproduction therefore alienated relations between major firms and 
indigenous Tibetans.580 The dominance of powerful firms from inland provinces 
hindered the protection or promotion of locally-oriented companies and business 
models. Therefore, the potential for inter-ethnic stratification emerged and could have 
intensified due to the context of low ethnic interdependence and competition. Ethnic 
conflict and demands for separatism were likely to emerge. 
 
Elsewhere, tourism was conceived as a balanced approach to economic growth and 
preservation of local tradition, though its effect deviated from expectations. In his 
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research, Ben Hillman narrated how tourism simultaneously escalated both national 
and ethnic identity of Tibetans. In his view, though the state-led investment in Tibetan 
tourism pushed local economic growth; national identity of Tibetans towards the PRC 
was not at the same time being strengthened. Rather, during the process, the dynamics 
of marketisation and the influx of local and migrated Tibetans reinforced their ‘ethnic 
consciousness and a renewed pride in their cultural heritage’.581  
 
Migration 
A further key issue brought about by the rapid modernisation project is Chinese 
migration. This has been a controversial debate between Beijing and Dharamsala as 
well as among scholars. In his notorious Five-Point Peaceful Plan for resolving the 
Tibetan issue delivered in Washington in 1987, the Dalai Lama explicitly addressed 
and demanded Beijing to cease its policy of Han Chinese migration transfer.582 In 
1988 in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, the Dalai Lama brought up 
this issue once again.583 In its response, Beijing denied all accusations and claimed 
that the freedom of movement was a civil right. However, the government admitted 
that there had been sections of the ‘floating population’ who temporarily resided in 
Tibet because of either the assisting projects or enterprise. Since the Second Tibet 
Work Forum institutionalised assisting projects and tourism, tens of thousands of 
Tibetans from neighboring provinces and non-Tibetan migrants throughout the state 
flocked to Tibet to take advantage of modernising constructions. The influx of these 
migrant workers further accelerated after the meeting of the Third Work Forum. The 
official statistical figures illustrate that the size of the Tibetan population did not 
dramatically change and they composed 94.97% of the total population in 1982 and 
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94.07% in 2000.584 However, as Goldstein observed, the groups of floating people 
still had a huge impact, “the number of these non-Tibetans is unprecedented in Tibetan 
history and has turned Lhasa, the political heart of Tibet, into a city where non-Tibetan 
residents appear to equal or exceed the number of actual Tibetans.”585 
 
In some way, this influx of migration strengthened communications between Tibet and 
other Chinese provinces. Strategically and politically speaking, this phenomenon was 
conducive to Beijing’s nation-building project.586 Both Deng and Jiang repeated the 
notion that there was no harm in increasing interaction between Tibet and inland 
provinces, and the fundamental measure was “What is best for Tibetans and how Tibet 
can develop ahead of the pace in China’s Four Modernisation.” 587  What they 
expected was that waves of migration would accelerate the natural process of ethnic 
integration.588 However, given that demographic figures change so fast and that the 
migratory population increased with their advanced capacity over local Tibetans, the 
sense of uncertainty over environmental and societal aspects could be perceived by 
Tibetans. The sense of marginalisation could widely spread. In this way, the potential 
of ethnic tension escalated.589   
 
In summary, modernisation projects in China brought about complex effects. Its 
performance on an economic aspect was impressive though various changes to 
Tibetan society, including environment and culture, resulted in new issues. Some 
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regarded these changes as threats which formed uncertainty, fear, and resistance.  
 
China’s variant standpoint shall be considered. Beijing’s stricter control in Tibetan 
affairs, especially those with regard to culture and religion,590 triggered a deep sense 
of dissatisfaction. With its adaptation of united work policies towards the ‘upper-class 
people,’ Beijing began intervening in various aspects of life, with a particular focus on 
Tibetan Buddhism practices. During a speech to CCP’s cadres in Tibet in 1990, Jiang 
Zemin stated that religion was not permitted to be a banner for separatists. Instead, it 
must be under the leadership from patriot, who supported the CCP.591 In another 
conference on religious affairs, Jiang also called for a higher degree of regulation in 
terms of the number of temples, monks and nuns. Importantly, the state claimed that it 
had the ultimate authority to recognise the re-incarnation of ‘living Buddhas’. 592 
Influenced by these distorted regulations, many Tibetans, including religious leaders, 
were reported to escape to India and abroad, seeking spiritual teaching and leadership. 
One of the major religious leaders was Kamapa in 2000.593  
 
As the logic of security dilemma reveals, Tibetan resistance would only render a 
firmer stance from the Chinese government to institutionalise its employment and 
radicalise the spiral interaction with a final outbreak of conflict and violence. 
 
Internationalisation of the Tibetan Issue and Chinese Threat 
Perception 
 
                                                     
590 For a general information can see Potter, 2003; Mukherjee, 2010. 
591 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi and Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu Weiyuanhui, Xizang 
Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian, 426. 
592 Ibid, 445-454 
593 BBC, “Tibetan Lama Meets Spiritual Leader,” January 8, 2000. 
240 
 
This section limits its discussion of regulatory factors in Sino-Tibetan interactions in 
the 1980s and 1990s, with a focus on the international dimension. It focuses on the 
commitment of internationalisation of the Tibetan issue in the US and Europe that 
assisted Dharamsala to counter the asymmetric power of Beijing. As suggested by the 
existing literature,594 these individual international supports not only kept the Tibetan 
issue active, but their actions are also taken as important regulatory factors accounting 
for Beijing’s adaptation of a stronger standpoint by the 1990s.   
 
The Dalai Lama’s Promotion and the internationalisation of the Tibetan Issue  
Since his successful visit to Western Europe and the US in the 1970s, the Dalai Lama 
gained an international platform beyond India. In the 1980s, his appearance abroad 
radically increased after the launch of the strategy of internationalisation. As Table 5-1 
shows, the number of the Dalai Lama’s visits to foreign countries in the 1980s 
doubled compared to the previous decade. In the 1990s, the visiting number doubled 
again compared to the 1980s.  
 
Table 5-1 Number of Dalai Lama Visits to Foreign Countries 
 1959-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 
Number 2 20 52 116 
Source: Organized from His Holiness The 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet595  
 
Reviewing the top five countries that the Dalai Lama visited in the 1980-90s, in Table 
5-2 (see next page), the majority were Western countries that keenly promoted values 
of democracy and human rights. They also accepted most Tibetan refugees apart from 
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India, Nepal and Bhutan.596 These intensive visits in the two decades ultimately 
raised public concern of the Tibetan situation in global civil society.  
 
Table 5-2 Top 5 Frequent Countries the Dalai Lama Visited in the 1980s-1990s 
 USA Germany Switzerland France UK Ratio to the 
total Visits (%) 
1980s 5 7 4 4 4 43 
1990s 9 8 8 7 6 33 
Source: Organized from His Holiness The 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet597 
  
Amidst the countries that the Dalai Lama visited in these two decades, Taiwan was a 
special case that provoked Beijing. For a long time, the Republic of China based in 
Taiwan claimed (and still claims) its ‘constitutional’ sovereignty over Tibet, and to this 
extent, Tibet is engaged in a complex and sensitive Cross-Strait relationship, with 
individual interactions between Taipei-Dharamsala and Beijing-Dharamsala that 
manifests into a triangular relationship.598 In the 1960s and 1970s, Dharamsala sent 
several senior officials to Taiwan in order to improve the bilateral relationship.599 
Such efforts continued and by the 1990s, huge progress was made. In 1997, when the 
island was having its first presidential election by popular vote, the Dalai Lama visited 
Taiwan. Understanding the context of the Beijing-Taipei relationship, he explicitly 
restated that he did not seek Tibet’s independence but only its autonomy. He called for 
the application of ‘one country, two systems’ to Tibet, as the Dharamsala’s delegations 
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previously proposed.600 However, Beijing was concerned that the Dalai Lama had 
formed a political alliance with Taipei and that the two sides would mutually support 
each other.601 Consequently, since then, Beijing added a condition requesting a public 
statement that “Taiwan is a province of China” from Dharamsala to their bilateral 
negotiation.602  
 
This growing problem involved dual characteristics of the Dalai Lama himself, since 
he was a spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism as well as a political leader in the TGIE. 
From the outset, when Beijing began to expand its international relations with the 
West after acquiring its position in the United Nations Assembly and Security Council, 
the Chinese government expressed a relatively flexible attitude towards the 
international space enjoyed by the Dalai Lama, as long as his visit was identified with 
religious intent. However, with the Dalai Lama’s frequent appearances in front of a 
global audience with other religious leaders such as the Pope or the Bishop of 
Canterbury in the UK, impressions of him as a fighter for Tibetan autonomy from the 
perspective of the Chinese government inevitably went beyond a religious dimension. 
Following the Japanese Prime Minister, Suzuki Zenko’s first meeting with the Dalai 
Lama in 1980, an increasing number of political leaders, not only the ruling 
administration in different countries, began to meet him. The Malaysian Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman met him, as did the Indonesian Minister of Religious 
Affair and its vice-President in Jakarta.603 These meetingsreinforced the Dalai Lama’s 
global influence. Further, the development of Tibet and bilateral negotiations between 
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Beijing and Dharamsala drew more international attention.604 By making his speeches 
in front of the US Congress and the EU Parliament, the Dalai Lama further broadened 
the global pro-Tibet network. 
 
The Nobel Prize award raised the profile of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan issue to 
worldwide recognition. Associated with the issue of China’s human rights abuses, 
many civil groups in individual states called for a more active stance taken by their 
governments towards the PRC. In addition, increasing western journalistic reports 
concerning Beijing’s crackdown over Tibetan demonstration further shaped the 
negative image of the Chinese government. Factors ranging from individual national 
interests and distinct ties with Tibet, led these external actors to provide various aid to 
the TGIE. Though it was clear that no foreign government chose to risk its 
relationship with Beijing by recognising the government of the Dalai Lama, their 
normative criticism of human right abuses imposed a certain degree of pressure on 
China.  
 
In its responses, faced by external critics, Beijing resorted to the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs of a sovereign state, and claimed that there was no 
universal definition concerning human rights. Beijing also regularly viewed its rising 
economy as a means to prevent the Tibetan issue from hindering China’s relationship 
with other countries. Meanwhile, following the guideline of ‘grasping with both 
hands,’ the CCP promoted economic growth in Tibet as a means to improve the 
well-being of its people and tighten control in its fight against local separatism. This 
chapter now examines the factor of Tibet in the US/China policy. 
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Tibet in the Sino-American Relations 
The discussion concerning Tibet in the US Congress in the 1980s-1990s played a 
more active role and directed relevant policies whereasthe administration adopted a 
more cautious attitude. Since the normalisation of Sino-American diplomatic relations 
in the mid-1970s, Washington was consistent with its official policy towards Beijing 
and accepted Tibet as part of China while cautiously prevented Tibet from becoming a 
considerable problem in the bilateral relationship. However, widespread concerns by 
the US public and the ongoing lobbying of civic groups for Tibet effectively shaped 
Washington’s foreign policy towards Beijing during these decades. When the Dalai 
Lama and the TGIE internationalised their pro-Tibet campaign, several US 
congressional representatives immediately responded, and then pushed the 
administration to take action.  
 
The first influential breakthrough for the Tibetan political cause came on the 24th of 
July 1985, when Li Xiannian visited Washington as the first president of the PRC after 
both countries officially established diplomatic relations. A letter, co-signed by the 91 
Congress members from the House and Senate was submitted to President Li, 
addressing their support for direct dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala. This 
letter also expressed concerns involving the situation of Tibet and requested Beijing to 
reconsider the aspirations of the Dalai Lama.605  
 
The U.S. Congress adopted a more active standpoint in 1987. In June of that year, the 
House of Representatives approved the Bill of H.R. 1777, in which it criticised the 
Chinese government’s policies against Tibetans, which resulted in the suffering and 
deaths of more than one million people. Subsequently, the amended version to H.R. 
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1777 of the Senate suggested linking Tibetan human rights to the US arms sale to 
China.606 On the 21st of September, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Human Rights 
Caucus of the House of Representatives, where he gave a powerful and influential 
speech, addressing his knowledge about the China-Tibet relationship in the past and 
his suggestions for a future Tibet. The Dalai Lama claimed that before its illegal 
occupation, Tibet was an independent buffer state amid China, India and Russia. In 
addition, he publicly proposed the “Five-Point Peaceful Plan.” On this occasion, the 
Dalai Lama not only delivered his perspectives to the US political elites and the public, 
he also enhanced Dharmshala’s bargaining power with Beijing.     
 
One week after the Dalai Lama’s speech, a series of pro-Tibet independence 
demonstrations occurred in Lhasa. The first demonstration occurred on 27th 
September, and then on 1st October, followed by more demonstrations in the 
following months. In most cases, the local police wanted to dismiss these 
demonstrations and thus the situation caused skirmishes in the city centre as more 
participants joined. 607  The degree of violence varied; however, the Chinese 
government’s responses to the arrest of ethno-nationalist demonstrators drew 
international attention.  
 
The US Congress identified the Tibetan demonstrations and Beijing’s suppression as 
evidence of China’s human rights abuses. Both houses, along with the media, urged 
the Reagan Administration to act. Congress added several points regarding Tibet in the 
Foreign Relations Authorisation Act (Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989), which was then 
signed by President Reagan as Public Law 100-204 on the 22nd of December 1987. 
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According to this law, the US government expressed its sympathy for the suffering 
Tibetans and, importantly, Tibet should be taken as ‘an important factor’ in 
Sino-American relations. Meanwhile, Congress suggested that the US government 
should instruct its officials to protect human rights violations in Tibet. The US 
government should also urge the PRC government to actively develop a dialogue with 
the Dalai Lama regarding the future of Tibet.608 Congress expressed full support for 
the Dalai Lama. The successive Clinton Administration inherited the heritage of this 
law and expounded it in the 1990s. 
 
Entering the 1990s, more resolutions with respect to Tibet were initialised by 
Congress which then appeared in the annual Foreign Relations Authorization Acts. 
Repeatedly, Congress requested the Administration to encourage the development of 
negotiations between Beijing and Dharamsala, as evidenced in Sec. 901, H.R.3792 
(Public Law 101-246)609 and Sec. 1702 (C)(1)(G), H.R.1561 (Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1996-1997).610 Sec. 225 and Sec. 702 of H.R.3792 
also illustrates the support of Congress by specifically authorising an appropriation to 
assist exiled Tibetan students. In Sec. 234, H.R.3792 (Public Law 101-246), Congress 
urged to support Tibet with greater intensity through the ‘Voice of America’.611  
Moreover, in several resolutions, Congress intentionally adopted an ambiguous stance 
that separated Tibet from China e.g. Sec. 236, H.R.2333 (Public Law 103-236)612 and 
Sec. 407, H.R.1253 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1997-1998)613. In 
some cases, Congress listed Tibet as a separate section and as ‘occupied,’ e.g. Sec. 536, 
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H.R.2333 (H.R.2333-Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1994-1995),614 Sec. 
1602, H.R.1561 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1996-1997),”615 and Sec. 
104, H.R.1211 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 2000).616 All these 
demonstrated Congress’s support for Tibet.  
 
In comparison, the White House took more factors into consideration and attempted to 
mitigate radical Congressional resolutions in order to maintain America’s China policy. 
For example, when the 103th Congress suggested an establishment of a Special Envoy 
for Tibet who would rank as an Ambassador responsible for the Tibetan issue, the 
Clinton Administration initially opposed it. However, faced by a similar bill in the 
following 104th and 105th Congress in 1997, it finally established the position of 
Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department as a compromise. 
This position of Coordinator was, however, designated by the Secretary of State thus it 
was not an ambassadorial rank.617  
 
In general, following the presidencies of Regen and Bush, the successive Democratic 
Administration adopted a more favorable attitude towards Tibet in the 1990s. The 
Tibetan issue was not acknowledged as an ‘official issue’ in Sino-American relations, 
but in practice, Washington took a prominent position.618 President George Bush 
initially met with the Dalai Lama in 1991. This meeting was not only the first direct 
communication between a US leader and an exiled Tibetan leader, but it also 
substantially encouraged an international constituency for Tibet. The subsequent 
President, Bill Clinton, also met with him at least four times (1993, 1994, 1997 and 
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1998) in both a formal and informal manner. In addition, considering the US-China 
relationship, the Clinton Administration restated the US’s acceptance of China’s 
sovereignty over Tibet, and that the US government did not recognise the political 
status of the Tibetan Government in Exile. These statements repeatedly contend that 
the US government did not have a strategic interest in Tibet but only concerned itself 
with local human rights. Since there were other political and economic issues mixed 
with the developing Sino-American relationship, the US Administration’s policy left 
an adequate leeway for operation. It was also a result of balancing factors between 
Congress, US civil society, and diplomatic relations with the PRC.619  
 
Tibet in the Sino-European Relations  
The Tibetan issue drew increased attention in the US since the mid-1980s and showed 
a similar tendency in Europe with the topic always associated with democracy and 
human rights. This development was concurrent with an increasing integration of 
diverse European countries that aimed to shape its self-image as a normative power.620 
Rather than challenging the principle of China’s sovereignty over Tibet, the European 
Union and its member countries expressed their concerns on Tibetan human rights 
since the 1950s. Nevertheless, the European view of narrating human rights as a 
universal value was not shared by Beijing, which insisted on the superiority of its 
national sovereignty and refused such external interference. The divergent 
understandings between Beijing and the European countries not only showed a 
conceptual gap, it also formed a contradiction to the Sino-European relationship in 
practice.621 
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After the Lhasa demonstration occurred, the European Parliament in Strasburg 
immediately passed a resolution on the 14th of October 1987 condemning Beijing’s 
excessive reaction to the protesting Tibetans. This resolution urged the PRC 
government to respect religious freedom and cultural rights of Tibetans who had been 
harassed since the occupation, though it also noted that Beijing showed improvements 
on the restoration of Tibetan Buddhism and political participation. In addition, the 
European Parliament expressed its support to the Dalai Lama’s “Five-Point Proposal” 
by referring to it as a basis for settling Tibet’s future status and relations between the 
Chinese and Tibetan people.622 Corresponding to the European Parliament, many 
member states also passed their individual resolutions domestically. One of the 
important cases was West Germany passing a resolution on the 15th of October 1987. 
Similar to the content of the European Parliament, the German parliament expressed 
its recognition of the liberation policies of Beijing but condemned the violation of 
human rights in Tibet. In addition to urging Beijing to encourage constructive 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama, the parliament emphasised that the German 
government and people should preserve Tibetan culture and religion both in Tibet and 
in exile, and grant them scholarships in German schools.623  
 
On the 15th of June, 1988, the Dalai Lama was invited to the European Parliament, 
where he further integrated his previous Five-Point Plan into the “Strasburg Proposal.” 
Importantly, he publicly announced that he only sought Tibet’s autonomy. He also 
articulated many concrete points in terms of building a democratic institution in Tibet, 
processes of transforming it into a peaceful zone, which gained praise in the West. 
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Following this, many countries took this proposal as the basis to encourage 
Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations. Faced with this question from Beijing, the President 
of the European Parliament, Lord Henry Plumb, claimed that the Dalai Lama’s visit 
was merely private. In a previous statement, the European Parliament also reclaimed 
its recognition that Tibet was part of Chinese territory.624    
 
Facing the repeated occurrences of demonstrations in Tibet and the Chinese 
government’s implementation of martial law in Lhasa in 1989, the European 
Parliament supported the Tibetan aspect. However, it avoided challenging China’s 
sovereignty. In its resolution, the EU parliament demonstrated its willingness to 
mediate in the conflicts of Tibet and urged Beijing to discuss its future with the Dalai 
Lama. However, in its response, the Chinese government insisted on the supremacy of 
sovereignty. It claimed that the European resolution was an attempt to interfere in 
China’s domestic affairs.625 
 
Parallel to the collapse of the Socialist camp in East Europe, the European Union was 
officially established and replaced its predecessor, the European Community, through 
the Treaty of the European Union of 1993. Gaining a higher degree of power of 
collective action, the European representatives played a more active role in the 
political component of Union’s China policy regarding Tibet. 
 
Maintaining a long-term principle of constructive engagement, the EU made greater 
efforts in the 1990s. In addition to the resolutions passed by the EU parliament, the 
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EU regularly expressed its concerns over Chinese human rights through co-sponsoring 
the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and its sub-commission and building a 
direct dialogue with Beijing.626 Since 1995, a biannual ‘EU-China Human Rights 
Dialogue’ discusses issues with regard to the rule of law, torture, the death penalty, 
civil and political freedoms, and rights of ethnic minorities. Through interactions 
among diplomatic officials, academic exchanges and co-operation projects, this 
dialogue aims to integrate China in an institutionalised framework.627 Tibet, most of 
the time, appeared as a topic raised by the EU.  
 
As some scholars have noted, the EU prioritises the application of International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as a norm regarding Tibet and the 
PRC; however, the Chinese government has not ratified the Covenant after having 
signed it in 1998. Beijing insists on its policies in Tibet, and aims to prevent the EU 
from contacting and supporting the exiled Tibetan government.628  
 
In its response to the promotion of the Tibetan issue as a human rights problem by the 
EU, the Chinese government frequently rebuffed and asserted that the issue essentially 
concerned Chinese sovereignty, rather than human rights. Beijing stressed that the 
alternative concept of collective rights was its own interpretation of human rights. A 
conceptual gap, therefore, existed in bilateral communications.629 At the same time, 
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through the expansion and strengthening of commercial trades with individual EU 
member states, the Chinese government strived for reconciliation within the EU. 
Emphasising the mutual economic cooperation, Beijing aimed to deviate concern from 
the debates over Tibet.  
 
The Third Tibet Work Forum and Chinese Enhanced Control 
 
The dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala in the 1990s ceased while informal 
communications between both sides continued. Though a meeting was held in Beijing 
in June 1993,630 the situation was an overall stalemate. Both sides proclaimed their 
existing willingness to negotiate though, in fact, progress was in stagnation. Each side 
perceived the other as a rival and this did not help seek mutual understandings. Rather, 
the failure of the Dalai Lama and Beijing to work together to choose the reincarnation 
of the 10th Panchen Lama in 1995 manifested these bilateral conflicts.631 At that time, 
Beijing unleashed a patriotic education in Tibetan monasteries and temples and 
implemented an anti-Dalai Lama campaign.632 The Dalai Lama’s photos and worship 
were banned due to his status as the Tibetan spiritual leader. The Sino-Tibetan 
relationship pervaded a sense of uncertainty, the Chinese campaign provoked the 
Tibetan emotional backlash and instigated sporadic protests in Tibetan regions.  
 
Another conspicuous indicator featuring such tensions was evident in the launch of the 
Third Tibet Work Forum on 20-23 July 1994.633 As explained, policies regarding 
Tibetan affairs were further prioritised. First of all, both previous conferences were 
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convoked by the Party Central Secretariat in advance and the Party cadres conducted a 
field survey. The Party then published an official statement in which instructions were 
revised after an investigation. Conversely, since the Third Work Forum, all 
investigations were conducted before the launch of the conference. In addition, the 
third forum was co-launched by the Party Central and State Council as well as 
relevant governmental officials. Such innovations demonstrated that Beijing raised the 
Tibetan issue in its national strategies 
 
On this occasion, anti-secession was highlighted as the priority task, equaling the 
economy. Beijing instructed a slogan as a guideline: ‘yige zhongxin, liangjian dashi, 
sange quebao 一个中心，两件大事，三个确保’, meaning ‘Centralising of economic 
construction, grasping of economy and stability, and ensuring of the acceleration of 
Tibet’s economy, of social progress and of improving living standards.’634 Clearly, the 
main notion of the new campaign was concerned with economic development and 
political stability was regarded as a vital condition. The Chinese authorities 
summarised it as the ‘grasping with both hands’. Jiang Zemin expressed, “Tibet is not 
permitted to be separated from the motherland, and nor is it permitted to undergo a 
long-term low development in the future.”635 A determination to push development in 
Tibet can be determined. 
 
This policy transition accompanied the occurrence of certain domestic and 
international events in the late 1980s, as discussed in the previous sections. 
Demonstrations in 1987, 1988, and 1989 and the enormous pro-Tibet independence 
movements and uprisings towards Chinese rule in Lhasa astonished Beijing. New 
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policies initiated from the early 1980s illustrates Beijing’s attempt to resolve the 
Tibetan issue through improving inter-ethnic relations and economic development. 
However, Beijing met with a dilemma.  
 
On the one hand, a stable economic growth proved to be a remarkable accumulation 
of the state’s power and the CCP leaders believed that they were implementing a 
correct policy. On the other hand, demands that called for more autonomy that turned 
into self-determination by Tibetans triggered the CCP’s apprehension to its rule in 
Tibet.  
 
A historical context must be considered. At that time, in addition to Tibetan 
demonstrations, some demonstrations also occurred in the rest of China. Student 
demonstrations occurred in Beijing and many cities in 1989. Voices sought for 
democratic transformation and resulted in a chain-like collapse of communist regimes 
in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, which strongly 
disintegrated the Chinese government’s negative perception towards these 
demonstrations. Also, the successful internalisation of the Tibetan issue further 
rendered Beijing’s antagonism towards external intervention. Eventually, a hard-line 
approach was taken both internally and externally. The CCP decided to continue the 
modernising reform but within a confined manner. The previous loosening of control  
regarding politics was no longer maintained.  
  
For Beijing, the boost of economic growth was the most important leverage to 
facilitate Chinese national identity for Tibetans.636 The Third Work Forum declared 
the intent to increase fiscal subsidies for developing local industries. From 1994 to 
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2000, the Chinese central government subsidised Tibet with 92 percent of total costs 
on average per year.637 In relation to this, the Work Forum announced a new 
nationwide range of assisting projects for the TAR. Fifteen provinces and cities were 
designated to provide various support to their individual ‘partners’ in Tibet. Other than 
funding local infrastructures, every three years, these provinces sent technical 
specialists and party cadres to Tibet throughout all administrative levels. State-owned 
enterprises also abjured to this assisting project.638 Thus, they were channeled to Tibet, 
either establishing branches or being responsible for local constructions.  
 
Education was also an important aspect involved in this project. Not only had public 
schools from these provinces recruited teachers to support Tibetan education, they also 
provided funding for Tibetan students.639 In terms of infrastructure, Beijing invested 
massively in traffic construction, including railways, roads, as well as aerial 
transportation.640 As a result, communications between the Tibet autonomous region 
and inland provinces were strengthened. Through building an increasing intertwined 
network via capital and individual support, the Chinese government expected to 
achieve an immediate and obvious profit. 
 
Meanwhile, the CCP launched policies aimed at stabilising Tibet’s political and social 
environment. Since the early 1990s the Dalai Lama and his government were targeted 
as another key source of conflict in addition to ‘Western anti-China hostile force’ that 
was continually blamed as the main cause for ethnic tensions. At the Third Tibet Work 
Forum, Beijing not only publicly devalued all proposals suggested by the Dalai Lama 
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in the 1980s, but also re-called him and the TGIE as the ‘Dalai clique’ whose ultimate 
goal was to separate Tibet from China with supporters from hostile Western forces.641 
Jiang Zemin set a tone that regarded the disputes between Beijing and the ‘Dalai 
clique’ as a war of defence of the motherland and as an opposition of separatism for 
all Chinese people, including Tibetans. This was a clear signal illustrating that Beijing 
adopted a hardened attitude towards any actor who could potentially threaten its rule.   
 
With regard to other measures to tighten control, Beijing specifically targeted 
traditional Tibetan figures. The ‘upper-class people’ were now redefined as those who 
sincerely supported the CCP. Those who were deemed as separatists would endure 
severe repression.  
 
Finally, Buddhism, which had strong ties with the Dalai Lama and a deep impact on 
Tibetan daily life, became another sensitive arena that Beijing carefully monitored. 
Having paid a large subsidy to restore Tibetan Buddhism in various dimensions, the 
Party sought to win the hearts and minds of Tibetan Buddhist disciples. In the 
meantime, the CCP drew regulations for monasteries and institutions. As nationalism 
was regarded as advantageous to legitimatise the CCP‘s rule, a patriotic education 
campaign that emphasised inclusiveness of the Chinese nation for all citizens of the 
PRC, regardless of their ethnicity, was promoted in the 1990s.642 In its association, 
religion is addressed to accept patriotic education by the name of promoting 
‘co-adaptation of religion and Socialism’. The key notion was deemed that disciples 
must prioritise the status of the Party-state and support the integrity of the state and 
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ethnic unity rather than religious belief.643  
 
It is apparent that the CCP turned to adopt a tougher standpoint to Tibet to enhance its 
national security, very different from its position a decade ago. Since then, the CCP 
retained its tough attitude to policy-making. However, Tibetan discontent did not 
dissolve. Rather, as the next chapter will present, their emotional fear and resentment 




Thus far, this chapter presents a transition of Sino-Tibetan relations from a low- to a 
high-uncertainty societal dilemma. It explores the Chinese government’s moderate 
means of implementing modernising policies in terms of reform and opening up 
relations with other countries. Beijing’s benign gesture was considered with its direct 
contact with the Dalai Lama and exiled Tibetans. The chapter then assesses the tension 
involving the fact-finding teams and the Sino-Tibetan bilateral negotiations as well as 
domestic and international events regarding the situation of Tibet.  
 
The regulatory factors played significant roles to the point where the Sino-Tibetan 
bilateral relationship was stagnant. This chapter provides a detailed review of events 
leading to this situation. It revisits the dynamics of Tibetan dissatisfaction towards 
Chinese modernisation and the latter’s tougher position in Beijing-Dharamsala 
interactions. The raised external concern regarding Tibet explains China’s insecure 
perception and resulting firmness in its approach. These domestic and external 
pressures forced Beijing’s adaptation from its tolerant attitude to a tough stance since 
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the mid-1990s. The notion of ‘grasping with both hands,’ which emphasised political 
stability and economic growth, gradually dominated Beijing’s mode of 
decision-making and was developed in future years.  
 
Whereas the potential to reconcile existed, the Sino-Tibetan relationship was 
enmeshed in a downward spiral created by unilateral modernisation, negotiating 
standoffs, and international critics. Both actors were trapped in confrontation. In the 











This chapter examines the Sino-Tibetan relationship from 2000 to 2012 against a 
background of Chinese conspicuous growth not only domestically but also in its 
global socio-politico-economic areas. 644  It argues that Sino-Tibetan bilateral 
interactions in this period featured as a high-uncertainty societal dilemma, assessed 
through the PRC commitments to Tibet and the Tibetan response as well as rounds of 
Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations.  
 
The notion of high-uncertainty societal dilemma stresses uncertainty concerning the 
actor’s intent on conflict within the classic security dilemma, under which actions 
aimed at maintaining and strengthening security and societal identity by the first group, 
would engender reactions from others thus resulting in further insecurity. Within these 
circumstances, involved actors are very sensitive to their opponents’ intentions and 
behaviour. Most likely, the actors would manipulate and exaggerate the opposites’ 
abilities. In turn, the interaction intensifies the tension.  
 
Applying this notion in this chapter, the Sino-Tibetan relationship is illustrative in its 
own right. With its strengthened state capacity, Chinese authorities were able to 
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employee various means to promote economic development for national integration in 
Tibet; the radical policy continued even after the riot of 2008.  
 
Beijing’s intention is clearly revealed in the governmental publication of three White 
Papers for ethnic minorities from 1999 to 2009.645 Indeed, some projects contained 
non-political and well-being-improvement purposes, and this research recognises this 
venture. However, focus is on the generated conflictual dynamics to which Tibetans 
were uncertain about Beijing’s policies. In the meantime, Beijing’s tougher degree of 
control on Tibetan society further reinforces this impression.  
 
Domestic and international regulatory factors served as a negative catalyst for the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship during this period. Major state-induced projects aimed at 
pushing national integration through economic development resulted in Tibetan 
uncertainty and fear towards China’s launched campaigns. This can be seen by 
Dharamsala’s repeated calls for moderating societal intrusion in the rounds of 
negotiations, and Phuntsog Wangyal, a significant Tibetan figure,646 who expressed 
heavy concerns about Tibet and Tibetans with four letters to the President Hu Jintao 
between 2004 and 2008.647 Beijing refuted these demands by asserting the legitimacy, 
benefits, and correctness of its policies, however, the policies did not contribute to a 
formation of solid Chinese national identity.  
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Conversely, Tibetan societal identity insecurity was exacerbated and ethno-nationalist 
sentiments were ignited during the process. Tensions and sporadic demonstrations 
took place, including a large scale anti-government protest on the 14th of March 2008. 
Since 2009 to the present day, self-immolations of monks, nuns and Tibetan youth can 
be witnessed on the street. These protests were not only constituted as isolated events, 
but also gave birth to agency of ethnic mobilisation against the ruling authority. The 
government’s subsequent repressions and political campaigns only further 
complicated the tension and spiral.  
 
While the international community increased concerns for Tibet, it appeared to only 
maintain Beijing’s insistence on a tough standpoint. Given the comprehensive 
consideration of relations with China, most major powers soon chose silence and 
limited criticism of human rights but their occasional interventions in different forms 
still posed concerns for the Chinese authority. 
 
To narrate the Sino-Tibetan societal dilemma, the discussion is divided into six parts. 
It begins with a discussion concerning China’s commitment to strengthen economic 
development and political control in Tibet since 2000. Following this, this chapter 
analyses the Beijing-Dharamsala negotiation of nine rounds from resumption to 
stalemate, suggesting core divisions. This chapter then considers the Tibetan backlash 
to Chinese policies, in which the 14th March Incident of 2008 and self-immolations 
after 2009 are examined. The fifth section examines the external concerns regarding 
Tibet relating to the PRC’s international relations. This chapter concludes by 
suggesting that the cyclic demonstration-repression indicates the failure of China’s 
commitment and implies that it must adapt its policy to be more inclusive in building 




Grasping with Both Hands: Beijing’s Radical Integration of Tibet 
 
With its increased state capacity, the Chinese authority became more confident and 
adopted an active attitude towards long-term issues, to which the stability of Tibet 
constituted a vital concern.648  Under this context, “Grasping with both hands,” 
centered upon economic development and social control, was launched and soon its 
overreaching influence intruded Tibetan societal life.  
 
The ideology behind this policy was to repress anti-governmental activities and 
eliminate roots and dynamics of Tibetan resistance. The CCP’s leadership at the 
Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001 highlighted the inseparability between Tibet and 
China. The Chinese authorities stated, the ‘battle with the Dalai Clique and its foreign 
anti-China supporters’ was essentially a continuation of ‘anti-Imperialism and 
anti-Hegemonism as well as anti-Separatism; it is a ‘struggle for protecting the state’s 
integrity’.649 This section presents China’s commitments to such thinking through 
economic and political approaches that could be combined 
 
Economic Commitment 
It should be noted that China’s policies contained multiple non-political tasks but their 
association and implication for national security were implicit. Hu Jintao, in his 
speech to the Tibetan representative team of the National People’s Congress on the 5th 
of March 2001, stated that boosting rapid development was extremely important for 
Tibet, not only for the purpose of enhancing the standard of living of all ethnicities, 
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but also because it would be conducive to “strengthening ethnic unity and remaining 
territorial integrity of the motherland.”650 In his speech at the Fourth Tibet Work 
Forum on the 25th of June 2001, the President, Jiang Zemin, also related rapid 
economic development to nation-building. He stated, “Only by accelerating 
development of Tibet can we consolidate unity of all [Chinese] ethnicities, and 
safeguard frontier and border defense.”651 The White Paper of 2009 China's Ethnic 
Policy and Common Prosperity and Development for All Ethnic Groups also stressed 
that common prosperity cannot be achieved without ethnic unity and integrity of the 
state.652 These statements expressed a clear signal that Beijing aimed to promote 
Tibetan loyalty towards the state through economic commitment.  
 
The Chinese authorities worshipped the effects of modernisation. As the studies of 
Deutsch and Birch illustrate,653 modernisation always accompanies the creation of a 
unifying market, urbanisation, and transformation of patterns of social communication. 
Individuals in this process would be brought into a group membership and their new 
identity thereby forged. The construction of public infrastructure was expected to 
facilitate this process.  
 
At this time, the Chinese government proposed projects affiliated with Western 
Development (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发), which was couched within terms of the 
reduction of regional imbalances between the eastern provinces and the west. A main 
instruction was to adapt the national industrial structure and direct economic capital 
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from the east to the west. For Tibet, the Central government subsidies were 92% of 
total costs on average per year, between 1994 and 2000.654 By 2000, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of TAR expanded 2.27 times compared to 1993, with an 
annual growth rate of 12.4% on average per year.655 Even though Tibet was still one 
of the economically disadvantaged areas at the time, Beijing believed that these 
figures justified its policies. The Central government continued its intensive 
modernisation in Tibet along with massive fiscal subsidies and assisting projects.656  
 
The Fourth Tibet Work Forum instigated an overwhelming degree of investment in 
Tibet. During the period of the Tenth Five-year Plan (2001-2005), the central 
government provided 37.9 billion yuan as fiscal subsidy and 32.2-billion-yuan 
investment and assisted projects in Tibet. 657  In the Eleventh Five-year Plan 
(2006-2010), the invested assisting projects jumped to more than 137 billion yuan.658 
These subsidised and invested projects covered various aspects. Amongst them, 
infrastructural construction and transportation occupied 30.8% of all budgets. 
Investments in agriculture, husbandry, forestry and water construction took 25.97%, 
energy construction 13.76% and post and telecommunication 11.29%.659 Moreover, 
Tibet was exempt from taxation; including central and shared tax. As a result, Tibet 
was provided with unprecedented support in economic resources, more than ever 
before.   
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In addition, state-induced projects from the ‘brotherhood’ provinces and cities, as well 
as state-owned enterprises (instructed to be responsible for the development of 
assigned units) were brought into discussion. These brotherhood units provided 
funding and regularly sent technical specialists and cadres to assist Tibet. By 2010, 
more than 4741 experts and cadres were channeled to Tibet across urban and remote 
areas, helping local constructions. In the educational sector, these partner provinces 
and cities were also responsible for providing training courses and relevant 
infrastructure. They were also instructed to provide additional positions for students to 
study in these provinces and cities; programmes ranging from primary school and 
college. 660  Consequently, communication between people in Tibet and these 
brotherhood provinces were strengthened and extended. It helped to forge ‘we-group’ 
awareness to some extent, but, as will be discussed, tension was rife. 
 
Moreover, these modernisation strategies created a comprehensive and complex traffic 
communications network between Tibet and Chinese provinces. Extensive traffic 
systems were created in remote areas and the growth of networks provided the state 
with a higher level of capacity to intervene in economic, social, and cultural aspects. 
To this extent, the state can effectively impose its will. Instructed by a policy termed 
as Prosper Frontier and Enrich Residents (xing bian fu min 兴边富民),661 the local 
government, throughout different levels, border areas in particular, instilled massive 
resources for building roads, bridges, enhancing energy, and extending 
telecommunication.  
 
These public infrastructures substantially strengthened communications within 
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previously isolated villages, and channeled them to the cities and vice versa. The 
expansion of infrastructure increased dynamics of human and capital throughout Tibet, 
and in turn, motivated Tibetans to leave inland provinces. The state expected that 
national integration would be achieved through daily practices and activities. 
 
One of the most influential infrastructure projects launched by the Fourth Tibet Work 
Forum and Western Development was the proposal of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway.662 
Previously, similar plans concerning building a railway connecting Tibet and other 
provinces were discussed among Communist senior officials since the 1950s, but 
given the technical difficulties and cost, the project was able to be started in 2000.663 
The CCP’s leadership was keen on its construction. Jiang Zemin stated in November 
2000, ‘Building this railway is necessary in terms of political and military aspects. It 
will be advantageous for developing tourism and improving communication between 
Tibet and the inland provinces. Taking factors of economic development, political 
stability, national defense, consolidation of ethnic unity, and anti-separatism into 
account, we must build the Qinghai-Tibet Railway’.664 Since its construction, its 
impact has been overwhelming. 
 
Connections between Tibet and neighboring provinces improved. A direct access from 
the heart of Tibet to Beijing was also created. For geopolitical strategy, the railway 
itself not only improved the state capacity for territorial control, but also ensured a 
more effective military projection of the People’s Liberation Army to the border 
areas.665 Chinese products from inland provinces were now available in Tibet at a 
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lower price, and likewise, Tibetan products were available in other regions. In general, 
Tibet is completely merged into the Chinese domestic market.666 In addition, the 
railway brought about great mobility between Tibetans and people from other regions. 
By comparing the figures of the National Census in 2000 and 2010, it is revealed that 
people moving out of Tibet to Qinghai expanded by 6.68, to Gansu by 4.86 and to 
Shaanxi by 9.22.667 Beijing was satisfied with this phenomenon and claimed that it 
improved inter-ethnic communication. However, migration flows in such a short time 
also resulted in inter-ethnic tension.  
 
Political Commitment 
In addition to policies initiated in economic terms, there were other policies and 
political campaigns that pursued regulation and restriction. Importantly, political 
ideology was prioritised. A higher degree of control was also implemented, initially 
from the local CCP’s cadres.  
 
The Fourth Tibet Work Forum explicitly announced that all Communist Party 
members, cadres and officials in particular, must study and demonstrate firm support 
to the Marxist views of motherland, ethnicity, religion and culture; and atheism and 
Materialism were called in practice. These were known as the education of ‘Four 
Marxist Views and Two -Isms (si guan er lun 四观二论)’.668 This education was not 
only taken as a measure for career promotion, but also as a measure overseeing private 
life. Regardless of original ethnic backgrounds, these official employees were 
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regulated to avoid association with any religious events, including ritual ceremonies, 
except for business work purposes. 669  Considering that Buddhism occupied 
influential sectors in Tibetan customs and daily life, such regulation incurred a 
negative reaction. 
 
Campaigns on patriotic education and the ‘Three Inseparables’, noting that Han 
Chinese, Tibetans, and all ethnic minorities were inseparable, were also imposed, 
initially targeting Party members in Tibet. The Work Forum stated, through these 
crusades, that members were expected to ‘identify the reactionary essence of the Dalai 
Clique and realise the importance of ethnic unity’ and ‘safeguard motherland’s 
integrity’.670 In September 2001, the new CCP Secretary of the TAR Guo Jinlong, 
declared a slogan ‘Drawing Two Lines and Reaching One Responsibility (huaqing 
liangge jiexian, jin dao yige zeren 划清两个界线，尽到一个责任)’. Its main notion 
was that all cadres, differing from ordinary citizens, must not have any religious belief 
and that is their duty to create a stronger united multi-ethnic state. Clearly, it was a 
statement forbidding religious practice.671 After the outbreak of the 14th of March 
Incident in 2008, it was reported that Beijing adopted stricter measures.672 Since April 
2008, achievements regarding anti-separatism also became a key indicator for 
promotion.673  
 
The Chinese authorities tightened control in monasteries and temples by preventing 
religious communities forming ties with anti-government movements. After the 
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dispute between Beijing and Dharamsala over the search for the 11th Panchen Lama 
in 1995,674 the Party carried out larger-scale purges to impose its authority. In this 
way, most abbots of monasteries and temples had to be filtered and approved by the 
government. Likewise, campaigns including the education of ‘Four Marxist Views and 
Two -Isms’ and patriotic education were overwhelmingly imposed within monasteries 
and temples. Namely, the purpose of these crusades was to create a legal basis for 
religious activities.675 In reality, the state attempted to eradicate roots of interference 
with politics and prioritised the Central authority from the beginning.676  
 
After the 14th March Incident, Beijing designated measures monitoring religious 
activities. The Party established resident cadres in most monasteries and temples. For 
these cadres, the tasks included collecting personal data of monks and nuns and they 
were responsible for delivering instructions from the party and reporting on matters to 
the Party. Also, they had to monitor the families of monastical members, spying on 
them to prevent any potential anti-separatist movements. 677  To foster patriotic 
awareness, the government requested that images of Party leaders and the national 
flag must be hung in temples and monasteries. As a result, during my field-survey in 
Lhasa, it was common to see flags flying on the roof of monasteries.  
 
The promulgation of Regulations on Religious Affairs by the State Council in 2004 
revealed a commitment that the state institutionalised regulation of religious 
activities.678 This law is applied to all religions in China; Tibetan Buddhism is 
included. According to Article 27, the law explicitly addresses that non-recognition of 
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Rinpoche (Tibetan living Buddha) as the religion’s internal affair. It belongs to the 
public and must be under government monitoring. In 2007, the State Administration 
for Religious Affairs issued ‘Reincarnation Law’. This step represented the authority’s 
further institutionalisation of managing Tibetan Buddhism, as it required that all 
‘living Buddhas’ wishing to reincarnate, must support the idea of ‘national unity and 
ethnic consolidation’ and acquire prior governmental approval.679 Understanding the 
profound influence that the Dalai Lama and other exiled Buddhist leaders have, the 
CCP regards the Buddhist reincarnation system as a contested arena and aims to 
completely prevent external intervention, concerning Dharamsala in particular, 
through the establishment of these laws.  
 
Finally, there were innovated policies and campaigns accelerating economic 
development and political control, as well as anti-separatist campaigns during this 
period. Beijing sought means to gain the loyalty of Tibetans through improving 
material conditions, and in the meantime, fight to stifle potential opponents. One such 
effort was a crusade instructed by the Fourth Tibet Work Forum which was termed as 
‘Strengthening Base and Maintaining Root (qiang ji gu ben 强基固本)’.  
 
The project of ‘Strengthening Base and Maintaining Root’ was carried out through 
corporation with many existing Tibet-assisting projects. Initially, Beijing infused 
budgets for local administration construction. The detailed programmes included 
provision of more local public infrastructure-building and raising of allowances for 
Party cadres and state employees. Meanwhile, the government redesignated its 
assisting projects in terms of human resource allocation. Accordingly, many aid-Tibet 
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cadres, technical experts and servants from the ‘partner’ units would be relegated to 
county level, while previously, they were designated to serve at provincial level.680  
 
Beijing also endeavoured to disseminate its messages in-depth. Since 2000, the 
government invested in a project by which it aimed to enhance radio and television 
broadcasting in Tibet and Xinjiang, officially termed as the ‘Tibet-Xinjiang Project 
(Xixin gongcheng 西新工程)’.681 Again, this project was instigated with the aim of 
reducing the information gap between urban and rural areas. But its political 
implication to nation-building was clear. As Jiang Zemin instructed, the task of this 
project was to transmit the ‘voice of the party and the state’ to millions of households; 
moreover, it would transmit ‘China's voice to the world and suppressed foreign hostile 
force and ethno-splittism.”682 Since 2002, the government officially commenced this 
project; in 2014, radio could reach 93% of the TAR, and television had also reached 
94.51%.683 With the expansion of these institutions and infrastructures, Beijing could, 
in a broader and deeper manner, dominate local society and prevent residents from 
receiving external radio waves.  
 
Through all these factors, Beijing carried out intensive and extensive policies and 
campaigns through economic and political means. These modernisation projects 
attained evident economic developments and progress, conspicuously improving 
living conditions for local people. These established infrastructure and frequent 
inter-communications with the people also projected an effective integration of Tibet 
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into the state, pursuing the emergence of a solid Chinese national identity. More 
significantly, tight controls were imposed more broadly to minimise and eliminate 
anti-government opponents. Such an aggressive line of thinking reflected its direct 
contacts with Dharamsala. The following section discusses this in detail.   
 
Stalemate of Beijing-Dharamsala Negotiations 
 
The Chinese authorities resumed its direct negotiation with Dharamsala in 2002. 
Previously, due to disputes over recognition of the 11th Panchen Lama’s reincarnation 
in the mid-1990s, their informal contact stalled; before that, formal dialogue had been 
suspended since the late 1980s. It is believed that the resumption was in line with the 
respective stance of both sides. For Dharamsala, its pursuit for talks was illustrative as 
this was also a primary goal for internationalising the Tibetan issue. Some observers 
associated the resumption to regular concerns and calls from the West, who played a 
vital role. Beijing was motivated to restart the talks because it needed to consider the 
powerful influence of the Dalai Lama, the TGIE, and Tibetan diaspora ties when 
forging its policies. These factors related to Chinese domestic and international 
politics, contributing to nine rounds of face-to-face meetings in the post-2000 era.684 
  
Initially, many international observers regarded the negotiations as positive. Prior to 
the initial meeting, Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama was allowed 
to return to Tibet. He visited his hometown in Qinghai province (Amdo) where he and 
the Dalai Lama lived in the 1950s, and other places including Lhasa and Shigatse, 
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TAR.685 Upon his return to India, Gyalo Thondup expressed optimism over the "great 
changes in the outlook of the Chinese Government," speaking in a positive tone about 
"great changes inside Tibet including many good roads and significant development in 
the cities."686 Following his trip, a four-member delegation, headed by the Special 
Envoy Lodi Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, also visited Lhasa, Shigatse, Chengdu, 
Shanghai and Beijing, marking the first formal contact between Chinese and the Dalai 
Lama's representatives in September 2002. In his comment on this talk, Lodi stated 
that there were two main aims for this trip. The first was to reestablish direct contact 
with Beijing and create a good atmosphere. Secondly, they wanted to elucidate and 
clarify the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach. He was personally satisfied with the 
outcome.687  
 
Subsequently, a yearly meeting seemed to be almost institutionalised. The second, 
third and fourth rounds of negotiation were launched respectively in May 2003, 
September 2004 and on June 30-1 July 2005.688 Upon the fifth negotiation in Guilin 
City in February 2006, Samdhong Rinpoche, the former Prime Minister of the TGIE 
summarised these experiences of talks, praising that “The first round was more [about] 
tourism, during the second there were some talks; the third one there was an elaborate 
exchange of views; during the fourth in Bern we were able to respond to all their 
suspicions and doubts and during the fifth we had the feedback on our explanation. It 
is not something static, it is moving.”689 
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However, the result may counter this optimism. These nine rounds of contact had not 
yet reached any concrete breakthrough. Little evidence enclosed that the Chinese 
authority compromised its tough policies.  
 
In the sixth round of negotiation in July 2007, Lodi Gyari admitted that the bilateral 
talks reached a critical stage.690 After the outbreak of the 14th March Incident, the 
negotiation became a standoff. In November 2008, the Vice Minister of the United 
Front Work Department, Zhu Weiqun, at a press conference, said that “anything but 
independence can be discussed” was a distortion of Deng Xiaoping’s talks with Gyalo 
Thondup. What Deng mentioned was that only when Dharamsala accepts that ‘Tibet is 
part of China’ would the Central government be willing to talk about the ‘future 
arrangement for the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetans.’691 Such a statement was 
instantly refuted by Gyalo Thondup in Dharmsala on the 19th of November, and he 
insisted that Deng never expressed such a statement to him.692 In this way, Deng’s 
original notion may have become an unsettled question and an important signal that 
showed resumed negotiations reached a deadlock. In spite of the regularity of their 
meetings, it seemed that the talks were saddled with certain irreconcilable 
preconditions, conditions, and contradictions.  
 
During the negotiation meetings, Beijing was concerned with proposals from 
Dharamsala that centralised on ‘unification of all Tibetan regions’ and ‘meaningful 
autonomy’ into the agenda. The Dharamsala delegation insisted that the TGIE only 
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sought the preservation of Tibetan societal identity and ethnic characteristics in terms 
of culture and religion. Thereby, the ‘unification of all Tibetan regions’ or establishing 
a unitary Tibetan autonomous region responsible for Tibetan societal affairs within the 
PRC’s state framework, was an approach to achieve ‘meaningful autonomy,’ and 
should produce a win-win result. Dharamsala contended that this was an appropriate 
compromise as the proposals accepted China’s sovereignty and its notion was also in 
line with the PRC’s Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law; the proposals 
also aligned with the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach.693  
 
Dharamsala’s ideas were echoed by some CCP cadres. Phuntsog Wangyal, the founder 
of the Tibetan Communist Party who played an important role in the liberation of 
Tibet, wrote four letters to President Hu Jintao between 2004 and 2008, expressing a 
similar standpoint. He suggested that the unification of all Tibetan regions does not 
violate the spirit of Regional Ethnic Autonomy. It is argued that by forming a coherent 
standpoint to ethnic minority, an increase in inter-societal harmony and the state’s 
stability and national integration would be the result.694 Phuntsog Wangyal called for 
Beijing’s permission to return the Dalai Lama, noting that his spiritual influence on 
Tibetans will be helpful to local governance.695 Echoing Wang Lixiong’s point; ‘Dalai 
Lama is the key to the Tibet question’, Phuntsog Wangyal asserted that reaching a 
peaceful solution must take the Dalai Lama into account.696 
 
Beijing denied these demands, insisting on its correctness of approach over Tibet. 
Moreover, through explicitly dismissing the existence of the Tibetan issue, the CCP 
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turned to limiting the scope of talks onto the Dalai Lama’s personal status under the 
preconditions that he had to ‘abandon the separatist activities’ and announce that 
‘Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable part of China’s territory’.697 Beijing’s condition 
was in turn unacceptable for Dharamsala.  
 
Given these phenomena, Beijing’s uncompromising stance is evident. On the 26th of 
August 2005, the politburo of the CCP issued that the Three Insistences — the Party’s 
leadership, socialist system, and Regional Ethnic Autonomy — were fundamental 
principles dominating policies over Tibet, including negotiations with Dharamsala.698 
Reading between the lines, the implication from this statement are not that these three 
aspects guide Tibetan policy but that the ‘the Party’s leadership’ instructs the policy 
prior to others. Following this logic, it should be illustrative that Beijing would not 
grant any flexibility facing Dharamsala’s demands. 
 
In addition to direct negotiations, Beijing employed the strategy of megaphone 
diplomacy towards Dharamsala through publishing a series of White Papers. The 
international community should be targeted as well. These White Papers served as 
demonstrations and propaganda of the CCP’s achievements, and were used to justify 
the Party’s superiority over the old regime in Tibet. The White Paper of Modernisation 
of 2001 narrated various progresses in Tibetan society, which were brought about by 
the PRC's modernisation projects.699 In 2004, another White Paper, titled Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet suggested that Chinese authority empowered Tibetans with 
autonomous rights in political, economic, cultural, and religious areas. This White 
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Paper also rejected the Dalai Lama’s call for ‘one country, two systems’ by saying that 
Tibet has been under a historical context different from Hong Kong and Macao, and 
claimed that it enjoyed a system of autonomy therefore any changes is a violation of 
Constitution.700 The White Papers Peaceful Liberation of Tibet by 60th Anniversary 
of 2011701 and Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet issued in 
2015702 also attributed to current progress in Tibet in the CCP’s systems and plans. 
All these points clearly demonstrated Beijing’s firm standpoint that the authorities had 
no willingness to adjust the status quo. 
 
In 2008, the TGIE presented the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan 
People, as the latest proposal to Beijing. Its delegations stated that this submission 
was a response to the inquiry from Du Qinglin, the Minister of United Front Work 
Department, with regard to the resolution of the Tibetan issue. This Memorandum 
again marked an important and concrete modification for Dharamsala, since it was 
designed within the Constitution of the PRC and Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. 
Alternatively, it requested Beijing to conceive a single administration for all Tibetans 
concerning their unique ethnic characteristic. As the Memorandum stated: 
 
 
Tibetans can benefit greatly from the rapid economic and scientific 
development the country is experiencing. While wanting to actively participate 
and contribute to this development, we want to ensure that this happens 
without the people losing their Tibetan identity, culture and core values.703 
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However, claiming that the Memorandum still violated the Three Insistences and the 
Chinese Constitution, Beijing dismissed this proposal once more. At a press 
conference, the Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department, Zhu Weiqun 




These individual articles about ‘meaningful autonomy’ dichotomise the united 
leadership of Central government and Regional Ethnic Autonomy. It 
[Memorandum] intends to deny, restrict and weaken the central 
power…Despite its decoration with wordings of Constitution and Law on 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy, its essence was still ‘greater Tibet’ and ‘high 
autonomy’ which we have recognized as ‘semi-independence,’ ‘independence in 
disguise’ and ‘Tibet independence’.704  
 
 
A question regarding Beijing’s insistence should be raised. Compromises and 
modifications have been seen in Dharamsala’s position. Demands and contents of 
proposals evolved with time and aspirations to find a workable approach to preserve 
Tibetan society remained.705 However, Beijing labelled these distinct suggestions as a 
package of ‘semi-independence’ and ‘independence in disguise.’ Reinterpreting Deng 
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Xiaoping’s statement that “anything but independence can be discussed” as “nothing 
involving the independence issue could be discussed,” Smith argued that Beijing 
would reject Dharamsala as long as the latter’s demands considered such implication. 
In his view, China only aimed to manipulate Tibetan identity to fuse with Chinese 
national identity. Potential threats to this process would fuel Beijing’s apprehension.706 
Therefore, Beijing adopted a self-defined attitude and was sensitive to any demands 
that contained potential challenge to its rule and national integration in Tibet.707 The 
Chinese authorities stuck to a firm standpoint while the Envoys of Dharamsala 
elucidated their standpoint that they would not challenge PRC’s sovereignty.  
 
With the retirement of the Dalai Lama from his political role in the TGIE and the shift 
of Chinese power to the Xi Jinping Administration, no further rounds of dialogue have 
taken place since the ninth round of negotiation in February 2010. When talks resume, 
they will deserve attention. Until now, the hardline approach still constitutes the 
CCP’s policy-making.  
 
Backlash, Conflicts, and Resulting Factors  
 
The imposition of tougher control along with the policy of “grasping with both hands” 
provoked Tibetan grievances. This section continues an examination of Tibetan 
demonstrations with the 14th March as the primary focus along with subsequent 
self-immolations.  
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Initially, occasional protests emerged as isolated cases. With time, they turned out to 
be widespread demonstrations across all Tibetan regions beyond the TAR.  
 
The eruption of the 14th March Incident in 2008 that took place before the opening of 
the Beijing Olympic Games marked the largest scale of Tibetan riot since 1959. The 
Incident soon created waves of anti-governmental protests,708 pervading the entire 
Tibetan regions in other provinces.709 Mass demonstrations commenced from the 10th 
of March 2008. Due to the initial crackdown and subsequent arrests by the police, it 
gave rise to further protests. Here, the spiral ‘ping-pong’ responses between protesters 
and the authority were discernible, which then escalated to a higher degree of 
conflicts.710  
 
On 14th March, angry protesters burned stores and attacked governmental buildings in 
central Lhasa. Meanwhile, disturbance also occurred in other pan-Tibetan regions. In 
its response, Beijing immediately blockaded local telecommunication, employed 
military crackdown, and arrested demonstrators. Its harsh reaction has yet to receive 
international concern and condemnation.711 The Incident itself shadowed the image of 
a rising China, but on the other side, it also provoked fervent nationalist sentiment in 
and outside China to counter pro-Tibetan opinions until the holding of the Olympics 
Games. 712  Afterwards, since 2009. occasional yet endless wave of Tibetan 
self-immolations to express ethnic discontents emerged and spread across all Tibetan 
areas.713  
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Having been reported by the vast media news, governmental and non-governmental 
reports as well as academic literature, causes and explanations of these demonstrations 
are highly debated. The Chinese government mainly attributed them to deliberate 
obstructions and masterminded by the ‘Dalai Clique and their foreign patrons’ in order 
to disintegrate the nation. On the other side, Dharamsala claimed that these were the 
outcomes of Tibetan frustration and disappointment with Beijing's policies with regard 
to “economic development, political stability and tightening of control over religious 
tradition and Tibetan culture” and “interference in and suppression of both religion 
and language, the forced removal of Tibetan nomads from the grasslands and the 
population transfer policy that moves Chinese to the Tibetan Plateau and reduces 
Tibetans to an increasingly disenfranchised and marginalised minority in their own 
land.”714 Both arguments reflect divergent perceptions and understandings. 
 
A wide range of opinions can be found in international media outlets. Geoff Dyer and 
Richard McGregor took economic disparity and excessive political control into 
account for the disturbances. 715  Elsewhere, Pankaj Mishra regarded the main 
dynamics of the 14th March Incident as the discontents of Tibetans towards rapid 
social change.716  
 
Moreover, scholars have also discussed distinct factors triggering these disturbances. 
Focusing on the demographic scope and protested content, Shakya argued that the 
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primordialist and ethnonationalist sentiments by Tibetans towards Beijing’s repressive 
rule was the main drive. He termed self-immolations as a ‘changing language’, which 
was a new form but old goal against the CCP.717 In addition, Topgyal argued that it 
was the logic of insecurity dilemma in which both the Chinese state and ethnic 
Tibetans aimed to strengthen their ‘national’ identity, to resist change in this cyclical 
confrontation. For Tibetans, demonstrations and self-immolations were acts and 
counter-measures to express the threat to Tibetan identity due to Beijing’s policies.718 
From another aspect, based on his field-survey in the pan-Tibetan area, Hillman 
regarded the socio-economic disparity as the main cause behind these tragedies.719  
 
Putting them together, this research ascribes the outbreaks of 14th March Incident and 
self-immolations as a result of the Central government’s way of securitisation as well 
as the defects of social, economic and cultural aspects,political repression, and Tibetan 
resistance. The dynamics were a mixture of widespread discontent to the 
socio-economic disparity and tough control upon Tibetan society, considering the fact 
that unemployed youth and oppressed monks were the main participants. Also, 
external factors are acknowledged in relation to various statements amidst exiled 
Tibetan organisations to long-term China-Tibet tensions and the sensitive time-line of 
the 2008 Olympics. 720  This research suggests that ethnic discontent could be 
mobilised and turned into a neonationalist sentiment, given the fact that the existence 
of social inequality and local tensions were high along the ethnicity line.  
 
This research claims that China’s policies involved internal contradictory dynamics. 
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As the Chinese government continued its dual focus on economic development and 
political control, the benefits and contradictions of the policies provide the 
simultaneously dynamics of integrating and disintegrating the nation-state.  
 
State-led modernisation development did not fully impress local Tibetans with a sense 
of inclusiveness. Rather, with regards to the multiplex aspects, a sense of social and 
economic exclusion was sensed.721 Scholarly literature argued that many Tibetans 
considered themselves as passive participants in this modernisation process with rising 
uncertainty and concerns that their traditional society changed in a very short time. 
For many farmers and herdsmen, rapid urbanisation dramatically reshaped the 
landscape and impacted their traditional basis in farming and herding. Consequently, 
they had to move into urban areas to acquire their livelihoods. Once there was no 
sufficient employment opportunity for new labourers, it caused a potential threat for 
social stability.722  
 
A research report entitled “Investigation of the Social and Economic Causes of the 
14th March Incident in Tibetan Areas” completed by Gongmeng Law Research Center, 
a non-governmental organisation in Beijing expressed a similar viewpoint. Pointing to 
the main body of violent participants, which were unemployed youths, Gongmeng 
argued that the 14th March Incident was a long-term side-effect of state-led 
modernisation.723 A research, published by the China Tibetology Center, an official 
think tank advising Beijing on its Tibetan policy, also adopted this viewpoint. In this 
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study, the author stated that the 14th March Incident was, in essence, a reflection of a 
variety of social predicaments amidst Tibetans within the background of a rapid 
modernisation process.724 In short, the Chinese government failed to evenly distribute 
its economic growth achievement. 
 
In the previous section, modernisation accompanying restructuring of societal identity 
was discussed. This can bring about identity homogenisation. However, the situation 
can be conversed. Horowitz identifies that, when a societal group recognises its 
members’ economic and political conditions becoming inferior, and the modernisation 
promotor, usually the state, cannot counter dissent, the group senses deprivation and 
suspension towards the practice.725 Moreover, when people sense the loss of original 
ethnic distinctiveness, the group can become anxious. Ethnic tension is thus fueled. 
 
With the Western Development project, the Chinese government invested hundreds of 
billions of yuan in the TAR and wider Tibetan areas. Many public infrastructures were 
deliberately constructed as a means to pushing economic growth, extracting resources, 
and integrating Tibet to a national entity. Vast assisting projects and inducement 
policies to Tibet and Tibetans were also committed and subsequently reshaped the 
original environment. Walking along the streets of Lhasa now, visitors may feel like 
they are in the middle of a Chinese inland city.  
 
From 2001 to 2014, the Tibetan average annual growth rate per capita net income of 
rural residents (yuan) was 14.1%, and income increased from 1331 in 2000 to 7359 in 
2014. During the same period, the average annual growth rate of the per capita net 
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income of urban residents (yuan) was 9.8% with income increasing from 6448 in 2000 
to 22016 in 2014.726 It is without a doubt that this figure represents that a extremely 
fast development occurred. However, the conditions in Tibet was still far behind the 
national average. According to a figure in 2014, the national average per capita net 
income of rural residents (yuan) was 9892 and urban residents 29381.727 Although 
progress in Tibet was overwhelming, a serious economic gap between Tibet and other 
regions exists. Even worse, many Tibetans perceive Tibet as the losing party during 
this process. 
 
By considering the yearly amount that the Central government subsidised the TAR, a 
picture of extreme dependence from Tibet on the state can be seen. (Table 6-1, next 
page). According to local statistics, the proportion of the state’s subsidy in the TAR’s 
total revenue, in 2001-2010, was, on average always exceeding 90%. This figure 
demonstrates that Beijing has made huge efforts to support Tibet. On the other hand, it 
also points that Tibet still has not established its own fiscal independence. 
 
Moreover, the way this external resource was utilised merits concern. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the state mainly focused on infrastructure-building. In 
association with this means of resource distribution, the industrial structure of the 
three sectors in Tibet was reconfigured, thus changing the scenario also forced 
Tibetans to change their way of life. While the primary industry took up 72.9% in 
employment in 2000, its percentage was sharply reduced to 53.6 in 2010 and 43.7 in 
2014. In the same period, the tertiary industry grew from 21.2% in employment, up to 
35.5 in 2010 and 41.6 in 2014. The contributions of GDP of the three industries also 
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revealed a clear scenario. In 2000, the primary sector occupied 30.9% of local GDP. 
However, this was cut to 9.9% in 2014. Regarding the tertiary industry, the figure 
increased from 45.9% in 2000 to 53.3% in 2014. Assessing these changing figures — 
employment in the primary industry rapidly decreased but continued to be the largest 
sector. The existence of an income gap between the primary and tertiary industries 
meant that economic inequality was exacerbated within a very short time. In addition, 
local construction, mainly planned by the central government, heavily favoured urban 
over rural areas therefore disparity only broadened.  
 
Table 6-1 
Proportion of Governmental Subsidies in Total Revenue of TAR (2001-2014) 
Year Total Revenue (yuan) Subsidies revenue of 
government (yuan) 
Proportion (%) 
2001 1018566 944776 92.7 
2002 1398795 1311470 93.7 
2003 1387906 1287564 92.7 
2004 1479554 1359655 91.8 
2005 2058670 1915340 93 
2006 2229029 2007860 90 
2007 3101337 2804127 90.4 
2008 3864431 3578559 92.6 
2009 5018573 4709465 93.8 
2010 5734659 5309980 92.5 






Another important factor that accelerated social change in Tibet was the sheer 
presence of migration. Table 6-2 (see next page) illustrates that it is evident that while 
the total population in Tibet increased by more than 10% between 2000-2010, the 
proportion of Tibetans decreased by 2.14% during this decade. One implication is that 
the non-Tibetan population — migrants — rapidly increased. Also, some observers 
have suggested that most migrants were mainly from Han and Muslim ethnic 
backgrounds.728 The influx of Chinese immigration into the TAR was multiplex and 
had mixed results, given the context that the TAR was enjoying massive financial 
support from the Central government and the Western Development project.  
 
The State’s tremendous modernising projects brought thousands of assisting technical 
experts from individual ‘brother’ provinces and cities. Businessmen, as well as 
migrants, were looking for better economic opportunities and came not only from the 
neighboring provinces, but also from eastern coastal areas.729 The restructuring of 
industries also drove Tibetans from rural areas to the cities. These investments opened 
up a window of opportunity, but the influx of external migration also devalued the 
state’s original purpose. Compared to local Tibetan residents, these non-Tibetan 
migrants tended to enjoy more advantageous status since they were often equipped 
with better connections and skills and on average, were highly educated.  
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Proportion of Tibetans in Total Population of TAR730 
Year Proportion (%) Population 
2000 94.07 262 
2010 91.93 300 
Source: Organised from Zhongguo Minzu Tongji Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui 2013, Zhongguo Minzu Tongji Nianjian 2013, 688 
 
With the expansion of infrastructure and urbanization, certain industries such as 
tourism started to boom. However, some surveys showed that the majority of Tibetans 
only had limited access to these new opportunities, either because of their lack of 
skills, such as Mandarin, or lack of connections to networks that controlled dominant 
sources of wealth in the economy. Without institutionalised protection, the simple 
logic of market principle exacerbated this bias. Therefore, economic inequality still 
existed and intensified across the urban-rural and urban-ethnic divide.731  When 
commenting on the occurrence of the 14th March Incident, Hillman expressed a 
similar perspective. He argued that many Tibetans did not enjoy the fruits of the 
developing process. Though there was no systematic discrimination to Tibetans, 
non-Tibetans and other external migrants were more competitive. The sense of 
deprivation appeared amidst the indigenous Tibetans. He further contended, “Because 
of the rosy picture painted by statistics and the state media, most Chinese are unaware 
that Tibetans have been among the big losers of China’s economic miracle, and that, 
within Tibetan areas, the pace of economic modernisation has polarized Tibet’s 
economy, rewarding a minority of Tibetans with state jobs, but marginalising the 
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majority of Tibetans, who are poorly equipped to access new economic 
opportunities.”732 Therefore, a situation that Fisher terms as ‘ethnically exclusionary 
growth’ occurred in the TAR. 
 
In addition to the negative impacts brought about by state-led modernisation, the high 
degree of anti-separatism with regard to social monitoring and control placed pressure 
upon local Tibetans and intensified their discontent. A wide range of state measures, 
such as ‘Strengthening Base and Maintaining Root’, patriotic education and 
ideological campaigns about “Four Marxist Views and Two -Isms’. were imposed to 
suppress voices of oppositions, as this chapter discussed, and this did not completely 
eradicate resentment. Rather, it led to a sense of threat and even pushed such 
discontented emotion to the ethnonationalist claim. While the harsh crackdown may 
quickly deal with the occasional uprisings, they were ineffective in eliminating the 
root causes. Once people did not perceive any internal route or opportunity to overturn 
the suppressive status quo, or there appeared no other alternative to counter the 
suppression, demonstration against the state could occurred.  
 
The surveillance of Tibetan Buddhism, which constituted an important part of Tibetan 
culture, posed a most controversial aspect. It has been witnessed that the state 
provided rich resources to restore and conserve temples and monasteries over Tibetan 
regions. In the meantime, the state also provided funding to preserve Tibetan 
Buddhism and invested in related projects. However, due to the fact that the Party 
recognised that Buddhism has a potential in mobilisation and the national 
loyalty-contestation of Tibet, it targeted the latter with the imposition of a variety of 
regulations. Consequently, these restrictions received widespread complaints among 
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local communities and drew international concern. The exceeding interventions were 
regarded as the CCP’s distortion of religious development, as could be seen through 
the protestors during the 14th March Incident and the immolated monks calling for 
genuine freedom to practice Buddhist tradition. It was resentment that drove them to 
go on the street or burn themselves. Moreover, it is pointed out that the regulations of 
Atheism and Marxism on the Party Cadres also created pressure, the ethnic minority 
cadres in particular, who were forced to disconnect from their local social networks. In 
Sky Burial, Wang Lixiong discussed his experience in a Tibetan Prefecture, Yunan, 
where he saw a Tibetan Senior Colonel, and a number of officials, worship the holy 
mountain.733 He argued that it was impossible to separate religion from Tibetan daily 
life. Frustration is also rife in Tibetan cadres in my field-survey. One interviewee 
suggested, “I do not like this policy. I do not know why the Party cares about 
this…[Because of that] I cannot attend many events in my village.”734  
 
In summary, attributing the dynamics of Tibetan backlash merely to external factors 
may simplify the explanation. Assertions about the primordialist and nationalist 
confrontation between Chinese and Tibetans may also fail to capture the impacts of 
social construction on Tibetan ethnic or national identity and neglect the positivity of 
Beijing’s policies. Drawing from insight of modernist perspective, this chapter 
contends that the Tibetan backlash was mainly a complex contradiction of the Chinese 
government’s nationalising policies. If the ruling authority does not adjust its current 
means, the dynamics of the backlash will not disappear and similar riots will be seen 
in the future. 
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International Concerns on Tibet and China’s Insistence 
 
This section moves on to discuss concerns from international communities and to 
explore the extent these concerns influenced the Sino-Tibetan relationship. This 
research finds that while the pro-Tibet movement acquired international concerns, the 
PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet and governance were not essentially challenged. Beijing 
firmly insisted on its tough position under such international pressure.     
 
The issues of Tibet drew wide international attentions. The reasons behind this are 
related to successful internationalisation by the Dalai Lama, TGIE, the Tibetan 
diaspora community, and existing pro-Tibet societies and organisations such as the 
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). The factor of increased global interest in the 
behaviour of a rising China should also be accounted for. The evolvement of the 
Tibetan issue is engaged in China’s foreign relations. Statements, legislations and 
actions taken by certain governments towards China concerning Tibet can be 
observed.  
 
Soon after the eruption of the 14th March Incident and subsequent crackdowns by the 
Chinese government, several major European leaders immediately expressed their 
support to Tibetan demonstrations. Resolutions and statements were made in 
individual states, calling for Beijing’s respect of Tibetan human rights and holding a 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama.735 The European Parliament also launched a meeting 
to consider a common consensus towards boycotting the Beijing Olympics opening 
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ceremony.736 Whereas the EU did not ratify this decision, some leaders, including 
Polish President Donald Tusk, Czech president Vaclav Klaus, German chancellor 
Angela Merkel, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, and European Parliament Speaker Hans-Gert Poettering, decided to stay 
away from the opening ceremony.737 Elsewhere, concerns and demands requiring the 
Chinese authority to restrain its suppression in Tibet and launch communication with 
the representative of the Dalai Lama could also be seen in the US,738 Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan. To summarise, the achievement of the 
internationalisation of the Tibetan issue, in general, reached another peak. Pro-Tibet 
campaigns mushroomed and formed a wider extensive transnational network to 
facilitate public awareness to this issue.  
 
The Dalai Lama is regarded as the most significant figure of the TGIE, the exiled as 
well as the large body of Tibetans inside China, and his popularity can be in a positive 
way promoting global concerns on the situation of Tibet. A variety of figures uncovers 
this trend. It was reported that wherever the Dalai Lama gave a talk, the occasion was 
crowded with attendants. Also, when Time Magazine began its annual selection of one 
hundred most influential people in the world since 2004, the Dalai Lama was listed in 
the ‘influential leaders and revolutionaries’ category three times in 2004, 2005 and 
2008, overlapping President Hu Jintao in the same years. In addition, the number of 
the Dalai Lama’s overseas visit also reveals this trend. The total sum of overseas visits 
between 2000 and 2009 was 121, surpassing total visits in the 1990s (116) and the 
1980s (52). While having retired from his political role in 2011, the Dalai Lama still 
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conducted overseas visits and expressed his comments on Tibet and China’s policy. 
 
However, facing such wide concerns, China was not forced to adjust its position but 
instead responded in a perfunctory manner. Beijing took several actions to respond to 
international concerns. For example, the principle of sovereign equality was often 
raised by Beijing, who called for non-interference with Tibet-related affairs as it is a 
Chinese domestic affair. Elsewhere, in the case of the 14th March incident, by 
acknowledging the high degree of international pressure, Beijing held dialogues with 
representatives of the Dalai Lama though the authority insisted on every measure it 
imposed without additional steps. In association with this, the Chinese government 
tended to resort to a diplomatic rhetoric that called for the promotion of bilateral 
friendship between the two peoples through cooperation rather than criticism of each 
other. The politico-economic clout was utilised to deter external assistance to Tibet. 
For instance, when learning about the Dalai Lama’s EU-visit and meeting with the 
French President Sarkozy, who was also serving as EU President at the time in Poland 
in late November 2008, Beijing announced cancellation of the EU-China Summit, 
scheduled to be held on the 1st of December of the same year.739  
 
The insight of Mylonas can be drawn here to explain Beijing’s behaviour. According 
to his perspective, when there is an external patron actor towards the domestic societal 
group who is in conflict with its home state, the state’s assertion and adoption of 
suppression tends to be evident. In particular, this phenomenon tends to be fiercer 
when the home state is holding a revisionist status.740 In this case, Mylona argued that 
the rise of China and its action towards Tibet should be applied.  
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Warren Smith’s comment on China’s long-term skepticism to international concerns 
on Tibet may also be useful to support this point. He pointed out that the Chinese 
authorities often regarded these concerns as commitment for deterring China’s rise. 
Given such presumption, Beijing thereby tended to deny and resist foreign criticisms 
or opinions.741  
 
The former Party Secretary of the TAR Zhang Qingli’s statement may provide some 
clarity. In the CCP’s journal Qiu Shi of 2009, he explicitly claimed that Tibet is a 
‘battlefield between China and the international anti-Chinese force.’ He described 
most of these foreign comments and suggestions as ‘the hostile force’s aim at 
disintegrating Chinese territory through the Tibetan issue.’742   
 
Facing Beijing’s insistence, many governments often chose not to collide with China 
because of Tibet, giving different contexts and reasons. While many European leaders 
chose not to attend the opening ceremony due to Beijing’s crackdown of Tibetan 
demonstrations, more than 80 representatives of states and governments were present 
and the attendance created a new record.  
 
In summary, China’s sovereignty over Tibet was not challenged. However, Beijing 
still kept eyes on powerful state statements and actions. This chapter now selects cases 
within the US, UK and India and briefly charts their engagement with the Tibetan 
issue with China in the post-2000 era. 
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US Government: Administration and Congress  
Among these wide governmental supports to the Dalai Lama, the US serves as one of 
the most important actors. While the US Administration has always been consistent 
with its official position towards the PRC, accepting Tibet as part of Chinese territory, 
the occasional meetings between the President, Secretary of State, senior officials and 
the Dalai Lama promoted the Tibetan issue. The making of Tibetan-related resolutions 
and laws by the US Congresses also created a powerful effect.  
 
In the Bush presidency, some measures posing pro-Tibetan implication were 
committed. Inheriting the legacy of the former Clinton Administration, President 
George W. Bush similarly adopted an active stance on the Tibetan issue.743 The 
President publicly met with the Dalai Lama at least four times (2001, 2003, 2005, and 
2007). On many occasions, he encouraged the establishment and direct dialogue 
between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. In October 2001, during his attendance at the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, Bush spoke about the Tibetan 
issue to Jiang Zemin.744 During his visit to China in 2005, Bush again explicitly urged 
the necessity of improvements of religious freedom and human rights with the Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao and the President Hu Jintao, and called for their engagement with 
the Dalai Lama and his representatives. In 2006, similar suggestions were raised again 
when Hu Jintao visited Washington. All these signaled the importance of Tibet in the 
Bush Administration’s China policy. 
 
A significant legislation within the US government’s Tibet policy after 2000 was the 
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Tibetan Policy Act (TPA), which included the H.R. 1646, Foreign Relations 
Authorisation Act of Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228), enacted by President Bush on 
the 30th of September 2002. 745  Accordingly, this Act provided a variety of 
aid-Tibetan institutions “to support the aspirations of the Tibetan people to safeguard 
their distinct identity.” This Act suggested and legalised that the President and 
Secretary of State should conduct steps to engage the Chinese authorities into dialogue 
with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and to ensure the implementation of the 
agreement, when such an agreement is reached. In addition, an annual report 
concerning actions taken by the President and Secretary of State and the status of the 
Beijing-Dharamsala negotiation shall be provided. Moreover, the TPA established a 
position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues affiliated to the Department of State. 
This was an advanced institutionalisation of the position originally designed by the 
Secretary of State in 1997.  
 
The essential objective of the Special Coordinator is to “promote substantive dialogue 
between the government of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives.” The main duties of the Special Coordinator include “coordinate the 
United States Government policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet” and 
“vigorously promote the policy of seeking to protect the distinct religious, cultural, 
linguistic, and national identity of Tibet, and pressing for improved respect for human 
rights.” There are other specific contents within the TPA, including economic 
development, environmental protection, release of political prisoners in Tibet, and a 
proposed establishment of a State Department office in Lhasa. Considering its 
comprehensive characteristics, the creation of the TPA represented a practical 
initiative to support Tibet but avoided direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty.   
                                                     




The US Congress also conducted a number of appropriations to fund pro-Tibetan 
programmes. These programmes included assistance to the NGOs that work for 
Tibetan communities in China, academic and skill-based exchange for Tibetans in 
China, Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; Tibetan-language broadcasts, and a 
wide range of assisting projects for Tibetan refugees in South Asia.746 Most of them 
were the continuation or expansion of the previous projects made since the 1990s. In 
2006, the 109th Congress passed legislation to award the Dalai Lama a Congressional 
Gold Medal in recognition of his international status and accomplishments. While this 
decision subsequently provoked criticism from Beijing, President Bush finally agreed 
with this proposal and attended the awarding ceremony on 17th October 2007.747  
 
As an overview, the commitments from the US government as a whole has kept the 
Tibetan issue active and raised Chinese doubt. However, it is noticed by scholarly 
literature, the US Administration and Congress often demonstrated a nuanced 
understanding regarding China and Tibet.748 The US administration is more coherent 
in the position that ‘Tibet is a part of China’. President Obama explicitly and 
repeatedly expressed that the US government does not support the independence of 
Tibet to the Dalai Lama in their meeting of 2010.749 However, with regard to the 
standpoint of Congresses, the scenario is more complex.  
 
As Lawrence pointed out, an inconsistency in Congress’ statements and actions 
existed in relation to Tibet. In some cases, the congressional legislation sought to 
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distinguish Tibet and China, and even termed it as an ‘occupied country’. For example, 
with the appropriation of Tibetan refugees, the TPA narrated them as people “who 
have fled Chinese occupied Tibet.” In the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 
2003 (P.L. 108-7), the Congress also individually lists China and Tibet, implying that 
they are separate political entities.750 On the other hand, in some cases, Congress 
appeared to accept a status for Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. 
However, entering the post-2000 era, Congresses’ stance was further congruent and 
recognised Tibet as part of China. For example, in the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-113), Tibet was termed as “minority areas” of China. Similarly, in 
P.L. 108-7 (2003), P.L. 108-199 (2004), P.L. 108-447 (2004), P.L. 109-102 (2005), P.L. 
110-161 (2007), P.L. 111-8 (2009), P.L. 111-117 (2009), P.L. 112-74 (2011), and P.L. 
113-76 (2014), they all referred to Tibet and Tibetans as “Tibetan communities in the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China.”751 
 
Great Britain’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over Tibet 
Historically speaking, Great Britain was a leading actor in promoting a special status 
for Tibet, in that it only recognised China’s suzerainty over it during the colonial 
period. After building formal relations with Beijing, London adopted this ambiguous 
position for a long time and avoided any direct challenges to the PRC’s sovereignty 
within its official statements.752 However, a ministerial written statement, dated on 
the 29th of October 2008, publicly showed that Great Britain adjusted its stance. 
David Miliband, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
confirmed the British government’s stance by stating that the UK government did not 
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support Tibet, other than concerns on human rights issues. This statement also 
clarified the reason for the UK government’s adaptation in which it suggested that the 
UK did take a special position towards China in the early 20th century. It only 
recognised China’s suzerainty over Tibet but this was due to the geopolitical context 
at the time. However, with regard to the fact that the condition did not exist any more, 
such a position was ‘outdated’. Miliband contended:   
 
 
Some have used this to cast doubt on the aims we are pursuing and to claim that 
we are denying Chinese sovereignty over a large part of its own territory. We 
have made it clear to the Chinese Government, and publicly, that we do not 
support Tibetan independence. Like every other EU member state, and the 
United States, we regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. Our 
interest is in long-term stability, which can only be achieved through respect for 
human rights and greater autonomy for the Tibetans.753 
 
 
This statement clearly presented an insight of realpolitik adopted by the UK 
government that it did not intend to support separatism in China. It demonstrated that 
this European major actor ended its ambiguity on Tibet and for the first time, it 
accepted China’s sovereign assertion. Yet it insisted on its high concern on normative 
values in this statement.754 Importantly, this view also reflected that Great Britain 
displayed a friendly gesture to the rise of China and provided it with diplomatic 
                                                     
753 Parliament of UK, “Written Ministerial Statements,” October 29, 2008. 





Sino-Indian statements and Tibet  
A previous chapter suggested that a great body of scholarly literature indicated that 
Tibet occupies a significant role in Sino-Indian relations with regard to the border 
issue.756 India is the long-term host to the Dalai Lama, tolerant of the TGIE, facilites 
Tibetan cultural apparatus and is a tremendous material support.Despite keeping a low 
profile, accounts for a suspension of Beijing and to a large extent made a complicated 
triangle relationship in association to this border dispute.757  
 
While having recognised China’s sovereignty over Tibet by referring to it as ‘Tibet 
Region of China’ in the joint Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, New Delhi’s assertion 
on the Tibet/China-India border, which was delimited by the 13th Dalai Lama’s 
Tibetan government and British India at Simla Conference in 1914, was not accepted 
by Beijing. Thereafter, when the agreement of 1954 expired in 1962, a question was 
then raised whether the Indian government still adopted the same standpoint towards 
the status of Tibet. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 had triggered frontier conflicts and 
shadowed bilateral interactions. Both parties resumed diplomacy since the late 1970s, 
though the border dispute still waits to be settled. When the Dalai Lama visited the 
Tawang district or other territory-disputed areas, tension was evident.758 Moreover, 
the military presence on the Line of Actual Control—either from the People’s 
Liberation Army or the Indian Armed Forces–often caused concern.   
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The triangular relationship between Beijing, Dharamsala, and New Delhi changed 
after 2000. In June 2003, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpaye, committed a 
joint declaration entitled Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation 
between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China with Chinese 
leaders during his visit to China. For the sake of creating a friendly environment for 
mutual cooperation, Beijing and New Delhi made several important statements to fit 
the interests of the counterpart. Significantly, Vajpayee recognised that ‘the Tibet 
Autonomous Region is part of the People’s Republic of China’s territory and as a 
reciprocal action, the Chinese government recognised India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. 
Meanwhile, Vajpayee also committed a disallowance of Tibetans’ engagement in 
anti-Chinese activities in India.759 These points were subsequently reaffirmed by a 
further joint statement of Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the 
Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question when Wen Jiabao conducted his 
return-visit to India in 2005,760 and the Sino-Indian joint declaration in 2006 during 
Hu Jintao’s visit.761 2006 was also highlighted as the ‘India-China Friendship Year.’ 
Viewing the increasing figures in various areas, the former Indian Minister of Rural 
Development, Jairam Ramesh, even coined the term ‘Chindia’ to describe the bilateral 
convergence. Following these statements, two more joint declarations were made in 
2008 and 2010 during meetings between Chinese and Indian leaders.762 
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To the present day, these joint declarations reached by Beijing and New Delhi after 
2000, have consolidated China’s ‘legal’ control in Tibet. In order to build a stable 
relationship with its counterpart, New Delhi adopted a low profile accommodating the 




This chapter contends that the high-uncertainty security scenario is manifested as the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship in the post-2000 era. Mainly, the conflictual dynamics were 
from China’s domestic environment. While many states expressed concerns for Tibet 
in this decade, during the 14 march Incident in particular, they did not demonstrate 
further supportive gestures.  
 
As presented, with its growing power, the Chinese authorities exerted numerous 
means, covering intensive and extensive modernisation projects as well as harsh 
controls to achieve its nation-building project in Tibet. Indeed, these impositions were 
driven by a mind of national securitisation. The Chinese policies in Tibet was not 
isolated and occurred in other regions of China. Rather, an occurrence of debate 
among academics and policy makers over the second generation of ethnic 
identification was a reflection of this background.763  
 
The accomplishment of economic growth was prominent in the improvement of local 
conditions, but — due to the biased negative conditions — an environment pervading 
                                                     
763 Rong Ma, “Lijie Minzu Guanxi De Xinsilu: Shaoshu Minzu Wenti De Qu-zhengzhihua,” Journal of 
Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 41, no. 6 (2004): 122-133. 
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uncertainty and fear of identity loss by Tibetans was created. Local tensions and 
conflicts appeared.  
 
Examining the burgeoned grievance across Tibetan regions, other than the TAR, this 
chapter highlights that Beijing’s commitments rendered dynamics of backlash and 
anti-government and even anti-China sentiment. This cyclic repression-demonstration 
relationship thus indicates the failure of China’s commitment and implies that China 
must adapt its current policy in a more inclusive way in order to build national identity, 
if the Tibetan issue and broader different ethnic tensions is to be peacefully and 
permanently resolved in the long run. Beijing’s power asymmetrically surpasses Tibet. 
Beijing could repress its opponents and defend its position with its stronger and 
constantly increasing economic and political foundations but a consolidated national 







This thesis sought to answer a question: How have Sino-Tibetan relations become 
increasingly tense and confrontational? To answer this question, it has analysed 
Sino-Tibetan interactions focusing on the development of the Tibetan issue and 
China’s Tibet policy as well as selected events that occurred in Tibet from 1949 to 
2012. This dissertation applies security dilemma theory, as a meso-level analytical 
framework integrating the factors of state-led modernisation and international 
intervention to analyse the dilemmatic scenarios. This dissertation examines causation 
and correlation over the conflicts. To make it clear, this dissertation not only 
investigates conflict as the outcome, but also reflects on conditions and underlies 
historical contexts creating peace and conflicts. This dissertation develops two types 
of societal dilemmas: low-uncertainty societal dilemma and high-uncertainty societal 
dilemma, to configure scenarios and dynamics between coexistence and violent 
confrontation. Having used it to analyse our cases, this thesis emphasises the 
dynamics to conflict mitigation within Sino-Tibetan interactions. Consequently, 
conflict is not argued as an inevitable consequence. Instead, escaping the predicament 
and peaceful resolution is workable. 
 
Through a review of existing literature, this thesis identifies two main knowledge gaps. 
First of all, a large body of previous studies has been limited with regard to the 
underutilising of Chinese language sources and thus resulted in the biased 
interpretation of the Chinese perspective and understanding of historical detail. 
Secondly, insight offered by conflict theory is inadequate in studying this theme. 
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While there have been many valuable and useful works contributed by various 
disciplines, research that can provide a concise theoretical explanation is insufficient.  
 
To fill these gaps, the thesis takes several steps. Firstly, it integrates more declassified 
Chinese archives and other first-hand material by accessing Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and a periodical Internal Reference collected in the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong as well as plenty of edited volumes and collections published in China. 
Anonymous interviews and field work in China were conducted. In addition, this 
thesis accessed the UK National Archives for more information.  
 
Secondly, this thesis turns to security dilemma theory. In chapter two, this thesis 
justified its advantages. For those who have adopted the rational choice approach, the 
structuralist arguments such as nationalism narrative, and socio-economic conditions 
in the studies, this research recognises their merits yet also notes their limitations 
regarding fragmentation and considers them to be to some extent, contradictory.  
 
By employing these methods above, this thesis presents an argument that contains the 
standpoints of Chinese and Tibetans, focuses on the agent level of interaction, and 
integrates material and psychological bases of conflict. It demonstrates a more 
balanced and sympathetic angle to consider the conflict. This chapter recapitulates 
findings and implications from below. 
 
Thesis Findings and Discussions  
 
First of all, to answer the central question, this thesis argues that the increasingly tense 
and confrontational Sino-Tibetan relations are the outcome of contextual bilateral 
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interactions caused by a pervasive sense of uncertainty and the mechanism of the 
security dilemma, within which both the Chinese authorities and Tibetans perceive 
behaviours from the opposite side as threats. This thesis finds that as either side adopts 
means only aimed at defending and securising their self-defined society through 
various forms, such as increased commitment of intensive national integration and for 
a desire for a high degree of autonomy for Tibetan society, a sense of uncertainty 
would emerge and then activate tension and conflict through a spiral interaction.  
 
At different times, negotiations were conducted in order to dissolve the divisions. 
However, as analysed, given that the demands were always associated with elements 
implicating danger to the societal securities of both sides, the formulated uncertainty 
only hindered the progress reaching little and falling into a stalemate. 
 
In addition, this thesis observes that factors of state-led modernisation and 
international intervention, respectively and together, can result in societal dilemmas.  
 
The Sino-Tibetan interactions affected by the two variables above featured outcomes 
between coexistence and violent confrontation. This finding not only helps to answer 
the central question, but also sheds more lights on questions regarding Sino-Tibetan 
interactions and issues of identity politics as well as possible resolutions to the 
conflict. 
 
Chapter three, four, and five touched upon the scenario of low-uncertainty societal 
dilemma, presenting the Sino-Tibetan interactional outcome of harmony. In this 
examination, the periods of Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC in the early 1950s and 
the Sino-Tibetan relationship in the mid-1970s-1980s, manifest conspicuous signals of 
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coexistence. This outcome is arguably affected by the conditions that the Chinese 
government adopted a modest standpoint of modernisation construction towards Tibet. 
Also, the aspect that Beijing was situated in a positive and stable international 
environment was important.  
 
On the other side, this thesis discovers that a perception of threat can be provoked, 
initially from a sense of uncertainty and then the security dilemma. The scenario of 
high-uncertainty societal dilemma is identified in chapter three, four, five and six. 
Such configuration is identified from Sino-Tibetan interactions in the mid-1950s and 
the early-60s and the late-1980s-90s as well as the post-2000 era when the Chinese 
authority launched radical modernisation campaigns. As also shown, the resulting 
question and resistance from Tibetans triggered a tougher reaction from the Chinese 
which together led to the repetition of a vicious circle. Meanwhile, the external 
assistance e.g. mainly from the Chinese rivals, including Taiwan and the US and the 
distinct states towards Tibet at different times, often gave rise to the Chinese sense of 
insecurity, who thereafter enhanced modernisation along with local control as its 
defensive countermeasure. Consequently, the increased mutual threat perceptions and 
physical interactions went through a spiral process that eventually led to the outbreak 
of conflicts. Based on the specific contexts, the violence manifested different degrees 
in these periods.  
 
To be explicit, the late-1950s demonstrated a picture of intense conflict; both the late 
1980s and post-2000s era presented a degree between intermediate conflict and 
conflict. The situations of early-1950s and late-1970s presented the least violent 




This thesis identifies the era of the Cultural Revolution as the type of real security 
threat given the absolute confrontation. It regards the Sino-Tibetan relationship at the 
time as an exception to security dilemma.  
 
In addition to drawing the points above, this thesis presents some reflections worthy of 
further exploration. Firstly, this thesis highlights the dynamic evolution of the 
Sino-Tibetan relationship and highlights the role of actions and perceptions. To be 
explicit, from the examination of the bilateral relationship at the agential level the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict is not regarded as an inevitable consequence nor is it a zero-sum 
game. While conflicts frequently occurred, the empirical analysis in this thesis still 
uncovers that dynamics to mitigation existed. This discovery provides academic 
researchers and peace workers with another way of interpreting history and exploring 
possibilities of conflict resolutions.  
 
For another, this research can serve as contributing to the literature of modernisation 
studies. This research has pointed out that state-led modernisation is conducive to the 
national integration, however, the formation and consolidation of ‘national identity’ is 
not a lineal and smooth process. In our examinations, the state’s intensive 
commitments, in particular the post-1990s, resulted in great concerns about societal 
survival within Tibetan society. With its rising state capacity, the Chinese state only 
kept strengthening such commitment for national integration and the sense of 
uncertainty emerged and spread and turned to be antagonistic to the state. Our 
research thus demonstrates that modernisation contains contradictory dynamics in 
terms of nation-building. A longer period of observation to Tibet and testing more 




Finally, the presence of external assistance is addressed to have impacts on 
Sino-Tibetan relations. Very often, as Tibetans received external assistance which was 
interpreted as a conspiracy against Beijing, the bilateral relationship tended to 
deteriorate and tension and conflict easily escalated. However, at some points, this 
thesis also observes that Sino-Tibetan relations can be relatively peaceful under such 
condition and that Beijing did not perceive Tibetans as having a certain degree of 
external help as a potential threat. Based on this, researchers might further analyse 




What we have examined from the previous chapters offer a set of policy suggestions. 
The suggestions are not only presented to the Chinese state but also to those involved 
more broadly in ethnic conflicts. This thesis suggests that the state 
government/nation-builder should bear greater responsibility in ethnic conflict and the 
state should balance its securitisation of societal identity and minority group’s concern 
over societal identity. The state actor is highlighted given the often asymmetric feature 
between the state and its ethnic minority in the conflict. Viewing its overall capacity 
and powers, the state government is bound to have more resources and agency to 
create viable circumstance for solving the Tibetan issue.  
 
Bearing Minority Concerns in Mind 
Firstly, this thesis suggests that the state should be sensitive to the concerned areas of 
minority groups, in terms of nation-building and national integration in particular. In 
many countries, the states have empowered minority groups with local autonomy, 
allowing the latter to implement self-rule. While Beijing claims that it has provided 
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such rights, many Tibetans refute this based on Chinese authoritarian politics along 
with complex interactions between local government and its people. The Dalai Lama 
and the CTA based on this point keep demanding for ‘genuine autonomy’. This has 
been a long-term debate and Beijing perceives Tibetan behaviours as a pursuit for 
independence.  
 
It can be understandable that notions of self-rule or high degree of autonomy, in 
whatever forms, suggested by minority groups would alarm the state actor which is 
also sensitive to them as well. After all, a demand for substantial autonomy or turning 
to de facto independence would provoke the state’s deep concern on the state’s 
disintegration and ethnic separatism. However, it must be noted that the state’s 
massive and intensive modernisation construction as well as nation-building agenda 
easily renders a sense of uncertainty to its minority groups. In this thesis’s empirical 
examinations, the greater the financial costs and political capital invested in 
committing the CCP-defined Chinese national identity, and the higher its expectations 
and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the stronger the CCP's sense 
of insecurity after each failure. And, paradoxically, higher pressure is put on the 
government to achieve perfect nation-building by the ruling authority itself. Beijing’s 
often compelling constraints, although being justified in the name of securitilisation, 
radicalise the Tibetan sense of insecurity and their resistance. 
 
In addition, with an ultimate goal of an increasing probability of mitigation, this thesis 
suggests that the state should take the minority group’s concerns into account when 
coming up with well-being conditions improvement for them. In its relations, the 
proposed aspects should not only be focused on economic conditions. Rather, 
sensitive areas including culture and ethnic memory etc. must be considered and 
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prioritised. In relation to this, respect and recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity 
are required. This standpoint is also in line with the idea of asymmetric conflict 
studies. As literature suggests, conflict would only be appropriately resolved relying 
on communication and trust as well as the stronger actor’s recognition of the weaker’s 
autonomy.764 
 
Improving the state-ethnic group’s mutual trust should be kept in mind of the 
policy-makers that they should pay attention to the political and cultural sensibilities 
while proposing its policies for all minority groups. Various aspects of inequality, in 
particular social and economic dimensions between the majority and minority groups 
also need to be addressed.  
 
Understanding the logic of uncertainty and the broader sense of fear and insecurity is 
crucial. Such understanding could help the involved actors in ethnic conflicts in both 
the domestic context and international environment to prevent confrontation, 
encourage accommodation and achieve peace. In short, sensibility and sensitivity 
should be highlighted in building a positive relationship. 
 
Constructing International Alliance 
To the extent of international politics, this thesis suggests that the state should prevent 
external intervention by constructing a positive environment for itself. From previous 
studies and the empirical chapters, the thesis demonstrated that under the condition 
that a minority group with overseas ties or external support tends to be mobilised and 
demands more substantial rights from its home state. In particular, when external 
                                                     
764 Womack, China among Unequals: Asymmetric Foreign Relationships in Asia (World Scientific, 2010), 
85-86; “Resolving Asymmetric Stalemate: the Case of the Tibet Question,” Journal of Contemporary 
China 16, no. 52 (2007): 457-460. 
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support to minorities increase, the demands from the minority group often raise as 
well. In this way, a triangular relationship among the minority group, its received 
degree of potential external support, and the nationalising home government, would 
shape their relationship patterns and thereafter the scenario of security dilemma. In 
line with this thinking, remaining in a positive relation with external powers should be 
pursued by the state.  
 
However, this thesis does not suggest cutting any form of interaction between the 
ethnic group and the external actor. Rather, it suggests that the state and the minority 
should reach a consensus over certain areas and the minority should be allowed to 
have international spaces. It would be truculent if the state denies any existence of 
international space or from receiving any form of external facilitation for the minority 
group. By doing this, the behaviour would only raise external sympathy for the 
minority and it does not help to improve the home state-minority relationship. In the 
recent decade, as Beijing largely took economic means as tools to restrict and 
discourage foreign administrations from showing concerns on Tibet, and all time 
seemed to be overreactive by criticising foreign officials when they met with the Dalai 
Lama on a public occasion, Beijing’s standpoint only received less support 
internationally. This way of adoption would be hard to mitigate tension. Rather, 
tension is often ratcheted up furthermore.  
 
An implication from this thesis is that the state must be tolerant and allow reasonable 
space for the minority group. Delineating a mutually acceptable area and let the 
minority group enjoy its freedom would be helpful and a key step to improve the 






This dissertation draws on the theoretical insight from security dilemma theory and 
emphasises the core concept of uncertainty. It also addresses the factors of state-led 
modernisation and international intervention in influencing the emergence of ethnic 
tension and confrontation. For the future, researchers can advance the research about 
Tibetan issue based on this thesis, and explore the role of other factors. This thesis 
suggests that researchers can further probe into the correlation between different 
variables and the security dilemma and sense of uncertainty. As noted before, while 
the distinguished factors in this thesis can arguably affect the situations of security 
dilemma in terms of the onset and degree of violence, the factors are not exclusively 
sufficient conditions, nor are they the only necessary factors.  
 
Meanwhile, it is without doubt that knowledge of this thesis is with its limitations. It 
meets challenges from both the macro- and micro- levels, which leave space for the 
future research. Firstly, having made efforts to dig into deeper understanding of ethnic 
conflict in Tibet, this thesis needs to get more understandings at the broader PRC 
national level. This thesis did not compare Tibet with other ethnic regions of China so 
a horizontal relationship between the Tibetan case and other minorities is unclear. 
Whether they have altogether, and how they constitute a single factor influencing 
Beijing’s ethnic policy are not fully analysed. In addition, this thesis may also be 
limited with regard to a nuanced picture at the local level. Due to various barriers, the 
author was unable to conduct a satisfactory time of field research in Tibet. The field 
work was conducted only in Lhasa but no other districts. In this way, an understanding 
of manifestation of security dilemma at the local level can further support the 




Overall, this thesis has contributed to research in the sense that it comprehensively 
covers structural and agential aspects of ethnic conflict, but one development towards 
either a broader picture or a minor one would be advantageous. It is pointed out that 
there are multiple actors and diverse perspectives within these levels. Such space for 
future research is thus worth considering 
 
To fill the acknowledged gaps, the author would like to pay attention to areas beyond 
Tibet in the next project. Over the past years since the Chinese president Xi took 
office in 2012, it can be seen that tensions in Tibet continue. With the CCP’s 
increasing strengthening of local control, the subject of Tibet has become more 
politically sensitive. Furthermore, Beijing’s governance in other ethnic autonomous 
regions, Xinjiang in particular, and Beijing’s relationship with Hong Kong and Taiwan 
is more destabilised than before. Pictures and slogans regarding securitisation of the 
Chinese nation and the state are conspicuous, and the insecure sense is pervasive 
throughout the Chinese state. This has raised questions about the CCP’s practice in the 
domestic and international realms. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis plans further research on application and adaptation of 
security dilemma theory to examine cases in the Chinese periphery i.e. ethnic minority 
regions, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Indeed, the sovereign status of Taiwan is essentially 
different from others, but it has been targeted as part of Chinese territory by Beijing 
since 1949. Resembling these areas, Taiwan-related affairs are under the regulation of 
the Department of United Front Work of the CCP in China. From Beijing’s view, all 
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these areas touch on China’s ‘core interests’.765 Such line of thinking from Beijing 
can be discerned from our empirical studies. To this point, conducting a comparative 
study is workable. For the next project, the author will compare Chinese policies 
towards its periphery and at the same time explore the roles of nation-building and 
security dilemma.  
 
Finally, having studied the issue of ethnic conflict of Tibet, the author remains 
optimistic while being cautious about the future. He believes that conflict is not 
inevitable; however, the role of perception of uncertainty must be emphasised. Threats 
to one actor exists when the actor considers itself in danger, regardless of whether that 
is objectively the case or not. As Booth and Wheler remind us, the existence of 
uncertainty should not be possibly eradicated, but it is viable to carry out means to 
marginalise it.766  
 
If conflict can result from the logic of security dilemma, it implies that peace can also 
be achieved through mitigation of a sense of insecurity. Knowing the theory has 
helped us move forward in this first step. In this way, this thesis highlights the 
dynamics of empathy and inter-subjectivity within actor interactions. What matters is 
not only actions the involved actors claim to securitise for themselves, but also about 
what others would have perceived these actions and how they would respond. In this 
era that fake news increasingly builds walls of distrust among people and waves of 
populism are identified in different corners, a sense of uncertainty is growing 
everywhere. At this time, building constructive communications and enhancing 
mutual-understandings are significantly meaningful!     
                                                     
765 Edward Wong, “Security Law Suggests a Broadening of China's ‘Core Interests’,” New York Times, 
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